

# Soviet Union

## Political Affairs

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### **Influence of Public Opinion Reflected in 28th Party Congress**

91UN0199A Moscow PARTIYNAYA ZHIZN  
in Russian No 18, Sep 90 pp 23-28

[Article by Vladimir Boykov, deputy director of the CPSU Central Committee Academy of Social Sciences Sociological Research Center and doctor of philosophical sciences, and Zhan Toshchenko, vice-president of the Soviet Sociological Association and doctor of philosophical sciences: "In the Mirror of Sociological: So As Not To Be Like Jourdain"]

[Text] *The heated discussion about the party's role in perestroika and in society rages on. Joining in ever more actively are not only communists but also non-party members, with indictments of the party prompted by empty store shelves, domestic problems, a feeling of powerlessness and many more things. Perestroika, begun by initiative from above, has become a subject of intense struggle and the cause of millions of people. And they are demanding ever more stridently payment on the markers issued at the start of perestroika. Under these extreme conditions it is especially necessary to have objective analysis of the actual situation, projection of its future development, knowledge both of people's interests and of the things which are hampering realization of those interests, and a more clear-cut perception of the whole spectrum of political orientations and opinions which exist in society. And this assumes a different attitude than in the past toward sociology, a serious attitude toward it. The 28th CPSU Congress demonstrated precisely that interested attitude. The new Party Charter reflects the need party elective organs have for projections and sociological groundwork. At the congress itself a sociological service was established and functioned actively for the first time in the history of party congresses. Incidentally, among the delegates, to whom sociological materials were distributed, 57 percent concluded that the surveys helped the congress with its work; only two percent expressed the opposing viewpoint.*

*In view of all this we felt that it would be interesting and beneficial for party committees, party organizations, individual communists and readers of our journal to become familiar with the conclusions drawn by the CPSU Central Committee Academy of Social Sciences Sociological Research Center from a series of public opinion polls taken around the country and within the party last year. We feel that the Center's findings will make it possible in a way to look in a mirror which reflects people's moods and to understand their attitude toward the pressing issues of perestroika, the anatomy of the party's crisis and the 28th CPSU Congress' political rating. The following comments are based on materials gathered in the course of seven all-union studies, the findings of a survey of congress delegates and data from pre-congress and post-congress polls of the general public. The accuracy of their findings is attested to by the fact that the sociological projection of congress debates on key issues was borne out by events. The results of voting on the debated points in*

*the resolution and in the election of central party organs also coincided with the spectrum of opinions expressed in the survey forms.*

Essentially, the 28th CPSU Congress reflected society's moods. The assessment of the current situation given in the congress' programmatic statement "Toward Humane, Democratic Socialism" reflected people's opinion. This is borne out by sociological research. The emergency measures outlined by the congress for bringing the country out of its crisis, i.e. normalization of the consumer market within one-and-a-half to two years and steps to overcome inflation, lessen the urgency of a number of social problems and stop the present crime wave, are wholly in line with the sentiments of the public.

### **Real and Imagined Alarms**

One of the main causes of general alarm is the state of the economy. In the opinion of 66 percent of economic experts surveyed prior to the congress the economy is on the verge of collapse, and 30 percent feel that its position is difficult but still manageable. The same assessments were given by blue-collar workers, white-collar workers and collective farmers. According to data from an all-union survey conducted in February of last year the extremely negative assessments of the country's economic situation were fewer at that time by factors of two or three. The situation at enterprises has worsened sharply: in 1989 this assessment was given by nine percent of specialists, but now this figure is 67 percent.

The figures themselves confirm alarming compilations of state statistics. But part of the difference is that sociology, in contrast to official accounting, focuses its attention on the social aspect of the problem. Under its "magnifying glass" economic disarray is seen as a source of social tension.

Let us consider a specific example. The economic approach to assessment of the shadow economy focuses on its use of its accumulated capital, the material harm it causes, etc. From this standpoint discussions can make speculation seem like nothing more than a manifestation of ignorant people's naivete. Yet in social terms the shadow economy not only undermines economic reforms, it also represents a threat to the foundations of civil society and a source of social tension. It is not only indiscriminate shortweighting, shortchanging and concealment of goods in trade and speculation which serve as catalysts of social outrage. The black market has extended its reach to medicines and highly important social benefits and spiritual values: medical assistance, dental work, coaching, books and theater tickets. A total of 62 percent of those surveyed stated that they had been forced to pay bribes, and 51 percent said that they had entered into "one hand washes the other"-type relationships.

As studies indicate, worsening of widely prevalent economic ailments is resulting in skeptical attitudes toward the possibility of reform or solutions to the crisis.

Whereas, for example, at the start of economic reforms 41 percent of those surveyed counted on their success in the foreseeable future (the remainder did not express an opinion), in July of this year only 13 percent retained their former optimism.

The transition to market-based economic relationships is creating not only shortages of financial and physical resources, but also an extremely unfavorable psychological atmosphere in the socioeconomic realm. The impermissibility of exploitation, private enterprise and unemployment has become a stumbling block to reform. It was precisely for this reason, it appears, that many congress participants were not willing to accept the term "market-based relationships" without reservation.

It is not only the prospect of transition to the market but also many other innovations which are causing a shift in views. For decades our country has been attempting to make the transition from a multi-tiered economy to one that is completely nationalized, from political and ideological pluralism to barracks-like monotony. Now, after starting with affirmation of glasnost and pluralism of opinion, we are witnessing the initial emergence of a multiparty system and diversity in forms of property. However, there are still many people who are looking at the unfolding of events through the traditional "ideological spectacles," perceiving them as a rejection of socialism in favor of capitalism. Incidentally, 91 percent of the delegates surveyed and one-half of those who responded to the pre-congress survey of the general public feel that there are forces in our country which are pushing it toward a bourgeois system.

While voting in favor of the socialist choice, 84 percent of the congress participants surveyed agreed that it is necessary to develop the private sector of the economy. The public's attitude toward the private sector is still unstable: in January 1990 the idea of developing that sector had the support of 59 percent, while in March this number was 57 percent and in May and June approximately one-half of those surveyed.

Nonetheless the general trend toward reorientation of the mass consciousness is undoubtedly determined by increasing attention to denationalization of commercial activity. This is evident in attitudes toward agrarian reforms. For example, 60 percent of the public surveyed in June 1990 assessed collectivization of villages as a mistake. And in the post-congress survey 42 percent of urban and rural residents alike were not opposed to the free sale of land (among CPSU members this figure was 38 percent, and among non-party members 55 percent).

But there are also many people opposed to private enterprise, according to the findings of various polls approximately 20-30 percent. In many people's minds the "harmful" cooperative member is the present image of the private entrepreneur. Antipathy toward cooperatives has long been expressed in polls and is intensifying. They as well as tenant farmers in rural areas are opposed in many regions not only by modern-day "Robin

Hoods" who are burning down stores and pigsties. There are also many public officials who are adamantly opposed to the very idea of future "kulaks" and "exploiters."

There are many contradictions in the public's mind, and it is important to investigate these thoroughly. Thus, while essentially favoring the transition to a market-based economy, one-half of those surveyed in April and May 1990 recommend that we maintain and expand rationing of goods and price freezes. The pressure of shortages and inflation, the bitter memory of past economic experiments and the expectation of negative effects from a transition to the market in unison are prompting people to make this choice (though it is an appalling one from an economic standpoint).

Yet many people have lost their former hopes of rapid success in perestroika, and not just in connection with economic problems. Alarm at the increase in crime was expressed by 52 percent of those surveyed in June 1990, while 52 percent expressed concern over environmental degradation, 46 percent over worsening of inter-ethnic conflicts, and 42 percent over the lack of a mechanism of social protection for people. In comparison with the findings of a poll conducted in February of this year these figures have risen by 15-20 percent. This alone has caused a sharp increase in social tension in society. The high level of such tension in our country was noted by 95 percent of those responding to the survey, while 71 percent noted a high level of tension in their own cities. Furthermore, 80 percent felt that the situation in our country is fraught with conflicts.

All this has had an effect on people's political activism. Whereas in June of last year 78 percent of the public described themselves as keenly interested in the goings-on in the political "kitchen," by June of this year this figure had fallen to 35 percent. The desire to participate directly in the work of local government organs was noted by even fewer people, only 10-14 percent. Concern that political struggle will turn into civil war in the future has been observed.

Apathy is also caused by the fact that political battles often appear to people to be nothing more than cynical political machinations. It is ordinary people who are forgotten in such battles. This is confirmed by answers to a survey question about who can protect the "common man" asked in November 1989 and in March and June 1990. Over one-half of the blue-collar workers, collective farmers and white-collar workers (53 percent) do not expect anyone's help with their difficult living conditions. The ineffectiveness of government is reflected in a loss of confidence in virtually all of its institutions. The USSR Supreme Soviet, respondents feel, is passing laws that do not work. Thus, laws on property, on leases and on income tax to one degree or another met with support from approximately one-third of respondents in a June 1990 survey, with one-tenth of them disapproving and the majority simply unfamiliar with the laws. Public opinion regarding our country's state organs is no better:



71 percent of those surveyed feel that their officials are not concerned about "simple" people.

The increase in public confidence in local soviets which was observed just prior to the election of new soviets is also disappearing. In June 1990 only one person in five surveyed stated that power in his or her rayon (or city) was in the hands of soviets. It should be noted that in the public's mind soviets and party committees are often perceived as rival institutions of political and administrative power. This was clear in the findings of a survey of delegates at the founding congress of the RSFSR Communist Party. Of them, 45 percent stated that relations between party organs and the renewed soviets have worsened. It is clear that in the final analysis this state of rivalry is harmful to all, and that above all it is harmful to perestroika and people's interests.

The state of public opinion is affected not only by the ups and downs of everyday life. The breakdown of former views of Soviet society is also a highly important factor in the way the public mind works. Now (according to the findings of a survey taken in June of this year) only one person in four "votes" to keep statements about the communist future in programmatic documents. Of course, this is only an average: among party officials 70 percent support such statements, while only 34 percent of retirees do, and only 13 percent of persons working in cooperatives. Does that mean that the "specter of communism" has been pushed aside by the "boons of capitalism"? Not at all, according to our findings. Essentially an ideological "vacuum" has now formed in people's minds. Against this backdrop we are witnessing the demise of former optimism, and many people are losing their sense of patriotism and becoming indifferent toward their homeland.

The public consciousness is laden with contradictions. On the one hand, people are opposed to levelling. On the other, they have grown accustomed to the effects of levelling and are infected with the mindset of the *Lumpenproletariat*. They are seldom concerned over high tax rates on large incomes, assuming that they could never have that kind of income. In their opinion the "fat cats" should be shaken down.

Today few people are receptive to programs which promise prosperity in the distant future. Hence to a large extent the increasing influence of populism.

#### **A Party of Power, or of an Idea**

Its ability to reach the public consciousness, which has become extremely contradictory today, and to find a solution to our country's state of crisis to a large extent determines the CPSU's right to political leadership in society. However, realization of this and the transition to new requirements is proceeding too slowly and with well-practiced motions. The reason for this is not only an old way of thinking on the part of party officials, something which has received the greatest amount of criticism. Previous work methods are still prevalent. The commonly-used term "vanguard role" is still interpreted

to mean a "leading role" for the party. The influence of the CPSU's ideological principles is decreasing. Thus, promotion of the idea of perestroika in the party's name at first sharply increased the people's confidence in the party and shook up the party itself. In 1986 over 80 percent of the people surveyed approved of the work being done by party organizations. Yet by June 1989 35 percent of working people, including 25 percent of CPSU members, said that they had lost hope in the party's ability to renew itself.

A new wave of confidence arose in connection with the publication of the CPSU Central Committee Platform for the 28th Party Congress. An all-union poll conducted soon after the publication of this platform indicated that 39 percent of the public had changed their attitude toward the party in a positive way. However, after a while the level of support once again began to decline, as some statements in the draft were perceived as applying solely to the party.

The lag of theory behind perestroika practice combined with growing political pluralism resulted in unprecedented disillusionment on the part of many CPSU members with the ideals of socialism and its sources and made many of these communists reconsider established standards of party life. In the public's mind the October Revolution and Lenin's image began to grow dim, negative attitudes toward the principles of democratic centralism increased, and the idea of establishing factions within the CPSU became more attractive. By failing to see this we are like Moliere's Jourdain, who suddenly realized that his whole life he had been speaking in prose.

It is clear that since the CPSU has groups adhering to Marxist fundamentalism and to moderate and extreme radicalism attempts to achieve unity through purely organizational measures alone is pointless today. This would merely meet with incomprehension in a number of social groups. For example, the engineering and technical intelligentsia, among which there are especially many supporters of social democratic ideas.

We need concepts capable of uniting party members on the most fundamental issues. And they can be brought up and be grasped by people's minds only through discussions. Useful experience in this regard was provided by the partywide pre-congress discussion. The Program Statement and the Party Charter adopted by the 28th CPSU Congress only stood to gain by the fact that a democratic discussion had taken place. And the existence of alternative versions of these documents made it possible to test the strength of various ideas. It is also of some importance that we have learned the skill of achieving consensus between communists' positions.

Practical experience demonstrates the correctness of Lenin's statement that organization without ideology is also without thought. It will give rise only to bureaucracy and alienation. In order to consolidate the party around

the ideas of perestroika it is essential at the very minimum for CPSU members to be interested in communicating with each other. However, only 13 percent of those surveyed reported that they had begun to work more actively in their own party organization. Only 26 percent of CPSU members were counting on participation and real aid from their party organization if they found themselves in a difficult situation. And 32 percent said that they were frank and sincere with their comrades in the organization when they discussed ideological problems. An equal number indicated that they valued the opinions of their party comrades.

The absence of normal human relations within their party organizations was noted between five and ten times as often as the presence of relations based on intraparty comradeship expressed through common interests, mutual assistance and good will. The "upper" and "lower" levels, according to polls, are even more alienated from one another than the party's horizontal structures.

Hardly anyone is happy with this state of affairs. It is also one reason for people quitting the party today. Beginning in 1989 the number of persons turning in their party membership cards began to rise. On the basis of studies done in June of this year it may be assumed that roughly one CPSU member in 10 is seriously considering quitting the party. The majority of these are blue-collar workers between the ages of 30 and 40.

It is no secret to anyone that the CPSU has long been the object of intense critical fire. One of the main targets has been and remains the apparatus of party committees, although they have undergone major (and in some cases undergone twice) changes in their composition and structure; this is evidence of the fact that the style and content of their work remain the same. Also alarming is the decline in the authority of party committee secretaries. According to materials gathered in the course of a study done in June of this year only one respondent in five regards the first secretary of a CPSU obkom (or kraykom) or raykom (gorkom) as authoritative. (For fairness' sake we should note that soviet, trade union and commercial officials are also not held in high esteem today.)

According to the findings of the pre-congress public opinion poll 50 percent of respondents (and 59 percent of CPSU members) favored elimination of party organizations in law enforcement organs. Approximately one-half of respondents were in favor of doing the same in labor collectives. Even among delegates to the 28th CPSU Congress, as indicated by a poll taken during the congress, there were quite a few individuals who supported the idea of depoliticizing law enforcement organs,

and 15 percent stated that party organizations should also be barred from labor collectives.

However, it should be noted that this is only opinion regarding the CPSU. Polls do not indicate any desire among people to consolidate in other parties, either. They are more attracted to non-party social and political movements, in which they see opportunities for self-expression. Evidently the rule which is typical of a number of Western countries is also manifesting itself in our country. That is, the attractiveness of political parties is waning at the same time that the influence of social and political movements is growing. What does this mean? The new parties which are presently striving to gain recognition in our country can hardly count on massive membership. In any event, only scattered individuals among those who have quit the CPSU intend to join any new party. This desire was expressed by only three percent of the total and by six percent among the humanitarian intelligentsia. Yet at the same time 51 percent of those surveyed regarded the ideas of Memorial as attractive, 45 percent were drawn to the Greens and 40 percent like the ideas of the Committee for Social Defense.

Yet despite all this **the CPSU remains an influential political force in people's eyes. Renewal of it and successful performance of the tasks which face it will help strengthen its authority. Much in this regard depends on achievement of an accord with all progressive new democratic movements on a common ideological and moral basis. The key to such an accord is socially attractive ideas.** This was the conclusion of an absolute majority of congress delegates. Only four percent of them feel that ideas will be lifeless without the support of authority. A majority realize that the ideology or force must be replaced by the force of ideology, the ideology of democracy.

#### **The 28th CPSU Congress: Thoughts and Conjectures**

Time will tell how this party congress will go down in history. Right now the important thing is to interpret its outcome. In this connection we must take note of this fact: previous congresses resounded with hosannas of praise. By contrast the latest congress often found itself under a hail of merciless criticism, something which is often interpreted as testimony to the CPSU's declining authority. The desire of the party's opponents to subject it to society's "gauntlet" is understandable, but their theses are very much groundless today.

One widespread conjecture is the statement that the congress delegates were overall more conservative than the party masses, and the latter more conservative than the country's population. Is that true? Let us take a look at the results of opinion polls taken among the general public, communists and delegates; these polls were conducted simultaneously in regard to key issues. The questions asked and the spectrum of replies to them in

percentages for each category of respondents look like this:

**What is Your Attitude Toward Development of the Private Sector of the Economy?**

	Non-Party Members	CPSU Members	Delegates
Should not be developed	15	12	12
Permissible on a small scale	41	56	73
Should pre-dominate	23	21	11
Unsure	21	11	2
No reply	—	—	2

**What is Your Attitude Toward Cooperatives?**

	Non-Party Members	CPSU Members	Delegates
Completely positive	4	8	4
Positive, but not in every way	43	52	61
Mainly negative	25	26	26
Completely negative	25	13	7
Unsure	2	1	—
No reply	1	—	2

**Only a Renewed, More Leftist and Younger Party is Capable of Leading the Country Along the Road to Serious Transformations.**

	Non-Party Members	CPSU Members	Delegates
Agree	39	61	83
Disagree	30	15	10
Unsure	31	22	4
No reply	—	2	3

**By Moving Toward the Market we are Moving Toward Fuller Realization of Socialism's Capabilities.**

	Non-Party Members	CPSU Members	Delegates
Fully in agreement	9	26	29
More in agreement than not	23	23	37
More in disagreement than not	25	12	15
Disagree	18	16	10
Unsure	25	19	7
No reply	—	4	2

As we can see, the delegates turned out to be more radically inclined than the party masses. And the views of the latter differed little from the views of non-party members.

A majority of the delegates came to the congress in hopes of making the kind of decisions which will help strengthen the party and overcome the crisis in our society. Yes, there were contradictory views among them. But discussion of the congress' Program Statement, which was thoroughly reworked in comparison to the CPSU Central Committee Platform for the Congress, played a significant role in radicalizing the sentiments of a majority of delegates.

The congress' central issue was ways of renewing the party. The decisions which were made sow hope, which is strengthened by the position of the great mass of delegates who spoke in favor of the party become more leftist and younger. At the congress a new view was developed on the correlation between social development goals and the means of achieving those goals. In response to the question: "Whose interests should be primary with regard to the drafting of state policy?" 81 percent of the delegates assigned priority to the interests of the individual above the interests of classes, nations or the state. Until quite recently this formulation was reversed.

The decisions made hardly need any commentary. But one thing should be underscored. Many points in the Program Statement adopted by the congress were not only brought fully into line with updated legislation, but were even more progressive in comparison with laws passed just recently, are adequate to the demands of social progress and open up broad prospects for initiative by party organizations.

There were problems on which the delegates' views differed from those of the general public. One of these was their attitude toward forms for the organization of agricultural production. This difference of opinion was revealed by comparison of materials gathered in the course of surveys of delegates attending the CPSU Agrarian Policy Section (470 people) and the general public. The following distribution of responses expressed in percentages of the total number polled were obtained:

	General Public	Delegates
Regarding the following as most promising:		
Kolkhozes	20	64
Sovkhozes	13	47
Individual farms	24	12

It seems that party committees and party organizations are being given food for thought by the findings of this survey, which was conducted after the conclusion of the

congress, at the end of July, in 19 regions of the country. A total of 1,726 people were surveyed, representing all the principal social groups. They were essentially the same people contacted by the Center prior to the congress.

They commented that they perceived the party forum as an important political event. This is confirmed by the following fact: just prior to the congress 67 percent of those surveyed intended to watch it on television, yet 88 percent actually watched it, and 35 percent did so on a regular basis. Another interesting fact: only seven percent of all the people surveyed cited the informal press as their source of information about the congress.

Attitudes toward the congress could not fail to be affected by worsening of the socioeconomic and political situation around the country and heightened expectations about its results. Of the people surveyed approximately one-third said that the congress had inspired in them hope and confidence, and 49 percent said that they were wholly or partially satisfied with its decisions. Many of the respondents commented that their opinion of the congress had been shaped by the numerous critical articles in the press. This once again confirms the responsibility which the press bears for objectivity in what it prints.

Many respondents, while acknowledging that the party is a leading political force, feel that the primary criterion for increasing its authority in the public's eyes today is immediate realization of the decisions made by the 28th Party Congress both centrally and locally, along with achievement of tangible successes in overcoming the crisis in society.

Practical performance of this task will to a great extent depend on how deeply and specifically party committees, party organizations and individual communists know public opinion and people's moods.

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### Rasputin Views Legislative, Executive Powers

91UN0182A Moscow MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA  
in Russian 21 Oct 90 p 2

[Interview with Valentin Grigoryevich Raputin, writer, USSR people's deputy, and member of the USSR Presidential Council, by Sh. Muladzhanov: "The Choice Has Been Made: A Word on Behalf of Conscience"]

[Text] We talked with Valentin Grigoryevich during a break in the sessions of the USSR Supreme Soviet. The fate of the USSR President's proposed draft, entitled "Basic Directions for Stabilizing the National Economy and Making the Transition to a Market-Type Economy," was clear by that time: it had received basic support from the parliament. And so it could be said that it was a fait accompli that the country would adopt a course aimed at implementing a new system of relations; it was about to

open a new page in its own history. I wanted to find out how this event was being perceived by Rasputin not simply as a famous writer, the author of "A Tough Fellow's Farewell" and other profound works, filled with dramatic collisions, but also as a major public figure, a USSR people's deputy, and a member of the Presidential Council.

[V. Rasputin] Let me stipulate right away that I do not consider myself to be a specialist in economic problems. But I will be bold enough to state the following point: The disputes as to whether or not we should make the transition to a market-type economy were a bit belated: whether we want to or not, we have already begun to make this transition. Both politically and economically, this process is already going on. Of course, many persons perceive it with alarm. We have neither experience nor traditions in this matter. I also see another danger. We are making the transition to a market-type economy without having freed up the peasants. Without free peasant farms and without accumulating at least a minimum amount of the basic necessities, such steps are far from safe. Each person should feel himself to be not merely a production unit, but also a fully entitled participant in state life—that is also an important condition.

[Sh. Muladzhanov] And the process of privatization promises to be a lengthy and difficult one.... But let us return to the program under discussion now by the parliament. Do you think that it will find support among your voters—people whose souls are attached to the land, to their work, and to their native places? Will you rely on their opinions in voting with regard to the draft, or will you trust more in your own intelligence and intuition?

[V. Rasputin] You see, if we are to speak about the people whose opinion we have become accustomed to cite, to my way of thinking, their minds have long become bleary or woozy. They expect some sort of decision but hardly care nowadays whether one variant or another is supported. If we are to speak about the people, it must be honestly admitted that people are fed up with the present vague, indecisive state of affairs. And they will accept virtually any choice as a step forward. The only thing we must avoid doing is to deceive the people, to understate or make light of the possible negative consequences. We must not conceal the fact that, without experience and without traditions we could encounter great difficulties along the path being proposed.

[Sh. Muladzhanov] Well, such a feeling that difficult days lie just ahead seems to be present even in those persons who are quite far removed from matters of politics and economics. How to minimize these "negative consequences" is another matter. It is no secret that



one of the most widespread "prescriptions" is to restore order by means of a very "firm hand," by the presence of a "strong authority."

[V. Rasputin] I think that it is necessary to restore order. But for this purpose we certainly do not need to return to the lamentable times of the cult of personality. I am confident that it is very important nowadays to inspire and hearten persons who have become disillusioned and disheartened. Without this, without returning to an interest in life and one's work, no reforms are possible. It is understandable that what we need here is an entire complex of incentives—both material and moral. In general, we have begun to forget about the moral incentives.

[Sh. Muladzhinov] Could it be that the reason for this is that people have become disillusioned with the former values but new ones have not been proposed to them? Could it be that we need to talk at this point about the spiritual metastases of the crisis which has afflicted us?

[V. Rasputin] Without a doubt, the crisis of the soul is the most dangerous and terrible thing that has happened to us. Nor can I help repeating what I have already said on more than one occasion: You journalists have played and are playing a significant role in this crisis. You strive to say more about bad things than about good ones. It is impossible to see merely bad, dark things around oneself!

[Sh. Muladzhinov] If the standard of living depended upon our published items.... If refraining from criticism would only reduce the rate of the crisis just a little bit....

[V. Rasputin] But I insist: you need to write much more honestly about the good things, about the improvements which are around you. And this might just be an important means for overcoming the crisis of the soul.

[Sh. Muladzhinov] Let us suppose that we were to change our emphases. But people see that the laws do not work, authority is amorphous, crime is increasing, and the standard of living is declining. What are the "improvements" for them?

[V. Rasputin] Of course, the problem is an extremely complex one. And I understand very well: the jelly-like powerlessness of the authorities is conducive to the fact that human beings are losing the remnants of faith and hope. The spread-out, washed-out quality of the actions of those persons from whom specific decisions and deeds are expected is one of the chief causes of the present-day situation.

[Sh. Muladzhinov] This is the very time to recall and remind you that it is already been quite a long period of time—by the present-day, extraordinary criteria—that you have been a member of the Presidential Council. Has your membership in this organ influenced your perception of public or state life? And has it changed your point of view on human or civil matters?

[V. Rasputin] If there has been a change, then it is only on the level of recognizing those difficulties encountered

by the executive authorities. Previously, you know, I was implacable, like many persons are nowadays. But gradually I have come to understand how complicated it is to implement any responsible, large-scale decision, and how many opposing forces there are. It is useful to "boil" for a while in this "kettle" in order to view life more realistically, more practically, and with a greater sense of balance.

[Sh. Muladzhinov] The opposition about which you speak is inevitable. But how should it be overcome in each case? The answer depends upon what form of rule we consider best for ourselves—a presidential or a parliamentary one. What have you decided for yourself on this matter?

[V. Rasputin] For starters I would note that I am an advocate of quite a strong and firm central authority, particularly during the present-day transitional period. Whether it is a matter of a federation or a confederation—we must not allow a dissipation of power and authority. Because, of course, if we did that, we would be constantly at each other's throats. We could endlessly stretch out our patch-work quilt, but it would be full of holes....

[Sh. Muladzhinov] So, to whom then should the government be subordinate—to the President or to the Supreme Soviet?

[V. Rasputin] Again let me begin from another point of view: the government must be strong and authoritative. Now as to the matter of subordination.... Nowadays, at a time of decisive actions, of emerging, operational problems, it is most effective, in my opinion, to have the evolving practice "tied in with" or "keyed to" the President. But, in general, I am in favor of full power being vested in the Supreme Soviet. Under normal conditions, it should be the body to decide matters of state importance.

[Sh. Muladzhinov] In this connection, let us turn our attention to yet another urgent problem. Yes, a great deal nowadays depends upon the viewpoint of the country's Supreme Soviet or of the republic involved. But more and more frequently the parliaments are experiencing pressure not only "from the side," "from above," or "from below," but also often in the most acute forms. A group of famished students can "tip the balance" of opinion of deputies and experts taken together. A "team" of nationalists committing excesses can compel persons to go against the norms of ethics and justice.... It is not a referendum, which takes into account the opinions of various social strata, but a kind of power pressure which influences the viewpoints of the authorities. Is this conceivable or possible?

[V. Rasputin] The anarchic type of action which you mention seems to me terrible for a whole range of reasons. When a youth movement or a nationalist movement is utilized for a destructive purpose, it is a blow inflicted on the economy, the legal system, and people's souls. Frequently marching under humanistic slogans are

persons who have nothing to do with humanism or any good cause. They provoke people and bring discredit on sacred ideas. And they engender a suspicious attitude toward freedoms. Humanists do not burn objectionable items on bonfires....

[Sh. Muladzhanov] Most likely, the triumph of genuine values, agreement between people, and an ascent to the truth is more important to them.

[V. Rasputin] All that may be so. But again I cannot help making some comments with regard to freedoms and glasnost. They are necessary and obligatory. However, does it not seem to you that we should sometimes think not only about the truth of words, but also about the time for uttering them? At times they work to bring about good things, but at other times they merely pour oil on the flames. The truth can be untimely—that is the way it seems to me nowadays. That does not mean that we need to prefer lies to the truth. I am talking merely about time and timing.... And another thing which is important. It does no good to merely mouth truths. People are waiting for answers the main questions; they are waiting for food for their faculty of reason and for their souls. But this kind of thing just does not furnish such food for them.

[Sh. Muladzhanov] Most likely there is a great deal of fairness and justification in what you say.... But, you know, we journalists have our own particular work, our own particular tasks and problems. And there is still the

entire world of literature and art, which is capable of attaining a profound understanding of the truth, of comprehending what is going on. And it is from this sphere that "information for meditation" is expected. However, one of the paradoxes of contemporary life is the following: the most authoritative artists have become utterly engrossed in politics and public life. Do you, Valentin Grigoryevich, for example, still have any time left for your principal work as a writer?

[V. Rasputin] Alas, very little. I have a mass of things to be concerned about. But the main reason does not lie even in my work as a deputy or in my duties on the Presidential Council. My heavy burden consists of letters. I try to reply to everybody. But there are a great many letters—and what letters they are! On the whole, only a few morning hours are left for my creative work....

The break was coming to an end, and my interviewee hurried into the hall where the sessions of the USSR Supreme Soviet were being held and where, within a few minutes, passions flared up with new force—about the market and about our life in the immediate future. The deputies made their choice, leaving for us the work without which any program is no more than a theoretical scheme. Could we add conscience, the almost forgotten moral categories to this series? "Let us return to that after some period of time, all right?" Valentin Rasputin suggested, as he took his leave. All right, let us return to it....

## RSFSR

### Abdulatipov on Future Russian Federation

91UN0295A Moscow SOYUZ in Russian No 42, Oct 90  
p 6

[Interview with Ramazan Abdulatipov, chairman of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet Council of Nationalities, by TASS correspondent Vyacheslav Zenkovich specially for SOYUZ; place and date not given: "Are You Strong, Russian Home?"]

[Text] begin bold Reports from various regions of the country concerning the proclamation of new status for national-state formations are coming onto the TASS wire one after the other. Tataria, Yakutia, and other autonomous republics have already declared themselves Union republics.

No one any longer doubts that the autonomous formations are now "out of short pants" and that the peoples who live in them have taken a considerable step forward in their development and that things have become cramped for them in the "shell" defined by the legislation which is currently in effect. However, the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet is in no hurry to evaluate this phenomenon. Nor is enough known about the position of the Russian leadership in respect of the future of the Federation. In order to clarify this issue the TASS correspondent turned to Ramazan Abdulatipov, chairman of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet Council of Nationalities.

"It is undoubtedly time for a fundamental change in the status of the autonomous entities," Ramazan Abdulatipov is sure. "But it is very important in the solution of these questions to not in renouncing some stereotypes become bogged down in others. But this is what is now happening. It is not a question of what an autonomous entity is called—a Union republic or a sovereign state in general—but of the actual economic and political possibilities of this formation.

"What would change if Gryazinskiy Rayon in Lipetskaya Oblast declared itself the Gryazinskaya People's Democratic Republic? Would it immediately have good roads? Would supply improve? Would there be a rise in the living standard? The autonomous entities may call themselves what they please, but it is important that the solution of the main questions not be lost sight of in this sovereignty game."

[Zenkovich] The Russian parliament is being accused of not responding to the autonomous republics' adoption of declarations....

[Abdulatipov] Why should we? It is up to the autonomous entities what they call themselves.

Not everything is in order, come to that, concerning the Declaration of the Sovereignty of Russia. Instead of elaborating a program for the staged implementation of

its propositions, an incomprehensible racket concerning "protection" of this document against some mythical encroachments is now under way. Precious time, meanwhile, is ebbing away in futile squabbles.

The opinion exists that, having proclaimed sovereignty, Tataria and other republics have thereby seceded from the RSFSR. This is not the case. In his appeal to the Russian parliament and B. Yeltsin, chairman of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet, M. Shaymiyev, head of the Tatarstan Supreme Soviet, observed that the basis of the Tatar SSR's [Soviet Socialist Republic] relations with the Russian Federation are mutually profitable agreements and the current principles of the voluntary delineation and delegation of authority and acknowledges the need for Tataria's participation in the conclusion of Union and federal treaties as a sovereign state. The situation is approximately the same in relations with other republics also.

[Zenkovich] Work on preparation of a federal treaty is already under way?

[Abdulatipov] The RSFSR Supreme Soviet currently has seven versions of a draft federal treaty. Their authors' views of the future of the republic vary. One draft, for example, presupposes Russia's return to medieval times fragmented by feudal commination: The authors propose that all oblasts and autonomous formations without exception be considered subjects of the Federation, republic status being imparted to them: the Kursk Republic, Ryazan, Smolensk, Tver....

I prefer the draft treaty drawn up by deputies F. Shelov-Kovedyayev and V. Mazayev, to which I made certain corrections. According to this document, two groups directly signing the document should be subjects of the Russian Federation. The first are the national-state formations which even now have their own constitutions, anthems, coats of arms, and other attributes of statehood. The second are self-governing territories: oblasts of the RSFSR and other formations without statehood. All subjects of the Federation are equal in all respects.

They delegate to the RSFSR Supreme Soviet certain powers without which Russia could not exist as a single federal state. Each subject should determine the extent of these powers itself, which would enable each oblast or republic to develop with regard for local singularities.

In my view, the subjects of the Federation should transfer to the RSFSR parliament the right to determine the general economic course and decide questions of defense and the system of federal and environmental security and the adoption, in accordance with the treaty, of the RSFSR Constitution and revisions to it and jointly coordinate external relations, education, basic scientific research, and the functioning of transport and communications.

The draft allows any subject of the Federation to adopt its own legislative instruments, not conflicting, of course, with the RSFSR Constitution. Laws enacted by the

RSFSR Supreme Soviet may operate on the territory of an oblast or republic only after they have been ratified by the local parliaments, unless they concern powers delegated to the RSFSR Supreme Soviet. I see nothing wrong in each subject of the federation having, if it so wishes, its own flag, coat of arms, and anthem. The RSFSR, according to the draft, would provide for defense of the interests of its citizens, regardless of their place of residence.

In working on the document we proceeded from the fact that nothing should be built "forever" for life moves on and everything is change, and after some period of time the form of the Russian Federation adopted now will in one way or another become outdated. For this reason the treaty should be flexible.

[Zenkovich] But the republic Supreme Soviet is not, it would seem, in any hurry to conclude such an important document.

[Abdulatipov] In my opinion, work in this direction should be speeded up. We are being urged on by life itself for the majority of laws being discussed in parliament currently affects in one way or another the foundations of Russian statehood—questions of its federal arrangement. And, lacking these foundations, it is very difficult to operate. In their law-making activity the deputies are running into a brick wall, as it were. A bill on the local soviets and local self-government was discussed recently, for example. But inasmuch as it could not work without a federal treaty, consideration of it had to be postponed. And this is happening frequently.

Preliminary consultations on questions of the conclusion of a treaty have already begun. I very much hope that it will be signed at the end of this November.

[Zenkovich] Will the document provide a mechanism for the punishment of a subject of the Federation for its failure to comply with commitments it has made to the RSFSR? After all, the absence of such a thing could engender lack of responsibility....

[Abdulatipov] I agree entirely. This question should unfailingly be stipulated in the document. I, for example, see it as a system of economic and political sanctions. However, inasmuch as we are resolved to build a state based on the rule of law, it is important to first prove the guilt of a republic or oblast here. I propose that this function be entrusted to a special RSFSR Federal Court.

The purpose of the federal treaty is to ensure the strength of the Russian home and the prosperity of Russians. It is our version, I believe, which corresponds to these requirements most fully.

### Disagreements Noted at RSFSR CP Congress

91UN0282B Leningrad LENINGRADSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 1 Nov 90 p 2

[Article by I. Losev: "About Gorbachev, the Market, and Disagreements—Notes From the Initiative Congress of RSFSR Communists"]

[Text] As we have mentioned already the third stage of the Initiative Congress of Russian Communists took place in Leningrad, on 20 and 21 October. For two days 574 delegates from 10 autonomous republics, five krais, and 40 oblasts of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic], representing nearly two and a half million Russian communists, discussed the situation in the party and in the country as well as ways out of the economic and political crises.

What did they speak about at the congress? In this article I try to give the readers of LENINGRADSKAYA PRAVDA an objective answer to this question.

### Is the General Secretary With Us or Against Us?

This question was posed by many speakers at the congress. According to them, rank-and-file communists rightfully expect that at this particular time, which is so difficult for the party and the country, the CPSU Central Committee would issue clear instructions on what should be done to repel the anti-communist pressure which is gaining strength in the country. The inaction, which looks very much like confusion, undermines the faith of the party masses in their leadership: some people are ready to fight for party ideals but they get exasperated by the center's passivity and by their own inability, for whatever reason, to make independent decisions; therefore, they are tempted to leave the party altogether. But there is nothing surprising in this, the speakers said. Our initiatives have been suppressed for so long, that we have gotten used to living as directed from above... Some people are so inactive because they are afraid their initiatives may disagree with what the Central Committee might say tomorrow and that would be an objective factor working against the party and against its unity.

The speakers would make one more immediate reservation. In their opinions, it is impossible to achieve any unity in the CPSU at present. Many delegates think that now the party consists of several groups united only by the same party membership card, but their goals and motives may be directly opposite. If we start talking about uniting with them, we will be lying knowingly or we will predetermine the party's concessions to various factions. In the long run the latter factor will result in the elimination of the party as a communist one and its transformation into a social democratic or any other party, which in principle is not one and the same thing.

As was said at the congress, when they were asking to hold the 28th CPSU Congress earlier than planned, the communists of our country and primarily of Russia were



hoping that the general secretary, the Politburo, and the Central Committee would lead the search for a way out of the cul-de-sac; they were hoping that the party would determine its own strategy and tactics in the conditions of an economic and political crisis. In this situation both the adherents and the opponents of the CPSU expected sensible and, what is very important, timely decisions to lead the many-million army of communists, or rather the entire Soviet state, in the right direction. But they did not get them, fortunately for some people and unfortunately for others. On the contrary, a lot of what was decided by the Politburo and by the CPSU Central Committee served to deepen the crisis within the party (read—within the country).

Many of the speakers wanted to emphasize the fact that the communists' hopes for the 28th congress have not been justified. Its decisions were so general that it is simply impossible to use them as guidance in everyday work. The fact that some people were excluded from the Politburo but then became members of the President's Council did not enhance the prestige either of these people or of the Council. The same could be said about the obvious discrepancy between the words of the general secretary at the 28th congress and his actions after the congress; it only made people disappointed in both.

Today rank-and-file communists speak more and more often about the need to replace the top person in the party—that was what the congress delegates said. The basic reason quoted by them for that is the lack of compatibility between M.S. Gorbachev's position on the government structure and the concept of the communist perspective. This fact was briefly outlined by A.A. Sergeyev, professor at the Labor and Social Relations Academy, CPSU Central Committee member, and organization bureau secretary of the Initiative Congress of Russian Communists.

"The party is losing the political trust of the people," he said, "while the party leadership, including the general secretary, are losing the political trust of the rank-and-file communists at a catastrophic speed."

Moscow State University Professor B.S. Khorev stated his point of view in a sharper manner:

"The general secretary has changed and we do not need such a general secretary any more. Our confidence in him has run out!"

He proposed the passage of a resolution of political no-confidence in Gorbachev and also demanded that someone else be immediately elected to his post. There were rather many supporters of this idea in the audience. However, the majority of the congress participants did not see this as a key to the solution of the problem. The political resolution of the initiative congress says the following: "The most impatient group of communists propagates a concept which can be qualified as a "Narodnaya Volya" [People's Freedom—a 19th century anarchist/terrorist organization] approach—the main thing is to remove M.S. Gorbachev from the position of general

secretary. But Gorbachev's personality is not the main problem; we have to replace a whole stratum of degenerates who have stuck to the ruling party only because it is a power machine, people who are concerned with their place in the system rather than with the workers' interests."

Having expressed its attitude toward the internal party situation in such a way, the initiative congress, trying to do its share to overcome the crisis, passed and sent for distribution in the primary Russian party organizations its version of a program of action. Its foreword states that the program aims to fight for the interests of the working class, of the peasants, of the working intelligentsia, of all who are working for the good of Russia.

This program clearly outlines the second feature characteristic of the discussions at the initiative congress—a protest against the "market ideology."

#### Do We Have an Alternative?

The economic discussion at the initiative congress was centered around the report by Professor A.A. Sergeyev, who was elected member of the CPSU Central Committee at the 28th congress and who participated in the work of the October (1990) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee where the problems of a transfer to the market economy were discussed. The deputies who took the floor before him basically spoke about the following: The CPSU had been talking for many years about the antagonistic contradictions between capitalism and socialism, but now, in the person of its general secretary and his team, it has started talking about building "a humane, democratic socialism with a human face" by switching to capitalism. At the same time it is not mentioned anywhere how it is possible to marry the communist ideology with the call for a transfer to private property and market relations, for which allegedly there is no alternative.

Doctor of Economics A.A. Sergeyev said in his speech that there was an alternative for the market. He tried to prove this statement using his analysis of the programs for the rejuvenation of the economy which had been approved by the USSR and RSFSR Supreme Soviets. He also presented an alternate concept designed by a group of economists. The speaker mentioned the common basis of Abalkin's and Shatalin's programs—both of them suggest a transfer to private property by legalizing the shadow capital and by attracting foreign investments on a large scale. The alternate method is based on revamping socialism within the framework of public ownership of the means of production as the economic foundation of the society.

It was emphasized that the wage fund at industrial enterprises depends on the reduction in prices of their products: The cheaper the manufactured goods, the higher the wages of the manufacturers. [sentence as published] It goes without saying that this process should not be spontaneous, but regulated. It should be based on

the achievements of scientific and technical progress, on modernized production methods, and on the introduction of new technology.

According to A.A. Sergeyev, realization of the programs adopted by the Supreme Soviets will inevitably cause a drop in the living standards of the majority of the population. He quoted what G. Kh. Popov said in his speech in the Moscow House of Scientists on 20 February, 1989. Popov insisted that a transfer to capitalism in our conditions would not take us to either the American or the Swedish living standards. At best we would achieve the standards of India or Bangladesh.

The speaker clarified his words by quoting academician Shatalin. The latter says in the Soviet press that the realization of the 500 days program can hurt the rich only. The same Shatalin, in an interview with the English *FINANCIAL TIMES*, says openly that the reform will result in a freeze of some social programs that have already been approved by the Supreme Soviet; and that includes new pensions. According to various expert estimates, the number of unemployed in the USSR will be between 12 and 50 million people.

"Foreign investments will not help us either," said Professor Sergeyev. "Foreign investors' worries about the political instability in the USSR are not the reason for this, contrary to what some people try to tell us. The main reason, in my view, lies in the fact that the Western economy is being drawn into a serious economic crisis. The editorial in the 22-29 September 1990 issue of the London *ECONOMIST*, for instance, calls 1991 the year of a recession in the capitalist economics and mentions that nobody can predict how long this recession will last. Therefore, Western markets will be closed for goods manufactured in the USSR by those same Western capitalists. But our domestic market will not be able to absorb those goods either, due to a steep drop in the real incomes of the population.

The speaker thinks that the party should switch to the position of decisive opposition against the legislative bodies if they continue with their policy of privatizing the economy and forget meanwhile about the interests of the working people. He sees this measure as a prerequisite for the revival of political trust in the party and of its prestige among the people, a prerequisite for strengthening its own ranks. A.A. Sergeyev clarified that he was not talking about any economic sabotage. We should display consistency as we protect the interests of the working people from the inevitable desire of the capitalists to enrich themselves at the people's expense.

Professor A.A. Sergeyev's position found support in the speech of Arnold Lokshin, a political emigre from the United States. In his opinion, Shatalin's program cannot resolve the country's problems in 500 days or in 500 years. He spoke of his disappointment in the fact that many materials about perestroika in the USSR published in the West, which are definitely of great interest and of educational value for the Soviet people, remain

unknown to them. At the same time, many far less important materials are being printed on a large scale in the central press.

Arnold Lokshin ended his speech with an appeal to strengthen the party on a Leninist basis and to unite all communists and all working people in the fight against inflation, unemployment, and the capitalization of the country.

The American's speech contributed noticeably to the shaping of the participants' opinion on the future market system. The delegates admitted that, without a doubt, they felt apprehensive about the coming market system. The failure of many people to understand at present what the system means is not the only reason for that feeling. Another reason is their clear understanding that we are not ready for market relations either in theory or in practice. It is already clear now, the congress stated, that Abalkin's and Shatalin's programs adopted by the RSFSR and the USSR Supreme Soviets cannot become the panacea to cure us from poverty. Rather, the contrary might be true. The beginning of the 500 days program was postponed by a month and, it seems, now it will be postponed even further and this fact could not but enhance the doubts in the efficiency of the proposed reform.

But we should be realistic. Yu.P. Belov, secretary of the Leningrad CPSU Obkom [oblast party committee] and member of the RSFSR Communist Party Central Committee, said at the congress: "Whether you like the market system or not, we practically have it already." He reminded the audience of Lenin's words that a concrete analysis of a concrete situation was the living soul of Marxism. He also called on the delegates to help protect the social rights of working people of all categories under the conditions of the already existing market economy.

"Today we should fight for the huge numbers of people in the party who are hesitating," said Yu.P. Belov. "They are not to blame for their doubts. They have lost all orientation because that orientation was taken away from them. They did not lose their faith in the ideals, but in the possibility of putting these ideals into practice. If these people do not see us as the representatives of their interests they will end up in a political vacuum and will leave for other parties. The CPSU cannot become a faction of 'sterile' communists or it will not have a future."

Yu.P. Belov drew the delegates' attention to one more issue—the preservation and education of the party intelligentsia, the intellect of the party, without which any progress becomes an impossibility.

Not everyone agreed with the obkom secretary. V.A. Tyulkin, member of the RSFSR Communist Party Central Committee, secretary of the organization bureau of the initiative congress, who took the floor after him spoke about the "main item of disagreement." He said that the party should not simply try to adapt to the new system, it should not fight for its place in the system, but

should act to protect the interests of the working people. But will the working people trust the defense of their interests to a party which is going to lead them to mass unemployment, capitalization, maybe even worse calamities?—V.A. Tyulkin expressed his doubts.

**THE CONGRESS helped to uncover more than mere disagreement among the communists. There was its share of political yakking, demagoguery, or attempts to make one's opinion the utmost truth. The latter was especially evident when the congress resolutions were being discussed.**

As any current socio-political movement, the initiative congress assembled quite diverse delegates, from conservatives to supporters of immediate and strong actions. This resulted in some extremely critical opinions, which even bordered on the verge of extremism. This particular factor helped generate a distorted public impression of the true tasks and goals of the initiative congress. There were also attempts to view the present and the future through the lens of the past, which has been deservedly denounced by the party.

The resolutions that were adopted by the congress are still somewhat declaratory; however, they present a realistic effort to influence the course of events; they appear as a concrete program of action where intolerance is replaced by the readiness to cooperate with anyone sharing the tasks and goals set by the initiative congress. The only question is: Have they achieved enough to be able to overcome the differences that still exist?

It is planned to hold the Second Initiative Congress of Russia's Communists on 20—21 April, 1991.

#### **Liberal Democratic Party Bogus Congress**

91UN0195C Moscow VECHERNYAYA MOSKVA  
in Russian 18 Oct 90 p 2

[Letter by V. Zhirinovskiy, chairman of the Liberal Democratic Party of the Soviet Union: "Scandal in the LDP: 'He Was Put in Jail Three Times'"]

[Text] On 13 October your newspaper printed articles concerning the "second congress of the LDP [Liberal Democratic Party]." I am officially reporting to you that no second congress of the LDP took place on 6 October 1990 in Moscow, never mind a special congress. On that day an assembly of a group of citizens comprised of 40 people, half of whom were guests and observers, took place at the Krasnopresnenskiy Rayon Soviet Executive Committee. Of the remaining 20 people, several really had been members of the LDP. But who were these people? The chief figure in the conspiracy was V. Bogachev. He was expelled from the LDP back on 19 September 1990. Another person, L. Narimanidze, stole a typewriter with foreign script from the leadership of the LDP. And what about Bogachev himself? He was put in jail three times, once for fraud (Article 147 of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Criminal Code); he has not worked anywhere since 1976.

and he has been involved in petty speculation and moonshining. He was expelled from two parties—from the DS [Democratic Union] in 1988 and from the DP [Democratic Party] in 1989. When it was finally established that he had embezzled about 20,000 rubles [R] from the treasury of the LDP, we had to part ways with him. He was expelled from the aforementioned parties for similar financial intrigues—in the DS he "borrowed" R4.5 [as published] and in the LD [as published] it was R3.5 [as published]. Unfortunately, all the information discrediting Bogachev only became known to us across six months, from April to September 1990.

And now this unsavory fellow "convenes," without even belonging to the LDP any longer, a "second special Party Congress." And when? When the chairman of the LDP is abroad. There has never been in the history of world politics a single party that could embrace such a scoundrel. From the judicial point of view, it was all illegal. The decision to convene a congress is made by the chairman and the Central Committee. We did not make such a decision. A congress may be convened at the request of the primary regional organizations, but not one such request was made. There was not even a request from a single member of the LDP. It was all the intriguing of one man—the drunkard and petty thief Bogachev.

I repeat once more that the assembly of adventurers and deceived citizens on 6 October 1990 has nothing to do with the LDP. We are not changing our course. On 20 October 1990, on Saturday, we are conducting our planned party conference at the House of Culture imeni Rusakov (the "Sokolniki" metro stop) beginning 1200. The conference will be attended by authorized delegates from all ends of the Soviet Union (about 200 people) representing the 15,000 members of the LDP. We are inviting to this conference representatives of all the parties and movements, Muscovites, guests of our city, representatives of foreign embassies, and Soviet and foreign press, radio, and television. On 20 October, you will see what the real LDP is like and how civilized a discussion we conduct. We are prepared to let some of the participants of the ill-fated 6 October 1990 assembly remain in the party. As for Bogachev, we are asking the procurator of Moscow to institute criminal proceedings against him in accordance with Article 147 (fraud) of the Criminal Code of the RSFSR. I believe that imprisonment for the fourth time and exclusion from three political parties will sober him up once and for all.

I request that this be published in the very next issue.

[Signed] V. Zhirinovskiy, chairman of the Liberal Democratic Party of the Soviet Union.

#### **From the Editorial Office**

We are publishing the letter from V. Zhirinovskiy complete with all its errors. The chairman of the LDP himself carried it in to the editorial board at the very moment that a meeting of the editorial colleagues of VECHERNYAYA MOSKVA was underway. But that did not stop

the author of the letter. Pushing the technical secretary away from the door, he burst into the office and threw the letter on the table of the editor with a cry. Zhirinovskiy continued to make a disturbance in the waiting room as well.

To be honest, the journalists were somewhat surprised by such wild conduct on the part of the chairman of one of the new parties—the Liberal Democratic Party. Especially since the program documents of the liberals declare nonviolent methods of opposition. "Our goal," wrote V. Zhirinovskiy in an appeal to the members of the LDP, "is a rich and cultured country."

Having read the above letter, the reader may come to his own conclusion both about the level of culture of the author and about the conditions reigning in the leadership of the LDP.

#### **Prokofyev on Coup Possibility, Finances**

91UN0344A Moscow MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA  
in Russian 30 Oct 90 p 2

[Interview with Yu. Prokofyev, first secretary of the Moscow CPSU Gorkom, by MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA correspondent V. Yevseyev; under the rubric "Following Up on Your Letters and Calls: Our Monthly Meetings in the Moscow CPSU Gorkom"; date not given: "October, Moscow, Communists Offer Concrete Plan of Action"]

[Text] First secretary of the Moscow CPSU Gorkom [City Committee] Yuriy Prokofyev comments on readers' letters and telephone calls to MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA.

#### **Is the Period of Confusion Over?**

[Yevseyev] Yuriy Anatolyevich, the mail brings us many letters to the editors, in which our readers accuse the party of not having a concrete action program, of lagging behind the fast developing political events; they mention the confusion that reigns in many party organizations. The same sentiments were heard at the recent MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA festival. In fact, there was an extended period of somewhat confused waiting, almost restlessness, when the party became almost totally absorbed in discussing its own internal affairs; this period lasted for so long that when, finally, a few days ago our newspaper published the long awaited draft of the new action program for Moscow communists, the editorial offices were not, to put it mildly, overwhelmed with a tidal wave of readers' comments. On the one hand, people have indeed grown tired of the abundance of documents being published these days; on the other, it does take time to study this draft and to give it thought. Still, I cannot help but quote a fairly typical response on the part of some Muscovites during a mini-poll conducted by our correspondents after the publication of the draft program: "No, I have not read it and do not intend to; I do not expect anything interesting from this party, I know by heart everything it can say." It is sad to hear

this, the more so because, in the opinion of those who have read the draft program, it is a non-standard, topical, concrete document.

[Prokofyev] Some reproaches directed at the Communist Party are quite fair. There really was some confusion, especially after Article 6 of the constitution was changed, making the party's operational environment completely different. I must say that this confusion was evident not only in primary cells, but at other levels as well: the raykoms [rayon party committees], the city party committee, even the Central Committee. We needed time to re-orient, to find ourselves in this new environment. There is also that burden of responsibility both for the party's past mistakes and the new ones, committed after perestroika had already started; this burden was and still is, weighing heavily on morale. Some communists took a position of repentance, some became apathetic; none of this helped the party's standing in society. A lot was said on this topic both at the city party conference, and at the Moscow Gorkom Plenum. We all knew that what was needed were not words or slogans, but a concrete action program. Yes, it was expected of us to come up with it earlier, and many Muscovites, tired of waiting, became disappointed and turned away from the party. It is, of course, sad to hear you describe this kind of reaction to publication of the Moscow communists' action program, which was intended for debate by the general public. Well, the time when party documents were mandatory reading for everybody is over. Now we have to fight for each individual.

[Yevseyev] What would you, Yuriy Anatolyevich, like to emphasize in this draft program?

[Prokofyev] This document is prefaced by an exceedingly candid evaluation of the current situation in our society. I think that anybody who reads it will have a more clear understanding of our position.

[Yevseyev] Is it different in some way from the position taken by the country's leadership?

[Prokofyev] I think that the leadership, to a certain degree, underestimates the danger facing our country. I personally believe that the current situation is more than critical—it is pre-catastrophic.

In our document, we call the desire to blame all our ills on the consequences of stagnation hypocritical. There is no question that the system of political and economic relations which existed in our society, slowly but surely caused our country to slide into the second-rate category, and caused an ever increasing gap between the trajectory of our development and that of the rest of the world. However, we have to honestly admit that we speeded up the advent of this pre-catastrophic condition by our own not so well thought out actions, and by the strategic and tactical mistakes which we have committed during the perestroika period as well.

[Yevseyev] Who is responsible for this?



[Prokofyev] In our document, we name four components, whose sum has brought our society to the brink of abyss after five years of perestroika.

First of all, it is those faulty steps, the mistakes our leadership has committed in the course of implementing the perestroika reforms. Second, it is the clumsy actions of representatives of the new political forces which have taken power in many soviets. Then it is the destructive influence of the "shadow economy." And, finally, it is the conservative forces in the society.

[Yevseyev] Forgive me, Yuriy Anatolyevich, for interrupting. I have here a letter from S. Voskoboynikov, a research associate. This letter arrived before your program was published, but it seems to be quite relevant to our conversation today. He writes: "In our troubled times many political terms and definitions acquire a meaning that is different from, and sometimes even diametrically opposite to, the original one. A typical example: the right and the left. Well, this one we have more or less sorted out. But when your newspaper writes about the conservatives, or about the leadership, I would like to have more clarity as to whom you have in mind. Different people put different meanings into these words." Let us do what our reader asks us to do. There is a phrase in the document: "The party was not able to produce a timely and critical evaluation of the leadership's actions, and took its habitual position of agreement." Which leadership is this referring to?

[Prokofyev] Until very recently the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and the USSR Council of Ministers constituted the country's leadership. It is they who are referred to in this discussion of past mistakes.

[Yevseyev] What about "the conservative forces of society?"

[Prokofyev] It is hard to give a short answer to this question. These forces are present in all strata and all categories of our society. It has become a stereotype to equate the apparatus—both the party and the state apparatus—with the conservative forces. Are there conservatives there? Unquestionably so. However, it would have been simple if they alone constituted the anti-perestroika background. Let us look at the composition of the Leningrad initiating congress which is trying to pull the party back to its former positions. Does it consist exclusively of party or state apparatus members? No, a significant group in that congress is represented by social scientists, the technical intelligentsia, and the working class. People who do not accept perestroika exist in every social strata of our society. They unite, and they act. And the worse the situation in the country becomes, the stronger will be their position.

[Yevseyev] The all-Union organization "Unity for Leninism and for Political Ideals," headed by the notorious Nina Andreyeva, is already conducting its third conference...

[Prokofyev] These attempts to turn the country back to a barracks-style socialism are just as dangerous for perestroika as the tendency towards capitalism.

[Yevseyev] The action program contains the following political prognosis: "Driven by the wave of civil clashes and spontaneous protest actions, new anti-democratic political forces or criminal elements may make their bid for power." We received a call from a Muscovite who introduced himself as Ivan Ivanovich Ivanov, and who asked us to clarify whether this passage hints at the possibility of a military takeover.

[Prokofyev] The meaning here is that it is not important where a dictatorship comes from—the right or the left. The extreme left is hiding behind pro-democracy slogans, but in reality they often stand on pro-fascist positions: They advocate anti-communism, a violent overthrow of the existing power, and reprisals against the differently minded. The extreme right does the same. In that they often find common language. It is not accidental that there has already been a rally in Pushkin Square in which both "Pamyat" and "Democratic Union" representatives participated, although you would think that these two organizations pursue diametrically opposite goals. History proves that extremes always unite.

[Yevseyev] Does it not frighten you that some people talk without fear, sometimes even longingly, about the possibility of a dictatorship?

[Prokofyev] When there is a deficit of power in the country, it is inevitable that some people become nostalgic about the past. Igor Klyamkin was the first one to say it publicly. Remember: "Do we need an iron hand?" This is a popular topic for discussion now. We also believe that the situation needs to be brought under control, but not through a dictatorship—be it a dictatorship of one individual, one class, or a political group; it should be done through strengthening the kind of executive power that exists in every democratic society.

[Yevseyev] Still, going back to the question of a military takeover, do you consider it possible under present conditions?

[Prokofyev] No.

#### How Can We Help a Factory Buy Another Factory?

[Yevseyev] The draft action program says that the Moscow CPSU Gorkom, together with the city union of state industrial and scientific organizations will come up with its own version of an emergency program to stabilize the capital's industrial development. Our readers V. Abuladze and T. Grishina ask: Will this program serve as an alternative to the economic policy of the Moscow City Soviet, and how will these measures be implemented?

[Prokofyev] At this point I cannot say anything about relevant Moscow City Soviet documents—they have not been published, although only days remain before the

start of a session that is supposed to consider the issues of Moscow's transition to a market economy. I think that in this respect the Moscow City Soviet repeats the mistakes of the Supreme Soviets, both of the country and of Russia, which have presented their economic programs for the deputies' consideration without first making these materials available to the overwhelming majority of the deputies, let alone to the general population.

However, as far as I know, the Moscow City Soviet program will deal first of all with the issues of converting the city economy into a market-based one; that is, it will deal with retail trade, public transportation, public catering, and local industries. We are talking about different things. Moscow is a major industrial center, with a large number of enterprises of all-Union or republic, not municipal, importance. Many of those have now fallen out of the range of attention, so to say; they have been left to their own devices. But they do face a multitude of problems: How to accomplish privatization, how to start a joint-stock company, how to convert—or to sell—the enterprise into collective ownership, how to establish contacts with other enterprises under market conditions, how to organize personnel retraining programs... We intend to help them answer all these questions. Therefore I do not see any "competition" with the Moscow City Soviet since it is involved, as I have already said, mostly in municipal issues.

[Yevseyev] So, your program will be of a consulting nature?

[Prokofyev] Yes, it will consist of recommendations, developed with the help of highly qualified specialists, for use by city enterprises.

[Yevseyev] How soon will these be available?

[Prokofyev] The work is being done now; it is supposed to be completed before the end of the year.

#### Where Do the Party Millions Go?

[Yevseyev] Yuriy Anatolyevich, as should have been expected, our readers have shown particular interest towards the part of the draft action program that mentions the possibility of using funds that now belong to the gorkom, the raykom, and to some large primary organizations, for such purposes as, for instance, personnel retraining schools under market conditions. Party veteran R. Golitsin, readers S. Smirnov and L. Ignatenko ask what those funds are, where did they come from, and what is their sum value?

[Prokofyev] Last year the Moscow party organization's income came to approximately R135 million [rubles]. The sources of this income were membership dues and publishing activities. Next year our income will probably be half as much. There are several reasons for this.

The scale of party dues has been changed. There are quite a few communists in Moscow who earn over R300

a month. They used to pay three percent of that sum as party dues, but now, in accordance with the new party rules, they will pay one percent less. This will greatly reduce the income from dues. Also, the city party organization is shrinking in size. This year it has already lost almost 100,000 members. It looks as if people will continue to leave the party. And on top of that we have practically lost the income from publishing because of a sharp increase in the tax on profits, and the higher costs of paper, printing, and postage.

[Yevseyev] If we take into account that the Moscow city organization gives the lion's share of its income to the Central Committee, the funds it will have at its disposal next year which may be earmarked for this retraining program for the city's industrial workers may turn out to be quite ephemeral?

[Prokofyev] Not quite. In the past, primary party organizations could keep only three percent of the dues they collected; now it is 50 percent. In the past, we have transferred about R90 million to the Central Committee; next year we plan to transfer only 4.5 million. You can do your own calculations.

[Yevseyev] Wait a minute. I come up with these figures: In the past the city party organization has kept R45 million; next year, despite a decrease in income, it will keep 63 million.

[Prokofyev] These are preliminary calculations, of course, but they are more or less correct. These are the means which we will have at our disposal—if we act in concert with the primary organizations and the raykoms, of course.

[Yevseyev] Forgive me, Yuriy Anatolyevich, but then I have to ask you a question, not in your capacity as the first secretary of the Moscow Gorkom, but as a member of the Central Committee Politburo. What will the Central Committee do, being "shortchanged" of these 85 and a half Moscow millions?

[Prokofyev] These funds used to go into subsidies for other party organizations around the country. It should be mentioned that, in addition to our city organization, there were only two or three others in the entire Russian Federation that were—to use business language—profitable; the rest lived on Central Committee subsidies.

[Yevseyev] What are they going to do now?

[Prokofyev] Now they will have to live within their means, get involved in commercial activities, earn money. Also, keep in mind that now party organizations will need more money than before. Now they will have to pay to lease their offices, for the paper for their publications, for the air time on radio and television. So, commercial activities will be unavoidable. Here, in Moscow, some party organizations are already involved in this.

[Yevseyev] What can you say about the calls to expropriate Communist Party property which often appear in the press, as well as in some letters from our readers?

[Prokofyev] If we are talking about Moscow, what is there to expropriate? We do not have our own resorts or hospitals, only the party committee buildings. But even that would be unconstitutional. Practically all of them, with a few exceptions, were built partly with party funds. Our largest structure that is the subject of so much discussion—the Social-Political Center—was built entirely with party funds. Who has the right to take it away? All these discussions are aimed at raising the wave of anti-Communism, at depriving the Communist Party of the means of its existence; this is an anti-democratic, dead-end approach.

[Yevseyev] The draft of the program says that the gorkoms and raykoms will make their quarters available for concerts, plays, and exhibitions. Will this also be a part of commercial activities?

[Prokofyev] Mostly, it will be free. We do not agree with the current trend of all-out commercialization of culture; therefore, as a rule, our cultural events will be charitable in nature.

[Yevseyev] Press operator V. Perelygin is asking for specifics on the city workers' club, the establishment of which is proposed in the program.

[Prokofyev] This idea was put forward by Moscow workers who were delegates to the city party conference and the 28th CPSU Congress. We have to admit that during the past few years the Moscow city organization, as well as the party as a whole, paid little attention to the workers' movement. Meanwhile it has accumulated many problems which require both discussion and resolution. Let us not forget that the working class so far has benefited least from perestroika, and therefore it is more dissatisfied with the party than the others. It is enough to say that 47 percent of all people leaving the party are blue-collar workers. This is, of course, a multifaceted, complex problem. That is why we should deal with it seriously and on a priority basis. We are ready to let the workers, the soviets of workers' collectives, organize their own club using our Social-Political Center as their base. By the way, I think that our party newspaper should also pay more attention to worker-communists, to give them an opportunity to express their views more often.

#### Who Will 'Purge' Whom?

[Yevseyev] We accept your criticism and stand ready to actively cooperate with this future club. However, the issue that concerns our readers right now is the one of the relationship between the gorkom and the Moscow City Soviet. "Do not these two bears understand, that they have to co-exist in the same cave?" asks pensioner G. Potapov, sarcastically. "Somehow we do not hear from our communist deputies in the Moscow City Soviet." This came from a letter from E. Kuzmina, a student. And

so on. It really is a paradoxical situation. Communists constitute the majority in most soviets, but the same group "Moscow" finds itself in a very unenviable position. Just recently, in his interview with VECHEERNYAYA MOSKVA, Yu. Vinogradov, the head of the coordinating council of this group, accused the Moscow CPSU Gorkom—and you personally as its first secretary—of not clarifying your position, of stalling the decision on creating a faction of communist-deputies on the basis of the "Moscow" group. Now this decision had been made, but I would like to hear your opinion, Yuri Anatolyevich, on this issue.

[Prokofyev] First I would like to comment on the "two bears." The Moscow CPSU Gorkom has many times offered closer ties with the Moscow City Soviet. We are not trying to foist ourselves on the city as its co-ruler, nor as advisers to the soviets. Sometimes we are told: You are just one of the parties. Yes, it is true. But only in theory. Let us look at the situation realistically. So far, there is no political movement, including those in opposition to the CPSU, which could be truly effective in regard to the actions the city needs now. Under these circumstances it is unreasonable not to use a million-strong organization with its established and, despite everything, still sufficiently well defined structure. We have said this more than once. We keep hoping for reciprocal steps.

Now, in regard to communists in the Moscow City Soviet. After elections they numbered 270. Now there are about 40 less, and some deputies are contemplating leaving the party. So, the number of CPSU members in our Moscow parliament is declining. That is understandable. In our elections we did not use party slates, as is done in many countries, where people vote for a candidate not so much because of his personal qualities, but because they support the platform of the party he represents. Here, in reality, each candidate was representing himself. By the way, many communists were elected precisely because they sharply criticized their own party. That is why it turned out to be impossible to put together a communist faction in the Moscow City Soviet right after the elections. That is when the group called "Moscow" emerged. It consisted of 90 communists. About 20 communists joined the independents, and the rest joined other groups. Therefore any talk of party unity was meaningless at that time. Besides, the Law on Public Organization had not yet been passed then. Now it is in effect, and this year all parties must register. This will help put everything in its place. Communists will remain communists, the rest will go to other political organizations. Under these conditions the work of the communist faction will no longer be a mere formality.

[Yevseyev] Judging from the published draft of the Moscow communists' action program, the purge of those who only formally carry a party card will take place not only in the Moscow parliament. I am referring to the initiative of some primary party organizations, supported by the gorkom, to conduct a new registration of CPSU members after the party program is adopted.

[Prokofyev] I would not put it that way. Yes, we have heard some voices in favor of a "purge." But who will be purging whom? According to associates of the Moscow Higher Party School our city party organization currently has at least eight factions. Just recently the gorkom bureau officially registered such new party clubs as the "communists-reformists" (these are former members of the "Democratic Platform" who have stayed with the party) and a group of communists from the "Marxist Platform" (the other part of this platform supported the positions of the Leningrad initiating congress). As is clear to everybody who follows intra-party events, these clubs differ quite a bit in their views. So, who is going to "purge" whom?

Therefore we support a voluntary re-registration of party members. Those who support the party's goals and tasks will stay with it; those who do not may skip the re-registration. They will have an opportunity to find another political organization which is closer to their own views.

[Yevseyev] Last question. Our newspaper will conduct extensive debates on the suggested action program for Moscow communists. If someone does not wish to use the newspaper as an intermediary, where should one send comments and suggestions?

[Prokofyev] Directly to the Moscow CPSU Gorkom. We have established a special task force which will review all these letters.

In conclusion, I would like to say that this program is open for everyone. Naturally, it will be expanded and adjusted in the course of the debates, but the most important point is that we can, and should, act on it now, without waiting for it to be formally adopted by the second phase of the city party conference.

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[Yevseyev] Thank you for the candid conversation, Yuriy Anatolyevich. We have not touched on one more important topic that is, judging from the number of calls to our offices, on the minds of many Muscovites—namely, the celebration of the 73rd Anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution in our capital. However, the reason for this omission is that next Tuesday the Moscow CPSU Gorkom will hold a press conference specifically on this topic. Therefore the very next day after this interview is published MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA readers will know all the details of how the holiday festivities on Red Square will be organized on 7 November. Meanwhile, until our next month's regular meeting.

[Prokofyev] Thank you. Until our next meeting in November.

### Moscow Party Organization Action Program

91UN02294 Moscow MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA  
in Russian 25 Oct 90 p 1

[Document "prepared by a working group formed on the initiative of the gorkom:" "Action Program of Moscow's Communists"]

[Text] To Ensure the Social Protection of Muscovites and Their Civil Rights and To Stabilize the City's Economy

**GOAL:** Under the conditions of transition to market relations, to defend the interests of the working man and the rights and safety of his person and to help him acquire faith in the future and peace of mind over the fate of his children.

*Operating in this direction, the city party organization must not distance itself from the solution of vitally important problems in the difficult transitional period. Without substituting for the managerial structures, it will take advantage of political and organizational possibilities and the influence of the party organizations in the work force and concentrate on the following:*

- The gorkom [city party committee] and raykoms [rayon party committees] and the primary organizations will support only such specific steps pertaining to transition to market relations as do not infringe the interests of the working people and take account of the specifics of the city and each of its rayons.
- Enterprise and organization party committees will act in defense of the rights of the work force to independently determine the forms of ownership and the models of management by all methods, up to and including the organization of political strikes and stoppages.
- The gorkom and raykoms and the primary party organizations will assist in the conclusion of business contracts for 1991 and the provision of the work force with government contracts (as of 1 October the level of provision with contracts and orders was on average approximately 40 percent).
- The Moscow Gorkom will use interparty relations with republic and oblast party organizations for additional supplies of high-quality products for Muscovites (in the present difficult import campaign, the gorkom has requested from the leaders of the fraternal Union republics Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan additional supplies to the capital of vegetables and fruit and organized Moscow's Communists for the harvesting of vegetables in the Moscow area).
- In conjunction with the Union of State Industrial and Scientific Organizations of the city the Moscow Gorkom will draft and offer a version of a program of priority measures pertaining to the stabilization of the



capital's industry and the prospects of the development of the Moscow industrial-economic region and will by parliamentary methods fight for its implementation.

- Moscow's Communists support the immediate adoption of an emergency energy program for the city capable of providing Moscow with the necessary heat and electric power, including the resumption of the construction of stage one of the Severnaya Heat and Electric Power Plant, and will participate directly in its elaboration and realization, via its representatives in the soviets included.
- The city's Communists will participate in the realization of specific measures pertaining to the development of sectors of the economy providing for the vital activity of the city itself (housing construction, health care, transport, food industry and so forth) and defense of the integrity of their work force and have supported and will continue the just struggle of the working people (the Moscow Gorkom was on the side of the subway construction workers and supported their demand for real material and financial backing for the installation of subway lines for 1991).

*With the transition to market relations a whole number of qualitatively new problems that are unfamiliar to Soviet man—connected with the appearance of unemployment, inflation and sharp price rises—will arise, and many people will confront the need to change their professions and improve their qualifications, and the government and local authorities could prove incapable of coping with the avalanche-like nature of the growth of the difficulties. People will need help to overcome the psychological stresses and material losses. The city party organization will make efforts to this end in the following areas:*

- The city's party organizations will develop political work at all levels and will support the workers movement in the struggle against the threat of the mass dismissal of working people without their having been afforded opportunities to find a new job or profession.
- The gorkom and the raykoms and the major primary party organizations will channel resources at their disposal and apply organizational efforts for the creation of schools for the retraining and instruction of personnel in modern production and management (these could be moderately priced worker retraining and requalification schools, marketing schools, courses for the instruction in computer technology of organizers and employees of the service sphere and such).
- The city party organization will participate actively in the formation and the activity of insurance funds for the social protection of individuals and the staging of charitable actions (the Moscow Gorkom was a founder of the Social Fund for Protection Against Unemployment created on the initiative of the newspaper RAB-OCHAYA TRIBUNA, ran the MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA charity lottery, and has rendered a number

of children's establishments and retirement homes specific assistance. This work will continue).

- The city's Communists advocate determination of the subsistence minimum under the specific conditions of Moscow and its more expensive life and the allocation from the city budget of the necessary resources for assistance for those who find themselves below the poverty line, primarily from the ranks of elderly people, invalids, the youth, and those with large families.
- The CPSU organizations of the city and the rayons will create legal advice centers and social assistance centers for the needy, the elderly, and the sick that are accessible to all Muscovites.
- The party organizations will assist in the formation of a Moscow city consumers' society and its local subdivisions, including in the territorial structures. Together with this, they will act as a guarantor of the protection of Muscovites' interests and submit to the Moscow City Soviet a package of proposals pertaining to antitrust policy of price curbs on consumer goods and the organization of the quality control of foods manufactured by the city's enterprises and its sale.
- Opposed to the universal commercialization of health care, the city party organization will seek, via its representatives in the soviets of people's deputies, the preservation of moderately priced medical establishments, their provision with modern equipment and medicines and the creation of the conditions for high-quality treatment for townspeople with a low level of sufficiency (the "Moscow" group of deputies will submit for the Moscow City Soviet's consideration a proposal concerning the special allocation of housing and extra payments from the city budget for municipal health care employees).
- The city party organization will support the youth and students' just demands and will contribute, including by its parliamentary activity, to the enshrinement of guarantees of their social protection under the conditions of the transition to market relations (referring to the indexation of the size of trainees' scholarships and subsidies from the state, republic and local budgets for public catering, municipal services and the youth's enjoyment of the services of health care and cultural establishments and sports installations). It will support in the Moscow City Soviet the city's Communist Youth League organization's initiative pertaining to the creation of a system of state and public service of youth and the Moscow Youth Fund and will seek the allocation of the necessary money for this.
- The city organization of the CPSU appeals to all the city's political and public organizations to form a fund for the construction of modern comfortable apartment houses with a special floor plan and equipment for large families and invalids.

The gorkom will strive via the Communist deputies, primarily the "Moscow" group, for the adoption of well-considered decisions based on Muscovites' opinion on such important matters as the sale of apartments into private hands and the establishment of a just system of payment for housing, depending on its quality, and will at the same time act in defense of the townspeople against the threat of a multiple rent increase.

*Sharing the concern of the city's inhabitants for the state of law and order in the face of the rise in crime, the Moscow city organization of the CPSU will contribute to the adoption of adequate measures in the fight against violations of legality and the assurance of a safe life for Muscovites.*

—The city's party organizations advocate a revival of voluntary forms of participation by the working people and inhabitants of Moscow in safeguarding public order and fighting against profiteering and abuses in trade. Moscow's Communists propose reformation via the self-managing committees of the place of residence, with the participation of the work force, of the volunteer public order squads, comrades' courts, and the system of worker control.

—The city organization of the CPSU is for the speediest enactment of a USSR law on the militia that determines the status, defends the honor and dignity of people working in the law enforcement authorities, and contributes to an improvement in their work and everyday conditions.

The gorkom will seek via the "Moscow" group of deputies a cardinal improvement in the material and technical facilities of the Moscow militia and the allocation of the necessary financial resources to this end.

The gorkom and the raykoms will support practical steps pertaining to the creation of a municipal militia and will render the soviets concrete assistance here, given a simultaneous strengthening of the all-Union system of law enforcement authorities.

#### **To Preserve the Capital's Intellectual and Cultural Potential**

**GOAL:** To prevent a loss of society's intellectual potential and cultural values.

*Under the conditions of general shortages the demand for new scientific developments and basic research could prove negligibly slight. Recognizing this, the Moscow city organization of the CPSU sets itself the following tasks:*

—Via the Moscow Communist deputies the gorkom will seek the speediest enactment of a USSR law on conversion that preserves the best S&T potential of the country and prevents unemployment among super-qualified specialists.

The party organizations of enterprises and research institutes of the defense complex will draw up proposals pertaining to creating on the basis of "technopoles"

provisions for priority scientific and technological developments and the manufacture of science-intensive products for the civilian sectors.

—The gorkom is for the creation in the city of the necessary conditions to develop basic scientific research and integrate academy, sectoral, and higher educational institution science. The party organizations of the city's research institutions will propose specific measures pertaining to the rational amalgamation and reorientation of the sectoral institutes for the preservation under the conditions of the market economy of their potential for S&T innovations on the scale of the country.

—In conjunction with the Communist deputies of the city and rayon soviets of people's deputies, the Moscow Gorkom will submit for consideration by the Moscow City Soviet proposals pertaining to a fundamental improvement in the position of the city's public education establishments and the assurance of equal opportunities for acquiring a full-fledged education for all children, regardless of the family income level.

*The capital's Communists are seriously troubled by the loss of the city's cultural and spiritual values and the decline in moral standards in society. The city party organization will contribute to a revival of Moscow traditions and historical monuments:*

—The gorkom and the raykoms will make their premises available for the organization of concerts, performances, and exhibitions for the broadest strata of the population.

—The city's party organizations will stage charity fairs and lotteries and organize voluntary Saturday work days and voluntary work on the restoration of cultural and architectural monuments (the Moscow Gorkom supported the initiative of the All-Russia Society for the Preservation of Historical and Cultural Monuments in respect to restoration of the Kazan Cathedral in Red Square).

—The Moscow Gorkom supports the demands of the artistic unions and sports societies that the establishment of taxes beyond their means pushing the sphere of culture and sport toward the commercialization of their activity be blocked. The city's party organizations will contribute to the development of a system of free and moderately priced sports and cultural establishments.

—The city party organization will help Moscow's national-cultural societies in every possible way. The Moscow Gorkom will participate actively in the formation of the Association of National-Cultural Societies and make facilities available for its activities.

**To Mold Political Culture, Develop Public Dialogue,  
and Create a New Information Atmosphere**

**GOAL:** To bring the city's party organizations to a fundamentally new level of political work in the interests of civil accord in society.

*Operating in this direction, the city party organization will make use of its available potential for the extensive notification of the public of the socioeconomic state of affairs in the city and the political situation and for a broadening of contacts and cooperation with various social forces and groups of the population and public movements:*

- The Moscow Gorkom proposes to all political parties and movements the establishment of a system of mutual regular consultations for the formulation of joint actions in the interests of civil accord, the development of democracy, and the renewal of society.

The gorkom advocates the creation of a political bloc of the center as a guarantor of stability and the prevention of a dangerous see-sawing of the situation in the city.

- Via the mass media, the gorkom will constantly keep Muscovites informed as to the state of affairs in the municipal economy. The Moscow Gorkom will create a city party information agency and begin the publication of a children's (school) newspaper, a specialized women's weekly, and a reference and advertising supplement to the newspaper MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA.

The printing facilities of the city party organization will be used to assist in the publication of rayon and works newspapers.

- The gorkom will organize on the basis of the Moscow Gorkom and Moscow Oblast CPSU Committee Social and Political Center the deputies' club "Moscow—Our Common Home" in the interests of consolidation of the people's deputies of the soviets of all levels for the solution of the city's urgent problems.

It will organize the work of a city workers' club. In conjunction with the unions it will organize the release of news bulletins on problems of development of the workers movement.

- For the purpose of unification of the public forces at large, advocating the socialist choice and civil accord, the city's Communists call for the solemn commemoration of the anniversaries of the October Revolution, International Women's Day, Vladimir Ilich Lenin's birthday, May Day, and the Victory Holiday.

The city organization of the CPSU will, together with the Council of Veterans of War and Labor, conduct a number of activities devoted to the 50th anniversary of the smashing of the German-fascist aggressors near Moscow and will seek the speediest completion of the installation of the Victory Memorial on Poklonnaya Hill.

**To Rally the Party Ranks and Increase the Political  
Assertiveness of the Communists**

**GOAL:** To acquire a modern appearance for the party organizations and combine the Communists' efforts on a platform of practical work.

*In striving for these goals the party committees of all levels will endeavor to ensure that the Communists of the city have a clear idea of the prospects of our society's development proposed by the CPSU and will study effective methods of political work and respond appropriately to the changes occurring in practice:*

- Enlisting in work the broad intellectual forces of the city party organization, the gorkom, in conjunction with the Leningrad Obkom, will prepare a version of the "CPSU Program" and offer it to the party for discussion.
- The gorkom supports the proposals of a number of the Communists' primary party organizations concerning the reregistration of CPSU members and considers it necessary that this work be performed following the adoption of the "CPSU Program."
- The gorkom and raykoms will support in every possible way the development of horizontal structures in the city party organization and will create conditions for the work of permanent conferences of secretaries of primary party organizations and party clubs. Moscow's Communists are for the creation of a youth wing of the CPSU.
- The gorkom, raykoms, and primary party organizations will convert political education labs into social and political labs and information centers, that will be oriented toward work with various categories of the population not only at enterprises and in organizations, but per the place of residence also.
- The city's party organizations will adopt an active offensive position in the fight against anticommunism and desecration of the memory and inheritance of V.I. Lenin and against moral terror against Communists.
- The Moscow Policy Institute will organize the goal-oriented training of the elective party activists incorporating study of the work experience of various parties, trends of the development of the social and political situation in the city and the country, and fundamentals of management.

\* \* \*

Such is the draft program of basic actions that the Moscow city organization of Communists proposes accomplishing in the interests of Muscovites and of the solution of the city's problems in the immediate future. It is open for discussion and for supplements and revisions. The program could not, naturally, take in the whole diversity of work on which the city's Communists are embarking currently. Much is being engendered daily

by life itself directly in the primary party organizations. And this cannot be inscribed in any program.

Following the comprehensive discussion of this document in the primary party organizations, it will be submitted for examination by stage two of the city party conference. But it is necessary to act in the specified areas right now, immediately.

[Dated] October 1990.

Footnote: This document was prepared by a working group formed on the initiative of the gorkom with regard to discussion in the club of delegates to the CPSU Congress and the city party conference of observations and proposals expressed in the rayon party organizations.

### Stankevich Interviewed on Tokyo Visit

91UN0205A Moscow VECHERNYAYA MOSKVA  
in Russian 26 Oct 90 p 2

[Report on interview with Sergey Stankevich, deputy chairman of the Moscow City Soviet of People's Deputies, during his mid-October trip to Tokyo, by TASS correspondent Vyacheslav Bantin: "Moscow Through Japanese Eyes"]

[Text] Tokyo-Moscow—The visit here last week of the chairman of the Moscow city soviet of people's deputies, Gavriil Popov, and his deputy, Sergey Stankevich, was a remarkable event in the political life of the Japanese capital. The night before his return to Moscow, Sergey Stankevich had an interview with TASS correspondent Vyacheslav Bantin.

In it, in particular, he said that Moscow should be the leading financial and commercial center of the country, the focus of the largest banks, insurance companies, and stock exchanges, and the center for the development of high technologies. All this can be done only with the most active contacts with the outside world. Moscow must be opened up for cooperation with other countries; foreign capital and technology can and must go through Moscow into Russia and then be further disseminated. Moscow should be like the gates to Russia.

What the delegation of the Moscow Soviet was working on here is directly linked to the future of Moscow as a technopolis, as the future financial and economic center of the country, S. Stankevich said. The interest in Japan is quite natural—of all the economically developed countries Japan has the greatest amount of free capital that is ready for investment.

Speaking of the main highlights of the visit, S. Stankevich first of all mentioned the meetings with representatives of the Tokyo City Council and the governor of Tokyo Prefecture, Shunichi Suzuki, as a result of which a preliminary agreement was reached that Moscow and Tokyo would establish fraternal relations. This would make it possible for the two cities to have

permanent close contact and conduct regular exchanges of a cultural, educational, and economic nature. The establishment of permanent ties between the capitals of the two countries can be considered a breakthrough that will have far-reaching political and economic consequences. In November a group of representatives of the Tokyo governor will come to Moscow to prepare the corresponding documents, which they plan to have signed during S. Suzuki's planned visit to Moscow in December. First of all, of course, these plans must be approved by the organs of power in Moscow and Tokyo.

S. Stankevich went on to discuss what he called the "material results" of the trip. He reported that, with the assistance of the general secretary of the Liberal Democratic party ruling in Japan, Ichiro Ozawa, an agreement had been reached with six of the largest corporations in Japan to grant Moscow the opportunity to acquire more than a million dollars' worth of consumer goods. Expenditure, including for delivering the goods to Moscow, will be born by the Japanese firms. The money has actually already been allotted and now it will be necessary to determine which goods to purchase within the established sum. Here it is necessary to proceed first of all from the needs of those Muscovites for whom changing over to the market economy is most difficult and to give them the opportunity, under the most privileged conditions, without trying, naturally, to gain profit for the city's coffers, to acquire Japanese goods, for example, washing and sewing machines. Of course, this is no solution to the commodity famine.... But while being concerned about the larger picture one must not forget about the smaller one.

In S. Stankevich's opinion, it is quite probable that the goods will make their way into the shadow economy. Therefore, it is planned to distribute the Japanese goods among the rayons of the capital, granting the rayon soviets of people's deputies the right to distribute them to the people and the voters. This is the greatest possible guarantee.

The deputy chairman of the Moscow Soviet reported that during the course of the visit they had managed to reach agreements with a number of firms for them to accept for study for a period of up to about three months a fairly large group of production organizers in Moscow—managers who will be able to learn a great deal in Japan. They also coordinated a significant contract that is about to be signed. This has to do with the production of glasses. According to the conditions of the contract, about 30 of the most modern optical stores will be opened in Moscow. Using special laser equipment right in these stores, the eye examination will be done, the right frames and lenses will be selected, and the glasses will be manufactured right there—the most modern kind, made of light alloys. All these stores will serve the consumers for rubles.

The Moscow plant that produces frames will undergo the necessary reconstruction, for which Japanese technology and capital will be used. The modern alloys needed for



manufacturing the frames will be produced partially at Moscow plants that previously worked for defense. There are also other interesting agreements, but the need to keep commercial secrets until the contracts are signed makes it impossible, unfortunately, to speak of them, just as it is impossible to mention the names of the Japanese companies that have expressed their readiness to cooperate.

S. Stankevich thinks that it is necessary to recognize the existence of the so-called "territorial problem" in relations between the Soviet Union and Japan, about which negotiations will have to be conducted. As a result, for example, the following kind of plan might be developed. To begin with the four islands to which Japan lays claim could become a zone of joint economic assimilation to which both Russia and Japan would have open access. Then it could be suggested that everyone who has work or business on the territory of these islands could register as permanent residents of the islands, regardless of their citizenship. The next stage could be the creation on the islands of a joint Russian-Japanese administration that would be in charge of management of the islands. After this point, S. Stankevich noted, there would be no obstacles to the signing of a peace agreement by the two countries.

Concerning the results of the founding congress of Democratic Russia that was held in Moscow, S. Stankevich said that up to this point the Democratic Russia movement and the interregional deputy group had tried to carefully draw a distinction between the N.I. Ryzhkov government and President M.S. Gorbachev. Three times the government has suggested variants for emerging from the economic crisis and three times they have been groundless. The government, and especially its head, have already become firmly associated with the crisis in all of its most difficult manifestations and the credit of confidence has finally run out.

Insisting on the government's retirement, the Democrats want to open up the road to two things. First, a Yeltsin-Gorbachev alliance, which had already begun to take form at one time, and second, a plan for radical economic reforms. Unfortunately, this plan was not destined to survive. In S. Stankevich's opinion, President Gorbachev acted inconsistently.

This is a cause of sincere regret since, as S. Stankevich emphasized, it is his profound conviction that perestroika needs the president, he can still do a great deal for perestroika, he has become its living symbol, and he serves as a very important guarantee of the proper order of changes. But now the president has actually taken responsibility for the failure that almost inevitably awaits the current Union economic program. And this is cause for serious alarm.

Figures in the Democratic camp, in the words of S. Stankevich, have now ended up in an extremely similar position. He had in mind, in particular, the leaders of the Leningrad and Moscow soviets, and the Supreme Soviet

of Russia. On the one hand, in spite of their will, they are having the Union program, which awaits failure, forced upon them. Indeed, quite independent of the Union Government, while remaining within the framework of the Union Government, at the level, say, of Moscow or Leningrad, it is quite unthinkable. At the level of Russia it is also practically impossible. Therefore, to stay in power under these conditions means to divide up the responsibility for the inevitable economic catastrophe about which the Democrats are now, of course, warning us, but the fact that they continue to remain in power means they are still responsible.

I cannot say that the Democrats have made their final choice—in favor of retirement—but that possibility is being seriously considered.

To be honest, S. Stankevich went on to say, the Moscow Soviet is not in charge of the city. He has nothing to do with the deliveries to Moscow of flour, meat, furniture, and so forth. It answers to the Muscovites for the lack of goods in the Moscow stores, but has nothing to do with their deliveries to the capital. With the exception of what is produced in Moscow enterprises, and then only if these are enterprises under city jurisdiction. And if a plant is not subordinate to the Moscow Soviet as, for example, the ZIL which makes refrigerators is not, then the soviet cannot tell it what to deliver and where.

Therefore, statements about the "master" of the city, S. Stankevich thinks, are exaggerated and nobody in the Moscow Soviet has any delusions about this. Nonetheless, it really must deal with both hunger and cold.... Regarding hunger: Deputies of the Moscow Soviet understand that the ruble will not work in the next few months and, therefore, they are trying with all their might to obtain real goods or hard currency in order to store up the minimum necessary food supply for winter.

Ration cards will probably be introduced in the capital beginning on 1 December. All calculations show that there is no other way to supply the city. Whatever people manage to deliver to Moscow, even for hard currency, immediately spreads out over the entire country, ending up on the black markets of various cities, and there is actually no way of stopping this, although the corresponding organs are working very hard. Along with the ration cards, trade at commercially free prices will be introduced.

With respect to cold. There is a full supply of fuel. But there will be a different problem during the winter: The heating systems have become so worn out over all these years that they are simply breaking down and falling apart. All it takes is one atmosphere of pressure over the norm and the pipes begin to burst. Then it will be possible to rub the Moscow Soviet's nose in all the places where the pipes have burst, using this in the polemics on one issue or another. And this kind of vulnerability exists in many areas.

One can imagine what kind of "master" the Moscow Soviet will be. Of course, we cannot go on living like this.

We cannot live from month to month, from crisis to crisis; we must make general decisions.

## WESTERN REPUBLICS

### Reports of Unjustified Party Privileges Refuted

91UN0181A Minsk SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA  
in Russian 18 Oct 90 p 3

[Belorussian CP Central Committee Affairs Administration: "Once More About Privileges: On the Essence of the Question"]

[Text] Recently a number of articles have been published in the newspapers RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA, NARODNAYA GAZETA, PRATSA, 7 DNEY and certain other publications, on the fact that the leading officials of Belorussia, including the apparat of the Belorussian CP Central Committee, enjoy allegedly undeserved privileges and benefits. Such articles have also appeared before, and appropriate explanations were made for them, which were brought to the attention of the readers. The appearance of such printed materials at this time, on the eve of the 31st Belorussian CP Central Committee Congress, generated reaction among both Communists and non-party members. In this connection it has become necessary to return once again to the given question, and to provide detailed information on its essence in the pages of the press of the citizens of the republic.

Analysis of the articles indicates that on the whole they can be reduced to criticism of the present practice of providing leading officials with housing, granting them official dachas and allocating garden plots to them; and also their trade and medical services.

The objective picture at the present time is as follows:

The constitutional right of every citizen of the USSR for housing extends fully to the officials of the party apparat as well. As a rule, people come to party work from working collectives, and are promoted from lower-ranking to higher-ranking party organs. At the same time many of them change their place of residence, and are move along with their families. Naturally, the question of housing arises, since as always, their place of employment and the apartment in which they dwell are provided to them by the local organs. In this situation, party committees as well as other organizations take upon themselves the concern for providing housing to their fellow-workers.

Funds and capital investments for housing construction for people working in the party committees (to include technical workers) are centrally allocated by the CPSU Central Committee Affairs Administration. The Belorussian CP Central Committee Affairs Administration does not build departmental residential housing, and the allocated capital investments are transferred to the executive committees of local Soviets of People's

Deputies for shared participation in construction, just as is done in all other enterprises, organizations and institutions. Incidentally, for the year 1991, the volume of housing construction with shared participation with local Soviets is being decreased by 40 percent. This is associated primarily with the reduction of the party apparat.

Distribution of funds for housing construction is carried out in accordance with orders from oblast party committees. On the average, a party raykom receives from three to five apartments in a five-year plan. They are allocated according to the queue on the basis of from 8-12 square meters of living space per person; that is, in accordance with the existing normative documents.

Allocation of housing in the collective of the Belorussian CP Central Committee apparat is the concern of a housing commission established by the Central Committee Secretariat. The membership of the commission includes representatives of administration, party and trade-union organizations. At the same time, housing is allocated first of all to newly-arrived officials who have been transferred to Minsk from other cities and rayons in the republic. You see, many of them spend a significant period (sometimes a year or more) in the dormitory of the Minsk Higher Party School before they receive housing.

And now, about the allocation of apartments to the persons designated in the articles. The main thing for which they are blamed is—the receipt of additional living space, allegedly in violation of the law. Is this true? Are there grounds for such accusations?

Let us turn to the legislative acts. Article 22 of the Fundamental Housing Legislation of the USSR and the Union Republics stipulates, that certain categories of citizens shall be granted living space in addition to the norms in the form of a ten-square-meter room. For citizens for whom space is necessary in accordance with the conditions and nature of their assigned work, the size of the additional living space may be increased. A number of normative documents stipulate that the list of the categories of citizens having the right to additional living space includes officials of state institutions and enterprises, and also professional, party, cooperative and other social organizations. This right is also granted to scientific workers, members of the unions of writers, journalists, composers, artists, architects and cinematographers; distinguished efficiency experts and inventors; members of the officer corps with the rank of colonel or the equivalent and higher; Heroes of the Soviet Union and persons awarded the Glory Medal with three degrees, Heroes of Socialist Labor, and persons awarded the Medal of Labor Glory with three degrees; personal pensioners, and also persons who suffer from certain diseases (in accordance with a list approved by the USSR Health Ministry). Detailed explanations on this account were given in the newspaper SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA on 26 April, 24 June and 19 September of this year. Consequently, the indiscriminate assertions

of the authors of the articles about violations of the law in the part on allocating leading party officials additional living space are without foundation.

As far as the specific facts cited in the newspapers are concerned, they have been carefully studied and examined in the Belorussian CP Central Committee Bureau. The check has established that the housing questions were authorized in accordance with housing legislation and in consideration of the established practice of allocating additional housing space to responsible officials of state and social institutions and organizations. When the housing was allocated, the size of the family, medical affidavits, membership in creative societies, the possession of a scholarly degree, and other circumstances, were considered.

Can one actually place under suspicion of illegality the allocation of an apartment to L.G. Kletskov, formerly first secretary of the Belorussian CP Grodno Obkom, a veteran of the Great Patriotic War and Hero of Socialist Labor, who in his time traveled to Grodno on the directions of the Central Committee, was given an apartment by the Belorussian CP Central Committee Affairs Administration, and now having retired, has requested allocating him housing in Minsk? Belorussian CP Central Committee Second Secretary A.S. Kamay found himself in a similar position, having been sent to Gomel in 1982 as well and having given up his apartment in Minsk; and subsequently having been elected Central Committee secretary, he has returned to Minsk, and has handed over the four-room apartment he previously occupied to the Affairs Administration of the Belorussian CP Gomel Obkom. Is it proper to reproach former Central Committee Secretary A.T. Kuzmin, wounded several times in the war years, who has moved from a five-room to a three-room apartment? Or is it proper to reproach someone on the pages of the newspapers for the fact that, due to life's circumstances one continues to live in a large apartment with fewer members of one's family, if in accordance with the laws presently in effect in the country, no one has legal basis for demanding they move to another apartment? One can only regret that the name of Belorussian CP Central Committee instructor V.V. Dovzhonok appeared in the paper, since his mother is gravely ill and a change of apartments was dictated by medical considerations. The living conditions of Comrades V.N. Bachilo and V.Ye. Zhdanovich, Central Committee instructors, were also improved in consideration of similar circumstances.

One can also cite convincing arguments on behalf of other officials mentioned in the published articles. For instance, when granting apartments to central committee secretaries, one must also consider the fact that by virtue of the specific nature of their work, the technical capability and appropriate space must be provided in these apartments for installation of special means of communication. However, the authors of the articles did not want to delve into the essence of the matter. Could the nature of the articles have been different in that case? Of course not. You see, for the sake of objectivity it would

probably have been proper to inform the readers that, in accordance with the law, in the city of Minsk alone, 323 apartments were allocated in 1989 in which the right to receive additional living space was realized. Of this number, only there were only six party workers, who were allocated apartments by the Belorussian CP Central Committee Affairs Administration.

Considering the gravity of the housing problem in the republic, the Belorussian CP Central Committee Bureau, while examining the above-mentioned materials once again called the attention of party committees at all levels to the necessity of strictly observing the housing laws.

At the very same time we believe that a number of the provisions of existing housing laws require clarification, which would be reflected in putting the changes into practice, and we are prepared to support any sensible suggestions on this account.

Just a few years ago, it was considered intolerable that a party worker should have his own dacha, garden plot or automobile. Party cadres understood, however, that many thousands of citizens have had such benefits for more than 20 years now.

The Atolino boarding house, which today has become "the talk of the town," was built in the 1970's. It offers a room and a plot of land to up to 300 central committee employees for the period of their employment on the staff. For this, each family is assessed a monthly fee averaging 14 rubles year-round, even though active use of the boarding house consists of only four to five months out of the year.

We note that 114 enterprises and organizations in the republic also have boarding houses, sanatoria and preventive health clinics.

This form of worker recreation has proven itself well, and it should be solidly supported by actively developing a network of such treatment facilities.

In 1988, by decision of the Belorussian CP Central Committee Secretariat, it was decided to allocate plots of land and authorize construction of garden sheds for workers of retirement age and to those who have a year to go before retirement. And only this year were these restrictions lifted, allowing party officials access to gardening societies, just as any other citizen.

In connection with the reduction of the party apparatus, rooms vacated in the boarding house have already been partially transferred to workers and employees of the Atolino staff. A certain portion of the rooms have been offered to former Central Committee officials—veterans of the party, war and labor who have no garden plots.

From time to time the topic of official dachas comes up in the articles.

In the little community of Drozdy, which was organized in 1946 for the relaxation of leading officials in the



republic, there are 32 small dacha houses, many of which are in very poor physical condition, to include eight which are totally run down. Only three houses are state dachas and only one of these is on the ZhRES [Housing Repair and Operating Service?] books of the Belorussian CP Central Committee Affairs Administration. The resolution of the Belorussian CP Central Committee and the Belorussian SSR Council of Ministers of 25 May 1990 authorized retaining the right to use officials dachas for a fee, as had been the case before, in accordance with existing housing and municipal norms, for members of the Central Committee Bureau, the Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, and the Belorussian SSR Council of Ministers Presidium. The families of former leaders of the republic—P.M. Masharov, T.Ya. Kiselev, S.O. Pritytskiy, F.A. Surganov, I.Ye. Polyakov, and A.N. Aksenov—are also authorized to use the dacha houses in the Drozd community, for the very same fee. State dachas are granted only to the Belorussian CP Central Committee first secretary, to the Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet chairman, and to the chairman of the Belorussian SSR Council of Ministers.

In the articles the fee for the use of official dachas is termed "symbolic." In actuality, central committee secretaries, as the temporary owners, pay up to 500 rubles a year for the dacha and all the municipal services.

At the present time the Belorussian CP Central Committee Affairs Administration is resolving questions of transferring vacant habitable official dachas to the jurisdiction of the Belorussian SSR Ministry of Social Security.

Also one-sided are the facts cited in the articles on construction of personal dachas for Belorussian CP Central Committee secretaries. The dacha village of which we speak has been situated in an already-existing construction zone beyond the limits of the Zhdanovich resort zone, within the bounds of the forest-park belt of the city of Minsk, where, incidentally, there are 252 gardening societies, within which there are more than 36,000 garden plots. It is no secret to anyone that about 200 small dacha houses have already been built on the territory of village number six.

As already reported in the press, among the personnel assigned to the former Fourth Main Administration of the Belorussian SSR Health Ministry, only 5.4 percent are party members, to include 1.3 percent who are employees of the Belorussian CP Central Committee apparat.

The aforementioned Administration was abolished by the resolution of the Belorussian CP Central Committee and Belorussian SSR Council of Ministers of 17 February 1990. Its polyclinic and pediatric in-patient department were eliminated. The republic polyclinic of the former Fourth Main Administration on Ulyanovskaya St. has been transferred from the books of the Belorussian SSR Council of Ministers to the health administration of the Minsk City Executive Committee,

to provide medical services to the citizens who live in the surrounding district, and to personal pensioners of union and republic significance. A consultation and diagnostic center is being set up on the facilities of this polyclinic for the republic's veterans of war and labor.

In order to render medical assistance to Heroes of the Soviet Union and Heroes of Socialist Labor, to People's Deputies of the USSR and Belorussian SSR, to laureates of the Lenin Prize, to persons holding the honorific title of "People's" of the USSR and Belorussian SSR, to academicians and corresponding members, to leading officials of republic organs, and also to the public dwelling in the city of Minsk in the region bounded by Ya. Kupaly, Ulyanovskaya and Lenin Streets, and Lenin Prospekt, a health-care and treatment association has been established by the Belorussian SSR Council of Ministers Affairs Administration.

We would remind the readers, that in 1988 the Aksakovshchina Sanatorium of the former Fourth Administration was also transferred to the Belorussian SSR Health Ministry for the organization of an institute of radiation therapy with a clinical department. The polyclinic building along Krasnoarmeyskaya St. had already been transferred to that institution for a dispensary.

For treatment of children and their parents from regions that had been subjected to radioactive contamination as a result of the disaster at the Chernobyl Atomic Power Plant, the former Fourth Administration's "Belorussiya" sanatoria in Miskhora and Druskininkay and the "Borovoye" sanatorium on Lake Naroch, were transferred gratis to the Belorussian SSR Health Ministry. The decision on this was taken by the Belorussian CP Central Committee and republic Council of Ministers in January 1990. The republic Health Ministry will also be in charge of the sanatorium being built in Kislovodsk.

It is fitting to stress that all the medical institutions of the former Fourth Administration have been under the direct supervision of the Belorussian SSR Council of Ministers and not the Belorussian CP Central Committee as certain of the publications asserted.

On trade and domestic services: Here each of the authors is exercising what he's best at. And by the way, it's time for them to put this topic to rest. There are no special stores, studios, or even order desks for responsible officials of the Central Committee apparat whatsoever; and there are, consequently, none to be closed. And there has been free access to the sole dining hall of the Belorussian CP Central Committee Affairs Administration in the Oktyabrskaya Hotel since its first day in existence; it is open to all citizens of the republic and their guests in accordance with its operating schedule.

We hope that unprejudiced readers can draw their own conclusions on the essence of the problem of privileges. Party workers are in plain view of everyone; they are not hiding from the people's eyes. In the present situation they are experiencing the very same difficulties as all the



citizens of the republic, and are doing everything to see that these difficulties are as few as possible.

Every newspaper has its own imprint, its own credo. And every print organ has the right to its own position. But this position must always be a weighty one, legally sound, and objective.

One cannot help noticing that in various publications, as a rule, the very same authors, as if literally carrying out a social demand for discreditation, deliberately write about the very same facts, calling them basically by the very same names. Moreover, all this is served up from a point of view suitable for forming a negative attitude toward party cadres in the social milieu.

Once again we declare with complete authority that the party officials of Belorussia, who were elected and are working in leading posts, have not been subjected to corruption, and do not permit unlawful activities as was the case in other regions of the country. Testifying to this is the many years of practical work and the objective reality of the present day. And if certain persons want to cast a pall over them, they can come right out and say it: they have assumed an improper role. Sooner or later, prejudice will yield its place to common sense and to the honest truth.

#### **Belorussian Official on Rise in Nationalism, Potential for Conflict**

91UN0240C Minsk ZNAMYA YUNOSTI in Russian  
9 Oct 90 p 1

[Interview with Mikhail Slemnev, Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet Nationalities Policy and Interethnic Relations Commission chairman, conducted by unnamed ZNAMYA YUNOSTI parliamentary correspondent: "Not a Powder Keg, But..."]

[Text] *Today marks the start of the 2nd Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet session. Preparations for it indicated that the people's deputies have very difficult work in store for them. But the most pressing issue will be the fate of our democracy and our national sovereignty. These and other questions were posed by ZNAMYA YUNOSTI's parliamentary correspondent to Mikhail Slemnev, Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet Nationalities Policy and Interethnic Relations Commission chairman.*

[Correspondent] Mikhail Aleksandrovich, I interviewed you at the start of the first session. By present-day standards quite a lot of time has passed since then. In your opinion what has changed in Belorussia's political life since that time?

[Slemnev] Our republic is beginning to move toward real state and spiritual sovereignty. Our progress is still hardly visible; it is painful and contradictory. But I do believe that the ice has begun to shift. And that movement is irreversible. It is extremely important that it is legislatively "nourished" by the Declaration of Sovereignty adopted by the first session.

[Correspondent] Yet under the present constitution the republic was already a sovereign state. Yet that sovereignty was just window dressing.

[Slemnev] Of course, in the real world no idea all by itself is capable of changing anything. But allow me to remind you of a well-known thesis of presently persecuted Marxism, i.e. that an idea becomes a physical force if it wins over the masses. Right now we are witnessing the awakening of Belorussians' ethnic self-awareness. The Belorussian Peoples' Front "Adradzhenye", the "Tavarystva belaruskay movy", the "Batskawshchyna" Association and others are playing a tremendous role in speeding up this process. And what a powerful impetus was given to the rebirth of Belorussian culture by the great Skorininskiy festivals! I had the pleasure of spending several days in, so to speak, a "pure" Belorussian-speaking environment. An unforgettable impression! The stimulus for and the guarantee of the irreversibility of Belorussia's movement toward national sovereignty are analogous processes occurring in the republics which border Belorussia: Lithuania, Latvia, Russia and the Ukraine.

[Correspondent] What are your comments on the tactics for gaining independence employed by Lithuania? How do you perceive our relations as neighbors in the future?

[Slemnev] It seems to me that the passions surrounding the sudden transformation of Lithuania into a sovereign state have already died down. In this regard everything was carried out, one might say, in a legally and politically irreproachable manner. Time will tell how our relations with Lithuania will develop in the future. But I think that reason will prevail. And we will live like good, independent neighbors. Incidentally, we are currently negotiating a trip to Minsk by Lithuanian parliamentarians who are responsible for interethnic relations issues. This is a result of the visit to Lithuania in the spring by a group of Belorussian SSR people's deputies which was made at Landsbergis' personal invitation.

[Correspondent] In the Baltic republics and in the Ukraine, not to mention in Transcaucasia and Central Asia, national revival has created many explosive problems. Does that not threaten us as well?

[Slemnev] The laws of the dialectic function mercilessly in every field, including that of interethnic relations: there as well every bit of progress also has its dark, regressive side. It is very important that that side be noticed in time and its further spread halted. If this is not done the situation could get out of control. Our republic today is a sufficiently stable zone of ethnic harmony. In order to maintain this ethnic equilibrium we must take care to ensure free development of all ethnic communities living in our republic. Our commission recently traveled to areas with dense populations of Lithuanians and Poles. And we heard many complaints. Specifically, it was commented that a number of newspaper and magazine articles have offended the ethnic sensibilities of Belorussian Poles...

Every citizen has the right to free ethnic self-determination. Yet by the same token I believe that following passage of the Belorussian SSR Law on Citizenship (and our commission is heading up the job of preparing the draft of this law) the infamous line 5 in personal information questionnaires should disappear.

[Correspondent] Mikhail Aleksandrovich, were there similar complaints from Belorussians living alongside Poles?

[Slemnev] There were, and even more justified ones. Incidentally, I just returned from a trip to Bialystok Wojewodstvo with my colleagues, Belorussian SSR people's deputies Gribanov, Borshchevskiy and Sumarov. I think that Belorussians in Poland need much more ethnic protection than Poles in Belorussia, and that is something to which we need to give some thought. In the near future we will consider the results of our trip at a commission meeting and report our findings to the Supreme Soviet.

[Correspondent] But are there in fact areas of interethnic tension in our republic? Does there exist somewhere a zone of, so to speak, heightened ethnic risk?

[Slemnev] There really are no clear-cut areas like that. But unskillful nationalities policy could easily create them. A particular danger is presented (as demonstrated by the development of events in the Western Ukraine) by religious buildings at one time taken away from believers by the state. Today they are being returned to their former owners. But which denomination has rights to them is difficult to determine without the aid of qualified specialists. A mistake in this regard is intolerable, for religiously motivated disputes often take on ethnic overtones and intensify tremendously as a result. Unfortunately there have already been cases of this nature in our republic. But it would be best to talk about that next time. Let us not inflame tempers. I will merely say that a special commission is working under the aegis of the Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet; this commission is delving into the tangled knot of ethnic/religious problems.

[Correspondent] Today one statement heard virtually everywhere is the claim that the main reason for interethnic hatred in our country is flagrant violation of the principles of Leninist nationalities policy. Supposedly if things had gone "according to Lenin" then the many problems which perestroika has exposed would not have accumulated during the cult of personality and stagnation years... Do you share that viewpoint?

[Slemnev] You know, I cannot agree with that. In those years there definitely were deviations from the Leninist model for achieving harmony in interethnic relations. But consider, for instance, the Brezhnev form of nationalities policy: "unswerving convergence of nations leading to their eventual blending on a basis of universal flourishing." That is a logical extrapolation from Leninist doctrine on the nationalities question. But how could thoroughly developed nations blend in a natural

fashion into a qualitatively homogeneous ethnic whole? That is not dialectics; that is scholastic equilibrium. Something like that can be achieved forcibly, to the detriment of ethnic distinctiveness. But a process like that is similar to bending a stiff spring. Sooner or later it is going to spring back.

[Correspondent] One last question, Mikhail Aleksandrovich. Our newspaper receives many letters from people asking how long our authorities are going to continue to do everything they can to ignore and refuse to recognize the Belorussian People's Front. In view of the fact that this stance with regard to the Belorussian People's Front merely serves to inflame passions surrounding this essentially ethnic issue, what steps does your commission intend to take?

[Slemnev] I keep asking myself the same question: how long? I think that the Belorussian People's Front should have been recognized long ago. The motives for and appropriate nature of such a political act have been so thoroughly covered (including by your newspaper) that there is simply no point in going into them again. I would merely add that the Belorussian People's Front deserves registration if for no other reason than for its active legislative activity in the republic parliament. For the opposition (the nucleus of which is comprised of deputies from the Belorussian People's Front) long ago without coercion, prompted by enthusiasm alone, prepared a package of draft laws for the upcoming session. In my opinion some of them are of somewhat better quality than those presented by official circles. As for measures which might be taken by our (or any other) commission to speed up their registration, there is no need for such measures now. As far as I know (if I have not been misinformed) the Belorussian People's Front is to be registered in the near future.

#### **Belorussian Constitutional Amendments on Legal Procedures Proposed**

91UN0240A Minsk SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA  
in Russian 27 Oct 90 p 2

[Article by V. Bykov, honored jurist of the Belorussian SSR and republic deputy minister of internal affairs: "Constitutional Paradoxes"]

[Text] As you are aware, the Supreme Soviet has established a commission to prepare a new republic constitution. It is possible that my thoughts, the fruit of practical experience, will be of interest to the commission members. In essence, those thoughts are as follows.

The current Belorussian SSR Constitution, like the USSR Constitution, has a Section VIII: "Court Proceedings, Arbitration and Procuratorial Supervision." The two chapters in this section outline the most important points in regard to conducting of trial proceedings by the court alone, procedures for forming courts, and the basic principles according to which justice is administered.

They contain articles 157 and 160, which concern the right of the accused to defense, lawyers' boards and legal aid to citizens.

Everyone knows, and this is stated in legislation, that trial proceedings involve not only the court's hearing of a case and the participation of the defense therein. In accordance with the Belorussian SSR Criminal Trial Code this process also includes the pretrial investigation, which is very major and of great importance in terms of ensuring that justice is served, as well as police inquiries aimed at uncovering, stopping, solving and investigating crimes or preventing crime.

Under their jurisdiction fall not only interrogation of witnesses, searches, identification, appointment of expert witnesses and forensic experiments, but also such acts as issuing of indictments and selection of crime interdiction measures, including the taking of suspects into custody, searches, seizures of property and correspondence, removal of the accused from his or her official position and a number of other functions which are of importance to the authorities and which significantly affect and even restrict citizens' most important rights (the inviolability of the person and the home, secrecy of correspondence, etc.) as guaranteed by the Belorussian SSR Constitution (Articles 13, 53, 53 and 54).

If we are creating a constitution not just for the purpose of proclamation and propaganda then we should definitely state clearly along with the articles on the rights guaranteed to citizens that those constitutional rights may not in any case be infringed upon legally in the name of the state.

In our republic investigative organs indict approximately 30,000 people a year, and of those approximately one-half are taken into custody while awaiting trial; tens of thousands of searches are conducted, and millions of rubles are impounded and property belonging to the accused seized in order to guarantee compensation for the physical damages caused by them. All this activity is nowhere even mentioned in the constitution, nor are pretrial investigation as a legal institution or the organs which carry it out.

This type of work, as well as other things, is done by police inquiry organs, and they and their functions are only mentioned indirectly in the republic constitution in chapters 13 and 14. Specifically, article 118, Chapter 13 states that within the limits of its powers the Belorussian SSR Council of Ministers "takes steps to protect the interests of the state, protect socialist property and preserve public order, and to ensure and defend citizens rights and freedoms; takes measures within the bounds defined by the USSR Constitution to ensure state security..."

A legal question arises: why does the constitution in its discussion of court procedures, arbitration, procuratorial supervision and lawyers' services make no reference to pretrial investigation and police inquiry? Why do the

activities of the investigative apparatuses remain outside the bounds of constitutional regulation, as well as those of the powerful services which conduct police inquiry, above all militia and state security organs?

Is it not because in times past these organs were regarded by the administrative-command system primarily as a punitive, repressive apparatus designed to defend the system's interests and the authoritarian aspirations of its leaders, an apparatus whose functions it was convenient to keep outside the scope of constitutional regulation?

But is failure to mention all these vital activities in the constitution in the best interest of anti-crime efforts? No, this merely hampers those efforts. The USSR Supreme Soviet was adamantly opposed to a draft law which would have made it legal to wiretap telephone lines in order to uncover serious crimes. The deputies were outraged, because this legal statute would have infringed on the constitutionally protected secrecy of correspondence, telephone conversations and data transfer by telephone. A majority of them obviously did not know that the law already makes provision for the monitoring of postal and telegraph correspondence in investigations as a very important tool for uncovering crimes, and that this has been applied in practice for decades. They did not know because the constitution does not say a word about the possibility or permissibility of such an exception to a constitutional provision.

Nor is the current system in the best interest of investigative and police inquiry personnel. The gaps in their social protection, material-technical supply and living conditions about which so much is being written and said today are to a certain degree the result of the silence and secrecy surrounding their work, the result of a lack of legislation, including constitutional regulation, a result of a public lack of information about the state of affairs in that area.

The current constitution contains the thesis that defense of the Motherland and military service in the USSR Armed Forces is an honorable duty of citizens of the Belorussian SSR. If that thesis is in the new constitution, then it should be added that protection of law and order and service in the militia, investigative apparatus or fire department are equally important and honorable, even though these duties are performed voluntarily rather than by obligation. The difficulty, danger and responsibility of such work hardly need to be proven. This work is perhaps even more dangerous than military service, because it involves constant risk and losses even in peacetime. Last year alone criminals in our republic used firearms on 117 occasions, including five cases in which firearms were used in assaults on militia personnel. Law enforcement personnel were also forced to use firearms in self-defense or to prevent serious crimes on 40 occasions. A total of 23 militiamen were wounded while performing their official duties, and one was killed.

I must note the vagueness and declarative and contradictory nature of Article 159 of the republic constitution.

It states: "no one may be found guilty of committing a crime or subjected to criminal penalties except on the basis of a court's sentence and in accordance with the law."

Interpreting the text of this article strictly one would have to deem improper the actions of investigators and militiamen who submit indictments and arrest guilty parties prior to trial, in the course of pretrial investigation and policy inquiry. Let us add to this that under current legislation the procurator, the investigator and the organ of policy inquiry (with the procurator's consent) have a right to free an individual from criminal prosecution if the individual confesses to committing the crime, and to close a case on a non-rehabilitating basis, i.e. they have the right to find a person guilty of a crime without trial. How can this be squared with the aforementioned declarative statement in the constitution?

It would be more correct to formulate Article 159 of the constitution thus: "No one may be subjected to criminal penalties other than by a court's sentence. An individual may be found guilty of committing a crime only in strict accordance with the law."

In view of Article 10 of the Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet's Declaration of State Sovereignty I would like to make the following suggestions:

- that Section VIII of the current Belorussian SSR Constitution be expanded to include a chapter on the militia, the investigative apparatus and state security organs setting forth their basic tasks, functions, and operating principles;
- that a number of special Belorussian SSR laws be drawn up and passed in regard to law enforcement activities, including laws on the militia, on the investigative apparatus, on fire safety and fire departments, and on regulations governing service in those organs;
- that civil, criminal, criminal trial, administrative, correctional and other republic legislation be updated and published in large numbers, including in Belorussian, as required by the Belorussian SSR Language Law.

#### **Belorussian Survey Shows More Residents Intend To Leave Republic**

91UN0240B Minsk SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA  
in Russian 27 Oct 90 p 2

[Article by Ye. Konoplya, BSSR people's deputy, director of the Belorussian SSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Radiobiology and academician, and A. Bobylev, doctor of juridical sciences and Belorussian State University professor: "Special Attention Zone: In the Mirror of Public Opinion"]

[Text] As a result of radioactive contamination significant changes are taking place in Belorussia's social and demographic structure. Above all this is affecting the number of people living in the contaminated regions. A

substantial migration of rural population out of the republic has been observed. Thus, a survey of rural workers who had already relocated to Buda-Koshelevskiy Rayon indicated that 29 percent of them intended to move out of the Belorussian SSR and that an equal number wished to move again, but that they had neither the strength nor the funds to do so.

Over the past three years the residents of Narovlyanskiy, Khoynikskiy and Braginskii Rayons have rated their working and living conditions as very poor. Furthermore, they are deeply convinced of the need to move out of the aforementioned regions. The primary motivations for such intentions were concern for their children's health as well as the belief that working and living conditions are not going to change for the better.

However, studies of public opinion have revealed persistent demands that a scientifically well-founded concept be developed for continued residence in the areas affected by radioactive contamination. To broad segments of the population the USSR Ministry of Health concept "35 rems over a lifetime" is unacceptable. But the problem of a legal system governing the contaminated zone also include such issues as agricultural workers' health. We feel that these issues should be considered comprehensively, and that in order to do this it is essential that a Belorussian SSR Law on the Use and Protection of Radioactively Contaminated Areas be drafted. But even prior to the passage of such a law the production of agricultural produce and all production-related and commercial activity in the affected regions should be halted, with the exception of environmental protection activity.

One important problem is organized resettlement of entire farms or their production subunits to new locations. Between 67 and 90.5 percent of those surveyed who are intending to leave the contaminated areas direct attention to this problem. Other forms of resettlement have not proven to be as significant to people. People are very concerned about where they are to be resettled. Thus, 82 percent of those surveyed in Buda-Koshelevskiy Rayon and 63 percent in Zhlobinskiy Rayon feel that their settlement in those rayons was a mistake, since in terms of radiation those areas cannot be considered any safer. This is having an effect on the plans of resettled individuals for the future. Of those resettled to Buda-Koshelevskiy Rayon 58 percent intend to change their place of residence again, and 12 percent intend to go back home. In Zhlobinskiy Rayon 26 percent of those surveyed do not intend to return to their former places of residence.

Study of public opinion indicates that in the resettlement process not all the problems connected with adaptation to a new place were resolved. For example, here are the views of persons resettled in Zhlobinskiy Rayon. Of those surveyed, 23 percent directed attention to local residents' indifferent attitude toward them; 26 percent felt that their living conditions had worsened; 34.4



percent of those surveyed were changing their profession; 27 percent noted a worsening of their families' material status; 18.7 percent indicated that their food supply was intolerably poor. A similar situation was found in other rayons as well.

Thus, problems connected with resettlement from the contaminated regions must be resolved on a scientific basis, and in order to do this we must have a clear-cut concept which will provide the whole population with clarity and certainty. These issues could be dealt with in the Belorussian SSR Law on the Status of Persons Resettled for Ecological Reasons (Refugees).

Despite the fact that four years have passed since the accident the people of Belorussia still do not have complete and detailed information about contamination of land and food products by radionuclides. This is increasing tension in the sociopolitical situation and is resulting in organized protests; part of the population is losing its confidence in the authorities. Thus, a survey of people living in Volozhinskiy Rayon indicated that they do not see any concern for improvement in the working and living conditions of rural workers in the contaminated areas either on the part of the republic government, the oblast and rayon leadership or agricultural enterprises.

The USSR Supreme Soviet has decided to create a unified system of radiation ecology information which will be accessible to all segments of the population and which will present a wide range of data on radiation contamination, health care and ecological statistics and will make use of the capabilities of the press, radio and television. However, the aforementioned poll of residents of Volozhinskiy Rayon indicates that only nine percent of those surveyed in contaminated areas are aware of the radiation level. A total of 42 percent of those surveyed were not aware of the radiation level, and 12 percent had contradictory information. Furthermore, 34 percent of those surveyed did not have objective information regarding their children's health or their own health. Nor is the USSR Supreme Soviet's resolution being implemented in other oblasts in the republic either. There are no objective data on the state of the public's health or those data, in the public's opinion, are being distorted in Narovlyanskiy, Khoynikiy, Braginskiy and Krasnopol'skiy rayons. The residents themselves are convinced that the state of their health and their children's health has worsened substantially. Attention is directed to this by between 66 and 91 percent of those surveyed.

It is time that Belorussia established a unified radiation ecology information system which is accessible to all segments of the population and which will make broadly available data on radiation contamination and will eliminate all the secrecy surrounding these matters. The Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet should consider establishing administrative and criminal penalties for officials who intentionally conceal or distort information

regarding accidents with ecological consequences or regarding public health and environmental pollution.

A number of legislative acts passed by the USSR Supreme Soviet recently which change substantially procedures for legal regulation of ecological relations in our country, as well as changes in our republic's ecological situation resulting from the Chernobyl nuclear accident, necessitate corresponding changes and amendments to our republic constitution. Thus, Article 18 should be amended to state that the Belorussian SSR establishes standards for ecological safety within its territory and carries out environmental protection efforts, defines limits and standards for the use of nature, and issues permits for or bans on activities by enterprises and organizations. Matters connected with the use or protection of radiation-contaminated areas of the Belorussian SSR are to be regulated by republic legislation.

Guarantees should also be provided for republic citizens' right to a pleasant, healthy environment, and this should be stated in a separate article of the constitution. This right will be guaranteed by implementation of the Belorussian SSR State Program To Eliminate the Effects of the Chernobyl Nuclear Plant Accident and other measures aimed at restoring the health of our republic.

#### **Moldovan Party Plenum Reports Summarized**

91UN0325C Kishinev SOVETSKAYA MOLDOVA  
in Russian 20 Oct 90 p 3

[Unattributed article under the rubric "Fourth Plenum of the Moldovan Communist Party Central Committee": "At the Plenum of the Moldovan Communist Party Central Committee"]

[Text] Today our newspaper begins to publish accounts of the speeches at the Moldovan Communist Party Central Committee Plenum taking place in Kishinev.

The first to speak was D.V. Koval, member of the Moldova Communist Party Central Committee, dean, and department head of the Moldovan State University imeni V.I. Lenin.

After characterizing the sociopolitical atmosphere in the Republic, he gave a positive evaluation of the centrist and, on the whole, considered and balanced position that the Moldova Communist Party Central Committee Bureau has taken lately in the discussion and solution of the most topical problems of the current life of the republic; he also noted a retreat on a whole series of issues. The influence of the party is not registered in the Republic's parliament during the resolution of important tasks, even though Communists make up more than 80 percent of the total of all the people's deputies, said the orator. The actions of the leadership of the Moldova Communist Party Central Committee directed at stabilizing the situation in the Dnestr region rayons are clearly too late.

The newspaper VECHERNAYA KISHINEV, which was organized by party organs and has been financed for more than three decades from the budget of the Moldova Communist Party Central Committee, was "stormed" and finally "conquered" by the city soviet of people's deputies using methods that are not part of legitimate political culture. The new newspaper of the Communists of the Republic's capital is NOVOSTI KISHINEV, and all kinds of obstacles are being created to bring it to financial bankruptcy at this time, at the end of the subscription campaign.

It would be unfair to blame only the Bureau or the Secretariat of the Moldovan Communist Party Central Committee for these and other slips and failures. We need to offer self-criticism and give a principled evaluation of our own actions as well. As one of the leaders of the Editorial Council of party newspapers, which was created after the 17th congress of the Communist Party of Moldova, I must acknowledge that over the last four months we did very little to make a real contribution to the political line of the newspapers and journals being published under the aegis of the party's Central Committee—KUVYNTUL, SOVETSKAYA MOLDOVA, and KOMUNISTUL MOLDOVEY (its new name is POLITIKA). These periodicals are still far from the stage where they could satisfy the demands of the reader of the party press.

In our specific conditions, where the anticommunist hysteria has become the prevalent motif in the periodicals of the republic press, it is not easy for the party newspapers to assert themselves in the journalistic context of the times. It should be noted that the editorial collectives of both party newspapers—the press organs of the Moldovan Communist Party Central Committee—are exerting great efforts to overcome stereotypes and outdated forms and methods of presenting material, and they are trying not to lower themselves to the level of abuse, bad language, gossip, and rumors that is so characteristic of a significant portion of their opponents.

The efforts being applied are clearly insufficient for the success of these publications. The journalists working on the editorial boards of the newspapers KUVYNTUL and SOVETSKAYA MOLDOVA still have much to do to become mature centers of ideological work ensuring the success of perestroika. For the time being they are in need of our concrete and active aid. The existence of the newspapers KUVYNTUL and SOVETSKAYA MOLDOVA and the journal POLITIKA under future conditions of a market economy will depend for the most part on the number of subscribers, of which there are few at present.

I would like to take the opportunity to request in the name of our Editorial Council, of the editorial boards of the party newspapers, of all the members of the Moldovan Communist Party Central Committee, and especially of the secretaries of the gorkoms [city party committees] and raykoms [rayon party committees] of the

party who are attending today's plenum, assistance in the organization and collection of subscriptions for party publications.

Aside from the forms and methods of political, organizational, and educational activity mentioned by today's speakers, I wish to briefly touch upon possibilities which we are not yet using and which the mass media have at their disposal for the resolution of strategic tasks of the party. In the fight for the implementation the principles of perestroika and for social justice and normalization of interethnic relations, the newspapers and journals of the Communist Party of Moldova could work together to conduct common campaigns with the periodicals of other political parties and social formations which function in the republic.

Constructive, interested discussion in the press encompassing a wide political spectrum will not in any way harm the authority of the party but, on the contrary, will contribute to an increase in the political prestige of the Communist Party among the masses. The pages of PRAVDA under the rubric "Discussion Page" are an excellent example of political pluralism expressed on the pages of a mass newspaper.

A number of city and rayon party committees presently have their own press organs, and other will soon have such publications. The new Law on the Press and Other Mass Media stipulate qualitatively new relations between publishing houses and creative collectives of journalists. Petty interference and crude administration by injunction are intolerable today as is the other extreme, which is so characteristic of several leaders—of leaving their newspapers to the whim of fate without assistance and support.

The notion of "party leadership of the press" is today acquiring a somewhat different meaning which should be distinguished from the meaning we invested it with five or six years ago. I believe that today party workers should see journalists not as mute performers of their functions, as they were previously, but as equal partners in the fight for the common cause.

Ignoring these truths will result in tragic consequences. A characteristic example of this is the attitude of the Komsomol Central Committee toward its press. As is known, over recent months both of the republic newspapers—TINERETUL MOLDOVEY and MOLODEZH MOLDAVII—quit being press organs of the Komsomol.

At present our perestroika is undergoing a moment of crisis, which is reflected in the alignment of forces in journalism in the republic. MOLDOVA SOCHIALISTE abandoned the party press and overnight became MOLDOVA SUVERANA, undertaking journalistic intrigues and defaming the party. The weekly VYATSA SATULUY deserted the ranks in the same manner. The creative collectives of these periodicals, led by two men who had recently been workers of the Moldovan Communist Party Central Committee, left the ranks of the CPSU.

I do not believe that we have become weaker because of this. We have simply parted with fellow travelers who were not on the same path.

The cause of perestroika demands significant efforts by party publicists in order to successfully propagandize and implement the initiatives and plans of the party.

One wishes to believe that the press of the Moldovan Communist Party will be equal to the high demands of the times, contributing to the orientation of the reader toward constructive, creative activity.

**F.I. Khristev**, member of the Moldovan Communist Party Bureau KKK [Control Auditing Commission] and first secretary of the Kantemirskiy raykom [rayon party committee], said, judging by how the Moldovan Communist Party Central Committee and the gorkoms [city party committee] and raykoms function today, I am getting the impression that somewhere, whether we mean to or not, we still consider ourselves the leading force in society. And this, in my opinion, is the source of our mistakes.

It is no secret that the moral and psychological atmosphere in the party organizations depends on the position and the attitudes of their leaders toward important problems that are troubling people. And although we have many good, useful ideas that are supported by Communists and nonparty people alike, we nonetheless are too slow to apply them to the processes taking place. In many instances we act in a stereotyped manner, the old way, without initiative.

I do not know about others, but I believe that the positions of the Moldovan Communist Party Central Committee with regard to stabilizing the situation in the republic are healthy. However, we must be consistent and principled to the very end in our actions; otherwise Communists and all the workers simply will not understand us.

The majority of us—and I, personally, as a member of the KKK of the Moldovan Communist Party—are correct to take a principled position with regard to Smirnov of Tiraspol. But why has the center only seen one side of the issue? Why has the Moldovan Communist Party Central Committee not stated its position in relation to those members of the CPSU who until recently enjoyed the support of the party in the attainment of their personal goals while today, in this difficult period, they abandon the party ticket? The fact that they are leaving the CPSU is not wholly a misfortune, but now many of them are defaming the party.

The so-called tactic of diplomatic smiles has its limits. In my opinion the time has come to think about the social defense of the members of our party as well. After all, for two or three years running we have been learning just from the press that, for example, in the FRG Communists are being refused jobs and certain leading positions. Today we have a similar situation in our country. It is recommended that teachers, employees of the soviets,

and leaders of various organizations and enterprises leave the party. This is why the Moldovan Communist Party Central Committee must express its position in this context. It is easy to see that if such tendencies continue, the sociopolitical situation in the Republic will hardly change for the better.

For now our attempts to prevent the organization of independent parties on the Left Bank and in the south of Moldova have not had any results. I appeal to my party comrades who wish to withdraw from the party. You should consider and then consider again. After all, we stand on the same platform, the platform of the CPSU. By withdrawing you will leave the village raykoms without the support of a large detachment of the working class. I do not believe that this is your goal. So let us think how we can remedy this situation together. I also have several proposals on this score.

However further events may evolve, the party should be united and indivisible. Only in this fashion will we be able to be a real force that has something concrete to say on the occasion of the further formation of our society.

And finally, the Bureau and the Secretariat of the Moldovan Communist Party Central Committee are often criticized today. I call upon everyone not to search everywhere for the guilty but to genuinely to begin to work. This is the only way that we may begin to move forward.

**V.I. Morev**, member of the Moldovan Communist Party Central Committee and chairman of the Beltsy city soviet of people's deputies, said participants of the Central Committee plenum met again to discuss the sociopolitical situation in the Republic. Today we state again that instead of improving, it has taken on an explosive character and approached an extreme. It means that we, the members of the Central Committee and its Secretariat, have not found the consolidating path for resolving these interconnected problems, particularly that of interethnic relations, as expected by all the inhabitants of the Republic.

Everyone, from the smallest to the greatest, is troubled by what is taking place in the Republic and in the Union. Why have ethnic problems cropped up in a region that lived without them for centuries, residing in a multi-ethnic home and deeply aware in practice that it is wise and natural to live in peace and harmony? And Moldovans, as the majority of the peoples, have been and are the primary pivot for a respect for peace. What is happening to us today? Why is this separation along ethnic lines taking place in collectives, families, and our hearts?

It is inexcusably tendentious to simplify interethnic conflicts by reducing them to something like, for instance, an unwillingness to learn Moldovan. People were not afraid of that; instead, they feared what occurred in practice. The laws on languages became an occasion for the formation of monoethnic presidiums

and governments and a cause for mass dismissals when organizing administrative structures.

The speaker noted that, taking refuge in depoliticization, party organizations are being curtailed in the collectives. There is already a list of positions that may not be held by Communists.

He spoke in detail about how the city soviet is using various means to try to restore justice, both with regard to illegally dismissed people and with regard to the honor and dignity of individual Communists.

By studying public opinion, the city soviet also came to a decision regarding the organization of a celebration for the 73d anniversary of the Great October Revolution. A demonstration of workers is taking place in the city.

The speaker had a number of proposals for the Central Committee. In our view, he said, a party document should openly name the causes that do not permit stabilization of the situation in the Republic: Ethnic discord, the ideology of Romanianization, and lack of clarity in the republic's relations with the Union and other republics. For example, recognition of dual citizenship would allay the concerns of hundreds of thousands of people.

It has become a fact that the People's Front of Moldova has moved away from many of its initial slogans. And at present it is conducting an actively anticommunist, anti-Soviet policy that contradicts the constitutions of the USSR and the Moldovan SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] and that contradicts the interests, especially, of the Moldovan people. "Intermovement," which does not represent a majority of the peoples, cannot be internationalist in essence.

The Moldovan Communist Party Central Committee must demand that the Republic Government disband political movements that by their actions contribute to interethnic alienation and even opposition. I am convinced that people who joined them with good intentions will understand such a step.

As he spoke, he stressed in detail the problems of the soviets and argued the need to sign the Union treaty. Then he said that he considers mistaken the idea that the party, having repudiated interference in the state sphere, is no longer responsible for the functioning of its structures. After all, more than 80 percent of the people's deputies are Communists. And it is no accident that the voters cast their ballots for them. The Communist Party fully answers for the socialist path of the development of society and the Moldovan SSR.

The primary party organizations should not stand on the side when a communist deputy or a communist leader in the state sphere speaks in favor of and votes for anti-Sovietism and anticommunism and violates the Rules and Program of the party. And if the primary organizations and the gorkoms and raykoms do not do their work, then the Central Committee and the KKK's must

come up with rulings and approaches that will put everything in its proper place. Unfortunately, this system is not working at present.

The Central Committee should take an active part in the Supreme Soviet. It should be designing drafts of laws, organizing meetings and discussions between deputies and leading specialists, ensuring that deputies have reference materials, and coordinating the actions of communist deputies, the international position, and a consistent effort to defend workers, peasants, and office workers. All this will strengthen the trust of the masses in the Moldovan Communist Party. Only concrete results will cement our relations with the masses. Especially during such an important transition period.

The appeal by letter from the Moldovan Communist Party Central Committee to the primary party organizations and to Communists of the Republic openly characterizes the situation and gives specific joint action for Communists at this stage in the development of society. We should be united in the Republic. We, the members of the Central Committee, are also called upon to organize everything occurring at the local level. And none of us has the right to sit idly by.

**V.K. Beshlyage**, member of the Moldovan Communist Party Central Committee and farm chief of the kolkhoz [collective farm] imeni S. Lazo in Grigoriopolskiy Rayon, took the floor. He emphasized that the sociopolitical situation in Grigoriopolskiy Rayon has intensified abruptly over recent months. The Second Congress of the People's Front of Moldovan and the congresses at Komrat and Tiraspol, which declared the creation of the Gagauz and Dnestr republics, served as the cause for this.

As a result of the decisions made at these congresses, the population of the rayon has split along ethnic lines and a similar split is taking place in the local party organizations among Communists. The idea that has sprung up in Tiraspol and Rybnitsa of creating a parallel Communist Party of Moldovan and Communist Party of the Dnestr region is contributing greatly to these processes. And although no official decisions have been made in the party organizations of the rayon, this idea is being disseminated increasingly among the rayon's Communists.

What is the cause, in my view, of the increasing tension in the rayon? First, after the rayon was visited by a group of Moldovan SSR deputies there was no adequate reaction afterwards on the part of the Moldovann SSR Supreme Soviet, which could have contributed to the stabilization of the situation. Second, there is the introduction into the people of the so-called consciousness that we are Romanian that is taking place via the mass media, especially National Television and Radio. This evokes a very negative reaction from the population of the rayon and serves as grounds for the idea of the Dnestr republic. Third, another factor contributing significantly to this is the active effort in adjoining rayons



by individual groups from the cities of Tiraspol and Rybnitsa, which is especially clear in the example of the village of Malayeshta, located close to Tiraspol.

Unfortunately, in this case the primary party organizations of the rayon are unable themselves to come to a unified opinion and find a way out of the situation that has arisen. I believe that in this case we, the members of the Moldovan Communist Party Central Committee as well as the Bureau and the commissions of the Central Committee, are being sluggish. In my opinion, there has been very little work to study public opinion and make predictions on the situation and on the next influence on the process of the formation of public opinion.

The speaker expressed the wish that workers of the Central Committee would visit the party organizations of the Left Bank more often. We at the local level want very much to see the final expression of our positions in the communist deputies and their defense in the parliament of the Moldovan Communist Party Central Committee, he went on to say. I believe that today's plenum and the rulings adopted at it will serve to stimulate the work of the Central Committee, as well as of the primary party organizations, in the business of consolidating our ranks and achieving peace in the civil harmony in Moldova.

**Ye.M. Beyko**, member of the Moldovan Communist Party Central Committee and first secretary of the Basarabyaskiy raykom, took the microphone. This is not the first time the situation has heated up to the danger point, he said. We have genuinely approached the abyss, and this hinders our movement. That is understandable to everyone. But the sight of this abyss makes some think of a chasm and others—of a bridge. I believe that all the members of the Moldovan Communist Party Central Committee and the secretaries of the primary party organizations who are here are interested in finding that bridge in order to set right the situation in the Republic and resolve those problems before us. We are also summoned to do this by the president of the USSR, who is troubled by the situation in the republic.

I believe that there are two aspects that are very important, fundamentally important, that should be addressed by each member of the Central Committee. I will address them, too. Incidentally, they coincide with those that are cited in the letter that we are discussing today.

In the first place we, members of the Moldovan Communist Party Central Committee, must speak out decisively against any manifestations of separatism. I am firmly convinced that the main reason for the sudden polarization in the south was the declaration by the Second Congress of the People's Front of the change in the name of the republic and that some forces are making efforts to unite with Romania. In my opinion this was the source of the consolidation of people in the south. And, of course, I believe that it is intolerable to resolve the problems of the republic according to its separate

parts or territories, no matter what motives are used to justify it. This is shortsighted from the political and the economic points of view.

Tearing the country into parts and creating separate princedoms is fraught with irreversible consequences and the degradation of our economic and hence our social organism. In addition, this is egotistical with regard to the population of the main part of the Republic, which does not wish to break ties with the other Union republics but, on the contrary, is in favor of renewing a Union of sovereign states. Even the parliament of the Republic has spoken in favor of this, by the way.

The Communists of the Left Bank and the south, in my opinion, should today speak out in favor of a moratorium on the adoption of new rulings, halt the election campaign, and demand that the deputies of their region resolve the existing difference by parliamentary methods. I believe that members of the Central Committee can also help out in this matter by traveling to the appropriate region, because the situation is critical. Compromise is still possible, there is a chance, and it must be used. If, of course, we are to work honestly in this direction.

Despite all the apparent unpopularity of these proposals, this is the sole path to civil peace.

And the second aspect: We must speak out unambiguously against the existence of factions in the Moldovan Communist Party, which, incidentally, are prohibited by the CPSU Rules. And Communists who call for factions must be disciplined. We should clearly recognize that the existence of factions is leading to the collapse of the republic party organization. Adherents of factions, whether they mean to or not, are aiding the forces who are trying to sweep the Communist Party from the political arena of the Republic. Any contradictions, problems, offenses are nothing in comparison with the main thing—the unity of our party. We must defend and preserve the Communist Party of the Republic. After all, it really is a consolidating force.

The speaker went on to characterize the sociopolitical situation in the Basarabyaskiy Rayon and talked about the consolidating role of the rayon party organization and its tactics.

We must persistently and patiently fight, using political methods and methods of persuasion, for our ideas and ideals that I am convinced will increasingly coincide with the true interests of the people. And in the end the people will figure out who is really speaking on behalf of their good and who is speculating unscrupulously. We will have to make a fundamental examination of our attitudes, forms, and methods in the soviets, emphasized the speaker. He asked that the Communists work harder to spread their ideas and programs among the soviets.

In conclusion, the speaker dwelt in detail on the problems of preserving the unity of the Moldovan Communist Party and noted that Communists must be united by a common idea, that idea that created our party.

**P.S. Marchuk**, member of the Moldovan Communist Party Central Committee and machine operator from the sovkhoz [state farm] "Ulmu" in Rybnitskiy Rayon, said, I acquainted myself very carefully with the draft of the letter to the primary party organizations. Yes, I agree that the situation in which the Moldovan Communist Party is functioning is extremely complicated and difficult. Let us try to figure out who is to blame for this. Are the Communists, who are standing at the lathe producing goods or working in agricultural production, really to blame?

Further on the speaker tried to explain the need to form the Dnestr republic and declared that the majority of the Communists of the city party organization are united on a single platform that includes ideological equality for people of all nationalities residing in the republic and loyalty to the socialist choice of the path for developing our society. Then he analyzed the draft of the "Letter of the Moldovan Communist Party Central Committee to the Party Organizations and Communists of the Republic" and made some concrete proposals for it directed at normalizing the situation around the Laws on Languages, at personnel policy, and at improving the interethnic situation.

At present there are many CPSU members, including many in our city party organization, who are leaving the ranks for various reasons, said the speaker. Some are dissatisfied with the decisions of the 28th CPSU Congress and the 17th Moldovan Communist Party Congress, which they have hardly read for themselves; others have been convinced by our ideological opponents that the party is to blame for all the misfortunes of society; and others accuse the Moldovan Communist Party Central Committee of passivity, biding its time, and the absence of a firm position with regard to sociopolitical events in the republic.

I believe that there is no use opposing resignation from the CPSU, never mind prohibiting it or restraining people. If they have decided to leave, let them! But we need to look into the eyes of such people and ask them, when were they sincere: when they joined the CPSU or when they resigned from it? I believe that there will be fewer of us Communists, but they will be more genuinely loyal to our society.

Then the speaker criticized the Moldovan Communist Party Central Committee that, in his opinion, does not have a clear, firm position and has not given a fundamental evaluation of the development of the situation in the Republic. He also criticized the parliament of the Republic, which does not take account of the interests of the Russian-speaking population, and of the law enforcement organs, which continue to do nothing in the fight against speculators.

In my opinion, only the Moldovan Communist Party is able to give the workers social protections, noted the speaker. But for that it must be sufficiently strong, organizationally and ideologically. I believe that we still have a chance to preserve the republic's party organization as a union of like-minded people.

**V.V. Kapetskiy**, member of the Moldovan Communist Party Central Committee and foreman of the Orkheyskiy No. 8 furniture factory, took the floor. He noted that this plenum should be a starting point in the activities of the Republic's party organization. The situation that exists in the Republic, as well as in the Moldovan Communist Party shows once more that we need to search for consensus of all forces functioning in the Republic. The economic crisis, the low political level, nonfulfillment of laws—all this is the reality of our life. Therefore the achievement of consensus is our main task. The Central Committee should not only sponsor that idea but undertake concrete steps to implement it as well.

The orator went on to emphasize an analysis of the causes of the crisis in the Moldovan Communist Party and simultaneously called upon the plenum's participants to take part in an active search for ways out of it. He condemned the actions of the separatist movements of the Dnestr region and the south of the Republic; he believes that the local party organizations are at their head. In this fashion they violate the Rules and Program of the party. There are cases where Communists leave the ranks of the party, declaring that they do not wish to be a member of a party that is breaking up Moldova.

The question is increasingly being raised, noted the speaker, of a declaration of sovereignty by the Moldovan Communist Party and of a change in its name. These questions were discussed by the Communists of Orkheyskiy Rayon, and many supported them. I believe that the first thing should be a careful revision of the draft Rules, which then should be discussed in each party organization.

**I.A. Zaretskiy**, first secretary of the Tiraspol gorkom, said, today we are genuinely examining a very important and serious document, and I believe that it will be widely discussed in the party organizations of the republic. The comrade who spoke before me gave a fairly good summary of the arguments of the separatists from Tiraspol and from the south who wish to split Moldova. Let us ask whether people on the Left Bank and in Komrat are really pursuing these goals and whether they are interested in their own Supreme Soviet, Council of Ministers, and Central Committee? Is this what really concerns people? Are these organs of power really so necessary to them? I think that the people are concerned with one thing: Protection and guarantees of their future. This is the basis from which we must proceed and study the situation.

I believe, along with the group of deputies from the republic's Supreme Soviet that traveled to the regions

and the presidential commission that visited us here in the city and Komrat—and they clearly saw that it is not a “white collar” conspiracy or the ambitions of individual leaders—that it is a deliberate wish of the population to protect its interests. As a result, the party organization of the city, when studying the situation, offered this evaluation of events: a defensive reaction by the population to those illegal laws that have been adopted recently by the Supreme Soviet.

This is why we disagree with the fact that the bureau of the KKK repealed our decision. We have appealed to the KKK of the CPSU Central Committee on this issue.

What specifically is the primary thing troubling people? I would emphasize the fact that a change in the social structure of the Republic and a change in the ideology are openly underway today here. Nationalism is ideology. And it is ideology pursuing a whole set of political actions. Precisely what kind of actions? Those such as: the right of nations is higher than the rights of the individual; only the indigenous nation may practice self-determination within the framework of statehood; and only a nation may create an effective economy.

The speaker went on to express his point of view on the development of events in the Republic and on approaches to the signing of a Union treaty. The letter of the Central Committee Bureau notes, he stated, that the parliament should publish its proposals concerning the Union treaty. I believe it is not enough to publish them; they should be discussed with all of the people so that these proposals on the Union treaty will suit everyone. If they do not suit everyone, then a referendum should be conducted, as has been proposed.

The speaker analyzed the sources of the reaction and disagreement of the deputies of all levels in the south and on the Left Bank with the events taking place in the Republic, as well as the disagreement of many Communists with the position of the Moldovan Communist Party Central Committee. In his opinion, this manifested itself in the fact that for a prolonged period of time the Central Committee has not had a clear and consistent position. We must clearly and objectively acknowledge that the Communist Party has lost the elections and finds itself in the opposition, he said. If we are in the opposition, it means that we should create our own shadow cabinet, we should head it with our secretary for socioeconomic questions, and we should conduct work in this shadow cabinet.

In addition, the letter says that an alternative law on sociopolitical movements will be proposed, and it affirms that in the Soviet all laws must be adopted with due observation of human rights. A correct phrasing of the issue! I absolutely agree with this. But why do not we ourselves, why does not our legal group and our group of communist deputies, propose alternative laws on citizenship, migration, and on the defense of the interests of ethnic minorities? After all, if we speak out in the press in the name of the Moldovan Communist Party with

these draft laws on the level of a legislative initiative, then naturally the position of the Communists of the Left Bank and the south will change fundamentally, I believe. It means that on this level the Central Committee really is working.

I believe that despite everything the opportunity for dialogue and for a search for compromises still has not been lost. M.S. Gorbachev's appeal was correct in saying that the way out of the impasse is truly on the paths of compromise, of the search for mutually acceptable resolutions, and of respect for equal human rights and freedoms.

Incidentally, the third plenum of the gorkom has worked out a package of proposals on this issue. In order to make this path a real one, I believe that the Central Committee and the rayon and city party organizations should work more actively with the deputies and with the Supreme Soviet. And at the session that is starting up, the group of communist deputies should take the decree of the Bureau that was adopted and introduce it at the level of a legislative initiative as the basis for a way out of the crisis. Because if elections are conducted, comrades—and preparations are being made—then the process really will become irreversible.

Proceeding from the existing situation in the party, the speaker proposed that the date for holding the republic party conference be moved up. Plenums of the gorkoms and raykoms need to assign delegates to the congress and convoke this conference in order to devise, on the one hand, tactics for action under the party's present conditions and, of course, to approve temporary rules, as well as determine plans for further action.

#### **Elections for Moldavian CP Delegates Set**

91UN0239C Kishinev SOVETSKAYA MOLDOVA  
in Russian 25 Oct 90 p 2

[Interview with B.M. Stratulat by the Communist Party of Moldova Central Committee Press Center; place and date not given: “Conferences of the Communist Party of Moldova: How Will the Delegate Corps Be Formed?”]

[Text] A campaign is beginning in the republic party organization for the election of delegates to a conference of the Communist Party of Moldova. As decided by the Fourth Plenum of the Communist Party of Moldova Central Committee, it will be held at the end of November and the start of December of this year.

B.M. Stratulat, chairman of the republic electoral commission for the election of delegates to the conference and chief editor of the journal POLITIKA, describes the formation of its delegate corps.

[Stratulat] It should be said right away that the Central Committee has established the conference representation quota at one delegate per 380 members of the CPSU. They will be elected on the basis of extensive

glasnost and in an atmosphere of party comradeship and sincere concern and responsibility for the formation of the republic party forum.

The democratic mechanism for forming the corps of conference delegates, formulated by the republic electoral commission and published in the party press, provides for the involvement of each communist in the election of the delegates. It affords the primary party organizations themselves greater freedom in deciding questions connected with the election of delegates. They are all accorded the right to nominate a candidate for delegate, which creates conditions for competition, multiple choice, and an objective evaluation of the candidates' political and moral attributes.

The multi-variant nature of this mechanism is viewed positively also. It is very important that the democratic provisions stipulated in it make it possible to remove from the primary party organizations and gorkoms and raykoms [city and rayon party committees] the shackles of every conceivable instructional restriction in organizing the electoral process, spare them any kind of regulation of this whatever and, what is most important, afford each communist an opportunity to feel himself involved in this important matter.

[SOVETSKAYA MOLDOVA] How do you view the composition of this forum, quantitatively and qualitatively?

[Stratulat] As of 1 October this year 188,434 members of the CPSU were on the register of the Communist Party of Moldova. In accordance with the representation quota, it is necessary to elect 491 delegates to the republic party conference. In addition, several delegates will be elected from party organizations of the Soviet Army and the internal and border forces stationed on Moldovan territory. We hope that the corps of delegates will be represented by communists working in all sectors of the republic economy and representatives of all nationalities constituting the Communist Party of Moldova.

Of course, it would be desirable for those elected to be the communists who are displaying genuine courage in the struggle against the stagnation phenomena and who by their political and professional qualities are capable of advancing perestroika and solving the main questions of the republic's development and the renewal of its Communist Party under the current conditions of social and political life.

[SOVETSKAYA MOLDOVA] How will the city and rayon party organizations be represented in quantitative terms?

[Stratulat] The Kishinev city party organization will be represented by 127 delegates, the Tiraspol by 33, Beltsy by 21, Bendery by 19, and Rybnitsa by 13. Of the rayon party organizations: the Orgeyevskaya by 13 and the Dubesarskaya, Yedinetskaya, Sloboziyskaya, and Sorokskaya by 10 delegates each. The rest, by fewer than

10 delegates. The smallest—the Keinarskaya Rayon party organization (1,027 members of the CPSU)—will elect three delegates. The Sholdaneshtskaya Rayon party organization has 1,553 members of the CPSU. Four delegates will be elected to the conference here.

[SOVETSKAYA MOLDOVA] Who will organize the work on the election of delegates?

[Stratulat] A republic commission for elections to the conference has been formed for this. Such commissions have been formed in all city and rayon party organizations. They have been approved at meetings of the party committee bureaus. Where districts have been formed, district electoral commissions have been approved.

And, of course, this whole work is the direct concern of the party committees.

[SOVETSKAYA MOLDOVA] Who has the right to nominate candidates for delegate?

[Stratulat] I would like to emphasize that the right to nominate candidates for delegate is accorded to meetings of the primary party organizations, and in organizations with party committees, meetings of shop party organizations.

Some candidates for delegate may be nominated by superior party committees and the party organization secretary council.

It should be noted that each meeting of communists has the right to nominate just one candidate. The form of voting (show of hands or ballot) is chosen by the meeting. The primary party organizations are accorded the right to nominate also a party member who is not registered in a given party organization.

[SOVETSKAYA MOLDOVA] Which candidate is deemed the nominee?

[Stratulat] The candidate who has amassed the largest number of votes in relation to the other candidates and who has obtained more than half the votes of the participants in the meeting is deemed the nominee. The vote-counting mechanism is the same at the time of the election of the delegates also, incidentally.

[SOVETSKAYA MOLDOVA] How are the elections of the delegates themselves organized?

[Stratulat] The newspapers SOVETSKAYA MOLDOVA and KUVYNTUL of 20 and 23 October, respectively, published the "Procedure for the Election of Delegates to the Conference of the Communist Party of Moldova." This document specified "that all primary party organizations in which the number of members of the CPSU corresponds to or is greater than the representation quota may elect delegates at their party meetings. Others unite in a district according to the sectoral or territorial principle so as to ensure that the total number of members of the CPSU on the register is no less than the established representation quota. The formation of



multi-seat party districts, in which two or three or more delegates will be elected, is possible.

Another version accords the right to elect delegates in city and rayon party organizations by way of general ballot according to a common list.

A third version provides for the election of delegates at enlarged gorkom and raykom plenums with the participation of primary party organization secretaries.

In all these instances, I repeat, the list of candidates for delegate is formed on the basis of the candidates nominated in the primary party organizations and also by plenums of party committees and party organization secretary councils.

The vote-counting mechanism is the same as at the time of nomination.

[SOVETSKAYA MOLDOVA] The time for preparation of the conference is limited. When is it planned to complete the formation of the corps of delegates?

[Stratulat] Before 20 November. It is essential, as the delegates are elected, to afford them an opportunity to participate actively in the elaboration of the main documents and decisions of the conference and, specifically, the draft Rules of the Communist Party of Moldova, which are to be adopted at this forum.

#### Appeal To Boycott Moldovan Elections

91UN0325B Kishinev MOLDOVA SUVERANA  
in Russian 27 Oct 90 p 4

[Appeal of the aktiv of a Kishinev veterans organization to all workers, Gagauz, and residents of the Dnestr region: "We Propose That the Elections Be Boycotted"]

[Text] Dear friends, citizens, Gagauz, residents of cities and villages, and veterans of war and labor! In these troublesome days for our republic, when an extremely tense situation threatens the integrity of the Moldovan SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic], we appeal to you.

We fully agree with M.S. Gorbachev, president of the country, that a fruitful resolution of the problems that have cropped up in our country in the area of interethnic relations are only possible by way of the law, preservation of the integrity of the Republic, and a search for harmony and mutually acceptable measures. All issues can and must be examined by appealing to reason and without opposing each other's interests.

We support the appeal of M.I. Snegur, president of the Moldovan SSR, to the Gagauz people, as well as his concern that further aggravation of the sociopolitical situation by holding the planned elections may push us into an abyss and result in human victims and the grief and suffering of the people. We call upon all veterans and citizens of the southern rayons and the Dnestr region not to participate in these elections.

In this situation we most firmly oppose anticonstitutional illegal actions, threats, intimidation, blackmail, and the use of force. We are in favor of the immediate beginning of a dialogue between all interested parties on an equal basis and we ask that at the negotiating table all parties attentively and respectfully listen to each proposal, show patience toward those who think differently, and persistently search for a path to civil harmony.

We are prepared to take an active part in the dialogue and in the achievement of civil harmony. We will willingly make our contribution to the triumph of justice and conciliation, bearing in mind that we all have lived, are living, and will live in our common home and on our common land, and that to divide and tear it to pieces will not lead to any good.

Our strength is in unity.

Recognizing the complexity of the sociopolitical crisis, we, the veterans of Kishinev, request that the Moldovan SSR Supreme Soviet carry out constructive measures to search for mutually acceptable resolutions that will significantly reduce the tension and confrontation in the republic.

[Signed] The Presidium of the Kishinev City Council of Veterans of War, Labor, and the Armed Forces.

#### Ethnic Conflict in Moldova Examined

91UN0271A Moscow VETERAN in Russian No 44,  
22-28 Oct 90 p 2

[Report on interview with Yu.V. Blokhin, sponsor of the "Soyuz" group of deputies, by T. Sadkovskaya: "15 + 0 = No Union, or Who Killed Dima Matyushin"; usage of Moldova and Moldavia as published]

[Text] While my interlocutor was answering an urgent telephone call, I looked through some papers and letters that he had offered me. A familiar name attracted my gaze in a report of Mircha Ion Snegur, chairman of the Moldovan Supreme Soviet. I read: "We should here name the instigators, organizers, and leaders of the recent unlawful actions: ...Blokhin and others." This was about my interlocutor—Yuriy Vitalyevich Blokhin, member of the USSR Supreme Soviet, deputy chairman of the Economic Reform Committee, and sponsor of the formation of the "Soyuz" group of deputies. In the country's parliament he has the reputation of being a serious person. In his own republic, it turns out, "the sponsor of unlawful actions." Why? How could this fail to be the first question?

But there is nothing to ask about another document (although I cannot bring myself to call this *cri du coeur*—a letter from Moldavian women to people's deputies of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic]—such). I would like just to be able to calm down after reading it. And recount in if only somewhat more detail a tragic business mentioned by the mass media in passing. Here are lines from this letter:

"An ordinary Russian woman was standing at the doors of the hotel in which you were staying during the first session of the Russian Parliament carrying a placard that said: 'My son, Dima Matyushin, was killed in Moldavia for speaking Russian.' The 18-year-old student was killed in the center of Kishinev on 14 May, 10 yards from the Supreme Soviet before the eyes of passers-by. A group of militants from the ranks of those who in the area of the Stefan the Great monument were spending their days and nights under slogans like 'Mother Russia, Take Back Your Prodigal Sons,' discussing plans for expelling all 'aliens' from the republic, this group considered that a young man walking by them was conversing too loudly and happily with two young ladies. In the language of the 'occupiers.' He was given a long and brutal beating. The militia arriving on the scene caught one of the killers, but let him go almost at once, discovering, evidently, with whom they were dealing.

"...When, on the day of Dima Matyushin's funeral, we women of the city went to the authorities with two placards: 'Save Our Children!' and 'Murderers To Justice!' a crowd of militants set upon us.... They beat up the elderly and even young girls. And in the evening, one of the top leaders of the republic, speaking on television, accused of inciting interethnic discord those who had come to him for protection against murderers and gangsters. So we women, mothers, and wives have remained the guilty ones. And the criminals are continuing to roam free."

Almost six months ago deputies from some republics, in which national self-awareness had begun to "awaken" in a highly dubious manner, the first to see the entire danger (for people primarily) of the separatist mood for themselves, as they say, united in the "Soyuz" group. We were the first to write about it. To struggle for the preservation of our state as the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. This, in brief, is the main purpose of what is, as of today, the most numerous group of deputies in the country's parliament (eight, including the Interregional Group, are registered altogether). This goal is becoming close, not only to the people's deputies, but to each of us. The "union indestructible of republics free" is ceasing before our eyes to be either indestructible or a union. And as regards the freedom of the republic.... There are questions here also. Freedom from what? Freedom for whom?

There is already a precedent of an election bloc of social and political organizations transforming itself initially into a parliamentary group and then into an independent movement. Therefore, my first question to Yu.V. Blokhin:

[Sadkovskaya] Will not the "Soyuz" group in the future be the basis of a new party?

[Blokhin] In our times anything could happen. The more so in that the Communist Party, for which internationalism is a most important principle of activity, is in no

hurry to occupy a clear-cut modern position on questions concerning interethnic relations, which are changing by the day, and for the worse as yet. Attempts were made to expel me from the party in 1989, incidentally, for... internationalism. I was charged with having sponsored the creation in the republic of the Intermovement. I still keep an extract from the minutes of the party meeting at which I was accused of destabilizing the social and political situation in Moldova. Now, however, many of my "accusers" have left the party, and those remaining are serving, in my opinion, just one organization—the Popular Front.

However, "destabilization" could in that case imply attempts to forecast events. At a meeting with S.K. Grossu, first secretary of the republic Communist Party, back in February of last year, leaders of the Intermovement warned that the continued counterposing of the indigenous and nonindigenous population would lead to the detachment of Gagauzia and the Dnestr Republic.

[Sadkovskaya] You speak about this as a fait accompli. But the Moldovan Supreme Soviet has said an unequivocal "no" to such a solution of the nationality problem in the republic.

[Blokhin] It is already a tragedy virtually. Whatever the topic dealt with at Union level, the republics are against the unitary arrangement and are seeking out with suspicion almost the least attempts to encroach on their independence. But at the republic level, the same persons are advocating only a unitary arrangement.

What, pray, would be imprudent about a federal arrangement for Moldova? The more so in that the population of the two regions have via a referendum supported autonomy, emphasizing particularly that they are for the preservation of their national-territorial formations within the USSR. The latter point, incidentally, is absent from the Declaration on the Sovereignty of Moldova. A federal arrangement would contribute to a return of trust to the republic authorities and contribute to a stabilization of the situation.

We are now alluding constantly to overseas experience. So, then. When in Belgium, which is smaller than Moldova, interethnic relations became exacerbated, three autonomous regions—Flemish, Walloon, and German—were formed there. Although there are only 100,000 Germans, say, in Belgium—fewer than there are Gagauz in Moldova. And our traditional "democratic" consideration—that there exists a France and Germany outside of Belgium—never occurred to anyone there. There are in the country three official languages, and the capital is bilingual. In order to preserve the state, the authorities agreed to a program of federalization. And it is as though the interethnic problem has not existed since 1962.

Therefore, when Moldavian deputies met with the president of the USSR and each was able to share his thoughts on how to normalize the situation in the republic, I named the four most important features, from my viewpoint. The Moldovan Supreme Soviet should

adopt a declaration to the effect that Moldova is and will remain part of the USSR. It is essential to recognize the federal arrangement of the republic. A declaration on the equality of all citizens living in Moldova is needed. No republic has adopted such a document as yet. And, finally, to consider the languages of the most populous nationalities official languages.

[Sadkovskaya] Talking with members of "Soyuz," I have repeatedly noticed the following regularity. Like you now, everyone talks first of all about the situation in his republic. Is this not a mirror image of the situation concerning our common Union, which is now increasingly reminiscent of the "15 + 0" formula?

[Blokhin] The Union reader is still receiving truncated information about events in the republics. So we avail ourselves of any opportunity to be heard. Representatives of our group went to Semipalatinsk to acquire their independent viewpoint. Members of our group have visited many of the country's "flashpoints." We have staged a number of joint actions pertaining to the course of work of the session. One consequence was a statement by our group apropos the events in the Near East, published in your weekly, incidentally. We are trying in our law-making activity to abide by the principal aim of our association—preserving the integrity of our state and seeking guarantees of a free life for the individual of any nationality, in whatever part of the country. The last legislative initiative of "Soyuz" is very important from this viewpoint: A draft law on refugees, for which hundreds of thousands of people cannot bear to wait any longer, has been prepared.

[Sadkovskaya] But, you will agree, even this long-awaited law may be viewed as a consequence of the absence of what is most important—a renewed Union treaty. Representatives of the Interregional Group proposed that parliament's activity begin specifically with work on a Union treaty. But given the old republic supreme soviets, such work would hardly have been fruitful. Now, following the replacement of the local soviets, is the time, it would seem, to embark on this burning problem. But once again a pause, procrastination. After all, even discussion of the programs of transition to the market has proceeded with such difficulty for the added reason that those who drew them up have completely opposing views of the future arrangement of our Union.

[Blokhin] The Shatalin program views the Union as "15 + 0," and a similar view was present in Aganbegyan's synthetic document also. Many parliamentary lances were broken over these propositions. And as a result the optimum wording, in my view, appeared, for all that, in the president's program: "Economic relations between sovereign republics are built on the basis of recognition of the state sovereignty and equality of the republics, and at the same time the integrity of the Union as a federation, given the understanding that the basis of the economy is the enterprise, and it is the state's task to create the conditions that are the most conducive to its

activity." This is entirely correct: Genuine independence must have first and foremost a producer.

[Sadkovskaya] I will permit myself to draw a certain parallel. There would not be this universal abuse apropos the sovereignty of the republics, autonomous entities, and oblasts (we will soon be talking about sovereignty for approach roads and farmsteads) were man in our society truly free. After all, you will agree, it is all the same to a person, if his life is normal, at what level—Union, republic, and so forth—the people whom he elected resolve his problems.

[Blokhin] This brings us to the talk about a Union treaty. There has been more than enough political speculation concerning the absence thereof. I, however, view this with disquiet. Ultimately we have a Constitution. That is, there is a legal basis for the normal life of our state. But this does not mean, of course, that the treaty of the 1922 model is not in need of updating and amplification. Our "Soyuz" is already formulating its position and its view of the future treaty. I recently met with G.I. Revenko, member of the Presidential Council, and our group will have an opportunity to familiarize itself with the scholarly efforts that are being considered there and to participate in the preparation of the draft treaty.

In connection with your parallel, incidentally. I believe that the first section in the Union treaty should be one devoted to the rights and liberties of the citizens. Without an understanding that the rights of the individual are higher than the rights of a nation, we will never achieve a truly democratic arrangement of our multinational state. Our group has working contacts with institutes and specialists dealing with problems of state and law. We recently obtained from legal scholars of Moscow State University a draft declaration of citizens' rights and liberties. A sound basis for work, although there is one appreciable "but": Man in a specific situation is in certain instances outside of the broadly democratic view of the problem. To what does this at times lead? I cannot refrain from referring to the recent "discovery" of a Russian deputy. The sense of it is as follows: It is the cadres who formerly suppressed all that was national who currently are suffering in the republics. Such obtuseness is simply staggering! The young Dima Matyushin, it turns out, was the main "suppressor" of all that is national and Moldavian.

[Sadkovskaya] Consequently, albeit slowly, we are approaching the creation of a Union treaty. There is an endeavor to hear the most varied viewpoints here. An example was the recent meeting in the USSR Supreme Soviet Deputies' Club between B.I. Olynik, chairman of the Council of Nationalities, and representatives of various parties and social and political organizations.

[Blokhin] The idea of such a meeting was given birth by our group of deputies. On whose initiative it took place is immaterial, but a wide spectrum of views on the future arrangement of the Union was expressed. And if we throw out all the "trumpery," whose glitter still must

surround innovations in politics, many sound, useful thoughts were revealed at this meeting. What is bad about the position of the liberal democrats, for example?

[Sadkovskaya] Which was expressed on behalf of his party by V. Zhirnovskiy, proposing such an unpopular measure as the "freezing" of the nationality issue by way of imposing presidential rule?

[Blokhin] Such proposals are unpopular currently, of course. But if one ponders their essence, it is, indeed, essential that we first and foremost preserve the state within the framework of the current Constitution and improve the health of the economy, removing all restrictions on economic activity, and only then embark on a gradual solution of the nationality question. Many stumbling blocks would simply disappear from our path, incidentally. After all, the republics are fleeing not from the Union, essentially, but from poverty and the impossibility of a better life.

[Sadkovskaya] The question of your attitude toward the "humble arguments" of A.I. Solzhenitsyn naturally suggests itself in the talk about the future national arrangement.

[Blokhin] I read very closely and very profitably for myself the version of the mechanism of the power of the people proposed in the article. Would that we had been taught and that we ourselves had learned a little more often to collate our most contemporary steps with the lessons of history.

But it is hard to agree with the proposed ways of solving the nationality question....

[Sadkovskaya] I realize that a sea of emotions has already welled up in this connection. But the idea itself is not new. A great writer from overseas has latched onto the idea present in the consciousness of part of society of the creation of a purely Slavic state. We, however, have shamefully glossed over the fact such an idea exists....

[Blokhin] But this is a process that is the opposite of modern world trends geared, on the contrary, to the utmost integration. I shall not talk about the economy, about the country's single national economic complex. The map of the country could, perhaps, be cut up any old way: by arrangement, by reference to historical traditions, in some other way. This could be done only if we forget that this is not simply territory. It is places where people and their near ones and dear ones live. And man should have the right, regardless of nationality, to freely live where he wishes. In the orgy of fiendishly understood democracy, in our national dance, we have clean forgotten about this. This is why people are dying in peace time. And why Dima Matyushin is no more.

### Creation of Transdnestr Society Detailed

91UN03284 Kishinev MOLDOVA SUVERANA in Russian 20 Oct 90 pp 7,8

["The Awakening: Roundtable with Members of the Action Committee for the Creation of the 'Transnistria' Society"—MOLDOVA SUVERANA headline; moderated by unidentified correspondent; recorded by I. Stich, place and date not given; "abridged reprint from MOLDOVA SUVERANA 12 October 1990"; usage of "Transnistria" and "Transdnestr Area," and "Moldavia" and "Moldova" as published]

[Text] Their names are well known to the community of intellectuals of our republic. They are Petr Soltan, doctor of physical and mathematical sciences, Moldova SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] people's deputy, and chairman of the Action Committee; Aleksey Marinat, writer; Konstantin Konstantinov, theater and movie actor; Nikolay Pogolsha, candidate of philosophical sciences and associate professor of the imeni Ion Kryange Kishinev Pedagogical Institute; Yevgeniy Nirka, journalist, nature studies specialist, and veteran of pedagogical work; Vladimir Kiriya, candidate of philological sciences, employee of the Moldova SSR Academy of Sciences, and secretary of the Action Committee.

It is necessary to stress that these people are assuming the burden, albeit somewhat belatedly, of a difficult but very important task: Being loyal sons of their native land, the Transdnestr Area, they are undertaking to announce the hour of awakening and will engage in extensive activities aimed at the cultural edification of this inseparable segment of our republic and the consolidation of the ethnic self-awareness of their fellow countrymen.

[Correspondent] What was the origin of the idea to create this society?

[Soltan] The idea of creating such a society is not new. It appeared a long time ago and, as they say, has been in the wind all the time. This is a collective initiative. It was voiced for the first time by Vladimir Beshlyage and Vladimir Kiriya, as well as our Prime Minister Mircha Druk and all those present here. Its emergence is quite natural. Of course, the problems that have come to the fore in the Transdnestr Area, both economic and in the spiritual sphere, are very acute. We, a group of Kishinev residents coming from the Transdnestr Area, decided to meet in order to discuss the problems and find a way out of the existing situation. We decided to set up a society that will help both us and our brethren to consolidate and assist in the awakening of their ethnic self-awareness. We know well our largely paradoxical past; we are aware of the tragedy of our people. Now that the events have taken this turn, on the initiative of the leaders of Tiraspol who seek to slice off a piece of sovereign Moldova—a deed devoid of any moral justification whatever—we resolved that it was no longer possible to postpone implementation of the idea of creating such a society. We decided that the time has



come to unite in order to help our brethren to the best of our ability. As far as the program is concerned, we intend to resolve issues of a cultural nature; however, we feel that in the future we will have to grasp problems of a broader scope. This does not involve only the Moldovan population of the Transdnestr Area but all of its population, both Russian and Ukrainian, because they are all heirs to the same tormenting and perverted history. After all, it is known that this area of our Moldova was relegated to oblivion by the government, writers, and the press...

[Correspondent] And only the Smirnovs, Morozovs, and people of their ilk did not forget it.

[Marinat] Absolutely correct. They worked day and night. Ultimately, they did succeed to a degree: At present, many people in the Transdnestr Area believe the tales they are telling.

[Correspondent] When will the first congress of the "Transnistria" Society be held?

[Soltan] I hope that we will succeed in holding our first congress on 11 and 12 November this year. However, it is not ruled out that this date will have to be delayed somewhat. Everything depends on the degree to which we will be able to implement what we have scheduled for the period of preparations for the congress. I also mean the plan to create a documentary about the history of Transnistria and the present situation in this area. This endeavor enjoys the support of President of the Republic Mr. Mircha Snegur. Our ultimate goal is for the people of Transnistria to, so to say, return to their roots.

[Correspondent] However, at first, perhaps, this spiritual disease needs to be diagnosed...

[Pogolsha] Of course. After all, over time conditions have developed in Transnistria which differ greatly from the situation in Bessarabia. It is necessary to study the symptoms and conduct certain sociological surveys in order to diagnose the disease. Very unfortunate distortions, especially in the demographic aspect, occurred in Transnistria to a greater degree than anywhere else in our republic. Where else do you encounter cities with exclusively Slavic populations, whereas the villages are solidly Moldovan? In this instance, contradictions between the urban and rural areas have acquired a clear-cut ethnic dimension.

[Soltan] These are the consequences of pressure applied by the dictatorship whose first commandment was to denationalize peoples.

[Pogolsha] We should also note another dimension of the problem. Over there, the working class is of one nationality, and peasants are of another. The same is the case with those who administer and those who are administered. Over there, the administrative-bureaucratic apparatus assumed only exaggerated forms, and due to this the contradictions were aggravated to the extreme. For well-known reasons, the Empire created industrial giants

over there that were of no use to the republic. They treated the most fertile lands in a beastly manner. Tell me what remains at present of the once most beautiful delta of the Dnestr? The destruction of the peasantry benefited only the cities, providing the cheapest labor for them.

[Soltan] All of these are the fruits of the same dictatorship, in essence that of the party. Hence the dictatorship of the urban areas with regard to the rural. Hence the current dictate of Smirnov and the people of his ilk in our villages...

[Pogolsha] This industrial oligarchy has ensured for itself a much more affluent life than the peasants and the intelligentsia. How is justice to be done? This will take many years. My parents grew up and lived under that dictatorship: They sincerely believed in socialism. We also believed in this global experiment, which had excellent ideological support. We are now witnessing the failure of this experiment: Old ideals have fizzled out, and all that remains is a profound tragedy of the people. We have very many honest and sincere people; how can they be accused of mankurtism and degradation? These doctrinaire ideas of socialism became second nature to them. At present, when everything old is collapsing, they keenly feel a loss and even pain, all the more so because the leaders over there manipulate their consciousness quite vigorously.

[Nirka] I do not quite agree with what esteemed Nikolay Nikolayevich has said: The people are not stupid, they know what is what.

[Marinat] I would call this sad story "A Magnificent Catastrophe." An English movie was shot based on factual Greek material in which people labored strenuously to implement an idea which turned out to be a bluff.

[Soltan] Yes, I remember, the people were building a railway in the mountains to bring down the timber cut at the top. However, the project was not economically feasible, and it failed. What were the poor workers to do except dance? What are we to do? Also dance?!

[Marinat] The dance was beautiful—"Sirtaki." In our case, it could still work out somehow if the collapse were only social; however, it has also become spiritual. We were deprived of our spirituality. After all, if Smirnov managed to prevail upon the leaders of the zone within one night, and the latter are, in their turn, prevailing upon the peasants, what does this mean? Have we really become so inferior that we have forgotten who we really are?

[Soltan] My impression is that we are still not past this catastrophe, that everything still lies ahead.

[Marinat] Perhaps. However, it would still be better if we arrived at some combination of socialism and capitalism, as has happened for example in Japan or Singapore.

[Konstantinov] Still, let us talk in more detail about our troubles. Look at what Bessarabia has lost in these 45 years. All of this has now been calculated quite precisely. However, think about what Transnistria has lost. After all, over there the dictatorship threw its weight around for 73 years. Over there, the situation is much worse. This indicates that totalitarian methods of building socialism are completely erroneous. Our Transnistria is the most graphic example of this.

[Pogolsha] That is why I am saying that this is second nature to our fellow countrymen. They are the victims of Stalinism to an even greater degree than we are. I know quite a few people in Transnistria who still believe that everything happening both here and throughout the country at present is the scheming of world imperialism, and we are Romanian spies.

[Soltan] All of this is nonsense. The supporters of totalitarianism apply such definitions primarily to the intelligentsia. But poor people do not care about this. They get up at dawn, somebody dispatches them to the field, and somebody lets them go home later, where they down a glass or two of wine and go to sleep until next morning. The main point is that the existence of the peasants has lost meaning. They are deprived of the great concerns of the peasants which make great sense. Being in control of their lives and their labor, the peasants always did everything, imparting to it the great sense of breadwinners for the people and the country. They have become robots. This is why their children flee to cities: There is nobody to set a worthy example for them. This is what the sense of a degraded civilization is. A peasant lives until his old age, and then he is of no interest to anyone...

[Marinat] We have been discussing more the social aspect of the catastrophe. Meanwhile, ours is a more acute topic—how is an ethnic catastrophe to be avoided? In my thoughts I very frequently return to my native village, Valya Khotsuluy; at present it has a different name—Dolinsk. For several centuries it was called Valya Khotsuluy; later, those who have always striven to assimilate us renamed it after their fashion.

[Soltan] Several days ago I talked to the poet Nikolae Dabizha, and he was very much surprised when I told him about several ancient words that have survived in our Koshnitsa. In our village, we have Troyan Hill, and Gospodarskiy Lane—could it be that this was where the troops of Stefan Cel Mare passed coming home after battling the Tatars and the Turks? Material published by this poet several days ago and the Great Russian Encyclopedia clearly suggest that the population between the Dnestr and the Bug has always been Moldovan.

[Nirka] Few people doubt it anymore.

[Marinat] I wanted to say that a locality quickly disappears if it is not administratively a part of its native ethnic territory. For as long as the village of Valya Khotsuluy was under Moldovan administration (Moldavian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic), it had Moldovan newspapers, schools, and day-care centers in

which the native language was spoken. As soon as it ended up in the territory of the Ukraine, all of these disappeared. Meanwhile, the population consisted of 20,000 Moldovans.

[Nirka] When were Moldovan schools in this village eliminated?

[Marinat] As recently as 20 years ago there was one Moldovan school there; my sister was its director. I also witnessed this piece of quackery: Children were given candy to induce them to study at a Ukrainian school, to switch to such schools...

[Soltan] Therefore, the formation of the Dnestr SSR at present amounts to nothing other than an attempt to justify the same policy of denationalization, an attempt to chop off one wing of our people in order to assimilate them faster, to make the people forget about their roots on this land, and to deprive them of their past and future.

[Marinat] It is clear that Smirnov has no intention of being silent. He speculates shamelessly when he calls this republic Moldavian.

[Soltan] Our sacred duty is to approach all Moldovans, their children, teachers, and mothers, with an appeal to become aware of the danger to them.

[Nirka] Do the children in Valya Khotsuluy still speak Moldovan?

[Marinat] No, they do not know their own language. The adults have also forgotten Moldovan if they have not used it. They protested somewhat when Moldovan schools were being closed: We do not need Ukrainian schools, we want to have Moldovan schools. A commission came from Moscow and said: "If that is the case, then there will be neither Moldovan nor Ukrainian schools; there will be only Russian ones!"

[Kiriya] In our Meleyesht we have a music teacher, Timofey Mikhaylov, who recorded nine cassettes of original folklore in this village—tales, riddles, jokes, and proverbs... The village has a large and ancient tradition. The first settlers arrived there from the vicinity of the city of Iassi. This is what historical documents show. These Moldovans grew millet (melay). Hence the name of the village. We always had great ethnic self-awareness. This is shown by the fact that during Stalin's terror many peasants fled across the Dnestr, that is, to Bessarabia. Subsequently, brutes from the NKVD [People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs] cruelly dealt with the relatives of those who fled. One person by the name of Gavrilitsa fled, and his brother was shot at the same time. It so happened that several Gagauz, Bulgarians, and Ukrainians found shelter in our village, getting jobs at the school, in the hospital, or at the collective farm board. So at present these very newcomers support those like Smirnov. However, there is one more woe. Many of the residents of Meleyesht work in the city, and those of them who march to the separatist drummer are given

special bonuses, extra sugar ration cards. Others are being intimidated by the prospect of being fired from work. The issue of the Tricolored Flag was resolved in our village by a bus driver who drove the citizens of Meleyesht to work in Tiraspol. He said: "Either you take down the Tricolored Flag, or I will not drive you to work anymore." Now the Tricolored Flag of the village is in the safe of the collective farm chairman.

[Soltan] Almost the same happened in the village of Doyban. This is an ancient Moldovan village. However, at one point several non-Moldovan families ended up in the village, and later they started another small village, Doyban II, on its outskirts. As time went by these outsiders came to lord it over the village, and Moldovans were relegated to a secondary status. A Ukrainian who has no earthly use for the Moldovan language is the chairman of the collective farm. The same happened in the village of Koshnitsa, where a multitude of newcomers also found shelter. Do not think that we are against this—our peasants know Russian culture and literature and value them, because this is what they have grown up with. However, why do these alien people refuse to respect our historic traditions? In Koshnitsa 7,000 Soviet soldiers are buried, and the villagers intended to restore a local church. They sought help from the entire population. But the Russian-speaking segment of the populace contributed little to this noble effort. They have forgotten about age-old traditions and everything sacred; they have become Mankurts, and they do not value their own traditions and culture, to say nothing of ours. Therefore, here is an open field in the operation of our society—educational work.

[Konstantinov] I am also concerned about something else. So, the Smirnovians are scaring our brethren across the Dnestr with Romanianization. I visited Romania recently. They treated us very well, and we found many common topics for negotiations. So, what is so bad about this? All of this is happening because as far as the inculcation of ethnic self-awareness is concerned, Transnistria was abandoned by us for many decades. Also, having made good, we forgot about our native land and became alienated.

[Kiriya] You are very right. Having moved to the capital, we forgot about developing the spirituality of our brothers, sisters, and parents—our relatives. This is what Smirnov's people exploited. They have done a good job, sometimes overtly and sometimes covertly. Agitation buses from Tiraspol and Rybnitsa travel through villages. They are driven by well-paid drivers who are relieved of their duties at their places of employment but whose wages are paid. Newspapers such as DNESTROVSKAYA PRAVDA and RYBNITSKIY METALLURG end up there in great numbers, calling for meetings, referendums, and elections. The native residents of Transnistria ask: Why is this happening? Who is authorizing this? Many of them ask: Please send us knowledgeable people from Kishinev, let them explain to us what is true and what is a lie; let them organize radio and TV broadcasts. Now, in this specific situation, many people

argue that a post of minister for the affairs of Transnistria with the Moldova SSR Government should be decreed, and they are right, because we cannot abandon our own brethren to the grace of separatists.

Let us consider why separatist ideas struck a favorable cord with the Moldovans of Transnistria. Unfortunately, they had no proper information; they did not know their historic roots, and many still do not know. I am convinced that if we visit our native villages more often and talk frankly to our people, much would change for the better very soon.

[Pogolsha] The attitude toward Romanians remains the strongest trump card the separatists hold. Older people, of course, remember how Romanian soldiers swaggered in these areas. This is what the separatists tell them: The Romanians will come again to sock it to you. In this case, two notions are equated—the old Romanian regime and the Romanian people, precisely as until now Stalin's terror has been equated with the Russian people. After all, these are completely different notions. Both old regimes committed many lawless acts. Many people who are still looking back to Stalinism forget for some reason about tens of millions of lives shattered in concentration camps and prisons. Let them ask, say, Aleksandr Marinat about the suffering that befell him and what millions of other people suffered through in the times of Stalin. This is why the regimes should not be equated with the peoples. I am very far from tribal consciousness: "My tribe good, your tribe bad." Meanwhile, this is how many people still reason. We have the same historic and ethnic roots as Romanians, and our language is the same. It does not become Moldovans to tolerate in their villages Smirnovs with their stupefying ideological schemes.

[Nirka] Let us reflect on one more thing. In 1947 I was discharged from the Army. I was 27 years old, and Minister of People's Education Lazarev appointed me dean of the natural science department of the imeni Ion Kryange Pedagogical Institute. All classes were taught in Russian. My predecessor was Ukrainian—M. Yaroshenko. Later he became an academician of the Moldova SSR Academy of Sciences. At the time he told me: "Make sure that in five or 10 years all classes at the department are taught only in Moldovan!" This is the advice a Ukrainian gave me! I heeded his advice. Every year I sent between five and 10 Moldovan graduates to graduate schools in Leningrad, Kiev, Moscow, Lvov. There are three academicians, four corresponding members of the academy, 15 doctors, and 152 candidates of science among my Moldovan students. In 1953 we switched to teaching all classes entirely in Moldovan. However, Agripina Krechun, who at the time was the minister of people's education of the republic, did not like this. She decided to transfer our department to Tiraspol in order to get rid of me. Our department operates there to this day. I worked until 1966, when some characters wrote to Brezhnev branding me "a double-dyed nationalist." The letter was referred back to Tiraspol; P.P. Petrik, who at the time was first secretary of the city communist organization, had me fired from

my job without explanation. The department, however, was Moldovan and remains so. We are compelled to state with regret that our local leaders—Bodyul, Postovoy, Petrik, and so on—are the most to blame before our people and before Transnistria; they worshipped "the Russian kingdom" all the time, just as we now have a number of people who worship "the Romanian kingdom."

Here is one more point. I am a bit angry with those who fought sincerely for the state language and the Latin script. It is possible that they would have secured the restoration of the historical truth sooner had they turned to the experience of the past when we, the residents of Transnistria, introduced the Latin script and the Romanian literary language at home. In 1932 a number of science personalities in Tiraspol, such as Irimitsa, Madan, Dymbul, and others, convinced G. Staryy, first secretary of the oblast committee, that opting for the Latin alphabet would be very useful and fair. As early as the end of that year Staryy gave the order, and the minister of people's education began to prepare the switch to the new alphabet. In 1932 we switched without any ado to the Latin script and the Romanian literary language. To be sure, in 1938 all who had previously fought for the language and the script were subjected to reprisals.

Finally, I would like to say the following. All of us, particularly our mass media, must be very careful in our assertions. I recently read the following view in an interview in the newspaper SOVETSKAYA MOLDOVA: It would be good to ask the government of the Ukraine to get Transnistria from us, and cede Bukovina and the south of Bessarabia to Moldova instead. What is it, really? Recently, I was in my native village, and also in Molovat, and in both villages the people set upon me: "Why do you want to sell us to the Ukraine without asking us?"

[Soltan] We should say that this year we sent many young people to study in Romania, including 20 young men and women from Transnistria. Now many parents from the villages of the Transdnestr Area come to us at the Transnistria Society and ask that we send their children to Bucharest to study. We send them even without preliminary exams.

[Kiriya] The duty of our Transnistria Society, which we will create at our first congress, is to embark on activities aimed at studying and explaining the tasks of preserving the integrity of our republic and consolidating its people. The society will rally around it people of good will from Dnestr localities, all people coming from this zone of our republic regardless of the language they speak, their social status, party affiliation, religious convictions, and ethnic affiliation. We hope to have our own quarters and our printed organ. We will cooperate closely with all creative organizations. We will fight for the prosperity of our sovereign Moldova. Our society should become a candle lit in the name of awakening our blood brothers from Transnistria to a new life.

### Hurenko Addresses Ukrainian CP Plenum

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[Report: "Report by S. I. Hurenko, Ukrainian CP Central Committee First Secretary, to the 28 September 1990 Ukrainian CP Central Committee Plenum"]

[Text] Comrades!

The social and political situation in our republic today remains complex and contradictory. A detailed analysis of the situation was given during the first stage of the 28th Ukrainian CP Congress.

But in recent months new phenomena have appeared in political life, and there has been greater urgency in some tendencies, and this requires changes in the tactics used in our work. In view of this the Central Committee Politburo has decided to present to this plenum a somewhat amended agenda, one which emphasizes the unique characteristics of the present moment and the urgent tasks of party organizations in regard to stabilization of the situation.

It should be noted that the process of further polarization of political forces is accelerating in our republic. Fifteen parties have already been announced. Eight of them have held organizational congresses. Among them are parties which have on the whole accepted the socialist choice. Some are of a liberal-democratic orientation. And in spite of a fully understandable divergence on many points in their programs they can be our political partners in the future. For these are the forces which are striving to protect society from social upheaval.

But the parties and factions which formed legally under general democratic slogans and have now thrown off this camouflage of words and are directing their efforts toward seizure of political power by any means, including violent means, are making their presence felt ever more aggressively. It should be noted that they have no solid social base and are winning supporters by speculating on people's present dissatisfaction, above all in regard to the economic situation, ecology and the social realm. Yet it is precisely these extremist forces which, united by their anti-communist platform, are the greatest danger to society today. They have unleashed a well-coordinated series of actions directed above all against the Ukrainian Communist Party.

The role of direct inspiration and organization of actions intended to destabilize the social and political situation is being played by the Ukrainian Republic Party, certain Rukh leaders and also the coordinating council of the so-called Association of Democratic Soviets and Democratic Blocs within Ukrainian soviets of people's deputies.

Our political opponents are planning a broad-scale civil disobedience campaign: a republic-wide strike and demonstration on the day the second Ukrainian SSR



Supreme Soviet session opens. This campaign is directed against the new Union Treaty and aims to block the fall induction of young people into the Soviet Army and to have the communist deputies in the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet recalled or the Supreme Soviet adjourned ahead of schedule and new elections called.

In order to intensify psychological pressure on communists who support the Ukrainian Communist Party's policy monuments to V. I. Lenin are being dismantled. I would like to remind you that something similar to this happened in the past. It started with the destruction of monuments, book burning and reviling of the dead, and it ended with annihilation of the living. And we should keep that in mind. It is by no means a coincidence, for instance, that in Drogobych, where the new city authorities sanctioned the illegal dismantling of a monument to V. I. Lenin, there are also plans to erect a monument to the Bandera. Incidentally, it will be located on the same site where a monument to Stalin once stood. Quite frankly, a telling coincidence.

It would be a grave mistake to fail to see that the consolidation of destructive forces on an anti-communist, anti-Lenin basis and their growing influence among a segment of the population as a result of difficulties in the social and economic realm represent a major threat to civil tranquility in our republic and to the very existence of the Soviet Ukraine. This threat has intensified recently as a result of the establishment of contacts between these forces and some strike committees in a number of our republic's industrial centers, where incitement is being carried out by emissaries of the so-called "Democratic Party of Russia" alongside representatives of the Ukrainian Republic Party and Rukh.

In the western region the situation is further complicated by worsening of the conflict between members of various religious faiths. A difficult situation is taking shape in the Crimea, which is continuing to receive a massive unsanctioned influx of Crimean Tatars, whose numbers there presently exceed 90,000.

A majority of the republic's populace is reacting to all these phenomena and events with increasing attention and concern.

It must be acknowledged that the tumultuous and ambiguous processes which are occurring in society are also affecting the situation within the party. In the course of preparations for this plenum the Central Committee Politburo appealed to party committees, primary party organizations and rank-and-file communists with a request that they express their opinions about whether things are changing for the better. Some of the suggestions received were used in the preparation of documents for this plenum, while others were taken into consideration during the drafting of changes and amendments in the drafts of the Ukrainian CP Charter and the statute on primary party organizations and their secretaries. The draft primary organization statute has been

distributed to you. We request that you study it carefully and express your thoughts on it.

In a majority of the opinions—and this coincides with the Central Committee Politburo's position—it was felt that a priority task today is strengthening of party ranks' ideological and organizational unity. We must bring order to our ranks and draw together genuine communists, those who stand firm on the positions of perestroika and are actively working for its interests. For very often the contemplative position of some party members has a harmful effect on the overall atmosphere in primary organizations, demoralizes collectives and distracts people from clear-cut political guidelines. Under such conditions it is very easy for the dubious little ideas spread about by our political opponents to find support and spread and for insidious propagandistic stereotypes and labels to take hold.

Some party cells have for a long time now already been virtually inactive and have lost or are losing influence within their collectives. As a rule it is in precisely these areas where members are quitting the party. During the first eight months of this year 73,000 people quit the party. That equals 2.3 percent of total Ukrainian CP membership.

People have various reasons for quitting. However, certain trends are evident. The party is being abandoned by careerists and timeservers who are attempting to portray their betrayal as great heroism. Many of them, after taking everything they could from the party and the Soviet State—awards, bonuses, honorary titles and large honoraria—are now abusing that same party and state with the same zeal with which they previously lauded and glorified them. The party is also being left by those who judge the results of their party membership in terms of the membership dues they pay and how much can be bought for that sum. In regard to them as well everything is clear.

Things are more difficult in regard to those people who are turning in their party membership cards because they could not withstand the pressure and did not sense support from the party, as has been the case in our republic's western oblasts. Even more difficult are the cases of those who cannot understand the present course of the CPSU and our country's government and therefore disagree with it. This should be stated frankly: there are many communists who are honest and truly devoted to our cause who regard it as a tragedy that the party has given up its direct power functions. They regard this not as democratization, but rather as a voluntary yielding of positions to other political forces.

There are people who do not understand how the party can set the goal of providing a high level of social protection for people and yet at the same time come out in support of a transition to market-oriented relationships.

That is all true. But one must realize that what we are witnessing are objective contradictions at the present

stage of restructuring. And each communist should be deeply aware of the need for this.

Party committees and primary organizations should support those who cannot immediately come to grips with the complexities of present-day life and help give them back their confidence in the party and in themselves. By doing so we will definitely keep many communists from quitting. Yet at the same time we should strive resolutely to rid ourselves of those who have long since consciously ceased to share our party's ideas.

The time has come to speak out boldly about the personal responsibility of each CPSU member, about his political and civic stance and, finally, about his morals. This is the way the issue is being stated, for example, by the communists of Gaysynskiy Rayon, Vinnitsa Oblast, and by the majority of the others who expressed their opinions on this point.

No one should be forced to stay in the party. As they say, a free man has free will. Though it is appropriate to remind people once again that at no time and in no place has there ever been approval for double-dealing, apostasy or, especially, degeneration.

We feel that primary party organizations should clearly define the position of each party member in the very near future during the course of the reports and elections campaign. Individual comrades' interviews are quite effective in accomplishing this. Suggestions are also being received proposing sociopolitical certification of party members. Kiev and Lugansk party gorkoms, Sak-saganskiy Party Raykom in Krivoy Rog and the Kharkov Electric Equipment Plant Party Committee deem it appropriate to re-register party members and exchange party documents.

Comrades, let us exchange opinions both on this issue and on all the other proposals which we are now going to discuss.

I must say that a certain "contribution" to the worsening of internal party affairs has been made by some "Democratic Platform" supporters. Of course, they should not all be lumped together; there are among them individuals who are sincerely interested in renewing the party and restoring its strength and influence. We are seeking viewpoints in common with them and moving in the direction of dialogue and constructive cooperation.

But it is high time we gave party organizations an unambiguous assessment of the "democrats" who support a split in the party. No one should be deceived by their statements regarding political pluralism and accusing the CPSU and the Ukrainian Communist Party of ideological intolerance and persecution of dissidents. They demonstrate extreme intolerance themselves by addressing the party solely through ultimatums and constantly threatening to break it up from within. This is nothing more nor less than an effort to dissolve the party. And the "Democratic Platform" activists, whether they

have noticed it or not, have already joined the ranks of the confirmed anti-communists who are attacking the party from the right.

We must all clearly see the danger of destruction and liquidation of party units in labor collectives, i.e. primary and shop-level party organizations and party groups. We fully share the alarm over this expressed in many letters and appeals received recently by the Central Committee, including those from the communists of Cherkassy Oblast.

It is clear that the preservation and strengthening of party organizations will to a large extent depend on the new generation admitted to party membership. Recently the number of new members has declined sharply. Since the beginning of this year approximately 13,000 people have joined the party. This figure, as you can see, is much smaller than the number quitting the party. But the most important thing is that genuinely convinced, ideologically steadfast and bold people joined communists' ranks; these people's membership in the CPSU does not hold out to them the promise of any privileges. And they are well aware of that and will immediately become actively engaged in political affairs. Just one example: Comrade V. M. Kozhushko, a worker at Tsentrolit Plant in Sumy, declared his intention to join the party at a city rally held in defense of V. I. Lenin. It is heartening to see that the majority of those joining are young people. Furthermore, 37 percent more people joined in August than in July.

I could list a number of places where party admissions are not only decreasing but actually increasing. For example, these include Mankovskiy Rayon (Cherkassy Oblast), Berislavskiy Rayon (Kherson Oblast), Korostyshevskiy Rayon (Zhitomir Oblast) and several others. This attests, on the one hand, to the authority of party organizations in those rayons and, on the other hand, to thoughtful individualized work.

We feel that the Pokrovskiy Party Raykom (Dnepropetrovsk Oblast) and Lyubarskiy Party Raykom (Zhitomir Oblast) are right in proposing a transition from the overly formalized tactic of "party selection" to active agitation and well-planned efforts to recruit people for party membership.

All of us are naturally concerned over the fact that some party members are not paying their dues for months at a time, while some primary party organizations have ceased paying the appropriate portion of the dues they collect into the overall party budget. I want to tell you plainly: this is a major, even a very major, service to the anti-communists. Including those who have sponsored overt persecution of our party comrades, mainly in the republic's western oblasts. For funds collected in the form of party membership dues are needed today to help organizations which find themselves in a difficult situation, to help party veterans, and to render material support to the party's mass media outlets.

We must clearly realize that the material prosperity of the Ukrainian Communist Party, as of any other political party, is an important prerequisite if it is to be able to carry out its work. Party committees, particularly those in Donetsk, Lugansk and several other oblasts, should work diligently to explain this to their communists.

The main conclusion from what I have said is that strengthening of party unity is inseparable from conscious discipline on the part of all party members. It should be clear to each communist that this in no way contradicts demands for renewal of the party and democratization of its affairs, or implementation of the principle of power to the party masses. Today it is time to augment that principle with quite specific and realistic content, ensuring genuine supremacy of the collective will and communists' reason through perestroika and more active efforts by primary party organizations in particular.

Comrades! It is only natural that despite all the importance of solving intraparty problems respect for primary party organizations is determined above all by their real influence on the affairs of labor collectives and on efforts to find solutions to problems in the socioeconomic and intellectual realms.

The party's renunciation of administrative-command-type interference in production work is still being interpreted in some quarters to mean that the party should not deal with specific matters at all. This was precisely the goal of the campaign to remove primary party organizations from production facilities. It is annoying that these ideas have gained support among certain communists. I would like to tell those comrades once again: a party which is deprived of access to practical social matters and which is isolated from the affairs and concerns of labor collectives will inevitably be transformed from a real political force into a debating society. And that is exactly what the anti-communists and some of our own "homegrown" reformers would like to see.

We are proceeding upon a diametrically opposed assumption. The strength of primary party organizations lies in their proximity to labor collectives, to the people with their needs, interests and concerns. And that requires practicality in our efforts and a close connection with real-life affairs.

At one time certain people in the party aktiv were mistrustful of the approval granted by the Ukrainian CP Central Committee to efforts by a number of primary party organization to solve specific socially significant problems. One could hear it said that this was just the latest newfangled thing they had dreamed up. But in those places where people have taken more than a formal approach to this much that is positive has already been accomplished.

For example, communists in Novoukrainskiy Rayon, Kirovograd Oblast, have set two main orientations in

their work: improvement of the food supply and restoration of the environment. All this has been concretized by a raykom plenum in primary party organizations' tasks and in instructions to communist deputies on local soviets and to economic administrators. People today can already see that the rayon's party organization is working on these problems persistently, consistently and effectively.

An object of special concern for the communists of Podillya Sewing Association in Vinnitsa is real application of cost accounting, preparations for the transition to leasing and technical refitting of production facilities. Their party organization has shown initiative by reinforcing all the important production sectors with competent, qualified specialists. All this helps ensure efficient work by the collective and successful compliance with contractual obligations. Of course, there are similar examples in other rayons as well. And I would like to direct the attention of Central Committee members once again to the need to focus our efforts on finding solutions to specific socially significant problems and to the significance which this has in regard to strengthening primary party organization's authority and respect for the party as a whole.

A separate topic for discussion are the tasks of primary party organizations in the Donetsk Basin and Dnieper region, particularly in mining collectives. It has already been stated at various levels that in those regions the social and political situation has worsened in an extreme manner. Part of the population in mining cities and towns has virtually lost all faith in the ability of republic and national government and of local organs to bring about change for the better in the situation.

In view of the urgency of the situation, the Ukrainian CP Central Committee and the republic government as working to bring about accelerated solutions to pressing problems. Some things have already been accomplished. I say to you frankly that it was under persistent pressure from and with direct input by communists leaders in the republic government that the USSR Council of Ministers passed the decree "On the Socioeconomic Development of Mining Cities and Towns in the Ukrainian SSR in 1991-95." Over 4.1 billion rubles have been allocated for implementation of this measure.

I would like to appeal to party committees and primary party organizations: while supporting miners' justified economic demands we must also without wasting time become actively involved in the realization of tasks for which this program makes provision. We must make more active efforts to reveal the true goals of those forces which, using miners' demonstrations as their base, would like to remove the CPSU and the Ukrainian Communist Party from the political arena as a political force. It is important that we work persistently to eradicate political and economic demagoguery and irresponsible statements about the possibility of immediate

improvement in miners' lives despite the substantial decline in the level of labor organization and discipline in mining collectives.

I must also say that over the past nine months the level of coal production has decreased by 10 million metric tons in comparison to last year's level. Incidentally, in August our republic economy was at a standstill in terms of growth, while salaries rose 14 percent.

There is probably no one who still needs to be convinced that the transition to market-oriented relationships will require a major change in the forms and methods of primary party organizations' work. Generalized discussion of the market often conceals fundamental incomprehension of all that the market entails. Hence one of the urgent tasks facing communists in the production-related realm: they must be well acquainted with these matters themselves first, then find and suggest the optimum form of economic self-determination for their collectives, and carry out active explanatory work on this basis.

It should be kept in mind that our practical transition to a market economy began when labor collectives were granted economic independence. The introduction into practice and mastery of market relationships is a difficult, complex task. We must mobilize all of collectives' existing intellectual potential, direct it toward development of a specific program in this regard and, no less importantly, draw up measures providing social protection for people.

If such programs, developed at party organizations' initiative, will be businesslike and farsighted, if working people sense their real results, then this will once again prove that primary party organizations are an integral part of labor collectives, not some alien formation which has been imposed upon them.

Nor should primary party organizations remain uninvolved in efforts to strengthen ties with subsidiary enterprises. For material-technical supply and performance of contractual obligations are presently the most important issues of all. As a counterweight to those who are recommending the disruption of such ties, those who are pleased by economic chaos, communists should through their actions prove their responsibility for the interests both of their collective and of the republic and the country as a whole.

In this regard we are counting greatly on party organizations in the administrative organs. Through each party member they should constantly keep a hand on the pulse of the economic organism, encourage stability and normalization of its operations, and achieve the eradication of excessive bureaucracy and manifestations of collective and regional egoism.

I would like to note that a majority of rural party organizations today enjoy great respect in collectives. This in combination with peasants' natural wisdom and moderation bars the way to political extremism. It is no

coincidence that it is precisely in rural areas that one does not find significant support for incitement by destructive forces.

Yet at the same time one cannot help but see that there as well a whole series of problems continue to worsen, above all social problems. Rural communists are correct in raising these issues. The Central Committee Politburo supports their demands, and this was also reflected in a recently adopted resolution on rural social development. We will continue to support radical reorientation of the government's economic policy with a view toward saving Ukrainian villages and restoring the social prestige of peasant labor.

We firmly intend to do everything we can to support initiatives by primary party organizations in regard to social protection for agricultural workers and their cooperation with cells of the Ukrainian Peasant League. The Central Committee is of the opinion that rural party organizations will have a key position in regard to those communist administrators on farms who are violating contractual discipline. It is no secret that today agricultural produce is not being sold according to state procurement requirements. We submit that actions of this nature undermine the food base of our sovereign republic and could result in very serious consequences for our entire people.

Particular attention should be paid to the work of party organizations at scientific institutions, in creative collectives and unions, and at educational institutions.

The party has had difficulty in its relations with scientists and figures in literature and the arts at various stages in our history. We have definitely broken with the distortions of the past. The Ukrainian CP Central Committee Politburo recently reconsidered and rescinded as politically false a number of Ukrainian CP (Bolshevik) Central Committee resolutions from the late 1940's and early 1950's in regard to the development of Ukrainian literature, arts and historical science.

Our view of mutual relations between party organizations and the artistic intelligentsia and scientists under present-day conditions consists primarily of a decisive rejection of administrative interference in creative processes. We favor a constructive dialogue and cooperation with those who work in the intellectual realm and we favor consolidation of them on a platform of the socialist choice, affirmation of the ethnic and cultural distinctiveness of the Ukrainian people and humanist ideas and the priority of common human values.

Party organizations within creative unions and cultural institutions have played an exceptional role in awakening artists' sense of personal responsibility for the molding of society's value orientations and for the political resonance not only from their work, but also from their every action and every word. We also count on communists in creative unions to help their colleagues more decisively rebuff attempts to replace the previous dictates of the party in regard to artistic creativity and



publishing activity with the even stricter and more intolerable dictates of other political forces. Yet such attempts are already being made today.

To a considerable extent what I have said applies to party organizations at scientific institutions as well. In this area there are specific difficulties and problems connected in particular with unsatisfactory material-technical and financial support for research. But today I would like to direct your attention to the following. It would be good if precisely party organizations in scientific collectives could initiate competent testing of a number of dubious ideas, conclusions and generalizations which are presently widespread among the public. I am referring to the avalanche of disinformation and dilettantish political and economic ideas, devoid of any scientific foundation, which is pouring down on the mass consciousness today. In this regard there is an extreme need for the calm, well-balanced word of an authoritative scientist.

Communists at academic institutions are also in a difficult situation today. They are being subjected to no less and sometimes even to more pressure than those in production-related fields. That is understandable: all the new political forces are striving to win over young people and lure them away from CPSU influence. Communists are reacting to this in various ways. Some of them despair. And some of them, for instance the party committee secretary of Kiev Polytechnical Institute, themselves present an "initiative" to dissolve their VUZ party organizations. But there are also quite a few who are seeking and finding new approaches and a new view of party organizations' role. For example, party organizations at several VUZs have concluded contracts with the administration in which they assume quite definite responsibilities in regard to improvement of the academic process, work in dormitories, etc.

Communists in the ministries in charge of education should in the near future take a clear-cut stance in regard to the so-called depoliticization of the academic process. Indeed, today we do need to expand students' spectrum of political knowledge. But we are opposed to attempts to impose upon them tendentious ideas with anti-communist overtones, force the introduction of religion into schools and force children to pray within the walls of educational institutions. This violates both freedom of conscience and legislation on schools.

In this regard we are counting heavily on primary party organizations at educational institutions, counting on them helping their collectives maintain a sense of responsibility for the fate of the next generation and prevent the destruction of all the positive things they have achieved over the past years and decades. Specifically, this applies to activities in schools by Octobrist, Pioneer and Komsomol organizations. For their main objective has never been a narrow party goal; their goal has been to instill patriotism and respect for people of different nationalities, collectivism and humanity.

Comrades! It is clear that success of a job in any realm depends above all on the people to whom it is entrusted. Some people, citing the dissolution of the infamous nomenklatura and their right to monitor administrative activities, conclude that party organizations should no longer be involved with cadre policy at all. That can be the thinking only of those who continue to regard cadre work solely as questionnaires and job descriptions and the arbitrary and groundless appointment or firing of anyone at any time.

But today cadre work consists of something else. We regard the search by party organizations for people who combine a high degree of professionalism with broad horizons, non-typical thinking and the ability to orient themselves in difficult real-life situations and to make bold and well-justified decisions as the essence of this work.

Unfortunately, such modern approaches to cadre work are not being taken in all places by any means. Specifically, it was for this reason that quite a few party organizations proved unable to nominate and support in a timely manner worthy candidates for election as people deputies and thus lost the elections. We are presently witnessing the results of this in many places. We must take this lesson to heart with all seriousness, and not just in those areas where we lost. Cadres should not be trained "in general," but instead with clear-cut orientations toward specific sectors. Once the party organization is convinced that an individual can achieve real progress it recommends him for a certain post and does everything it can to help get him elected or appointed. We must continue to work with these people, relying on them as we pursue our course in the economy and in the social and intellectual realms. In our opinion this is the correct and sole possible approach under a multiparty system and under conditions of political struggle. On the other hand, we must also be exacting in regard to those who cannot cope with their assigned sectors and fail at their tasks. Party organizations should criticize them thoroughly, and if necessary raise the issue of replacing them in a timely manner.

I would like to note that many party committees, primary organizations and communists who responded to the Central Committee's call for dialogue stressed the need for greater attention to communists who are economic administrators. This is a reasonable demand, and it should be utilized fully in our further work.

Comrades! At a time when we are affirming real independence for primary party organizations we require a radical review of their relationships with party committees at all levels. It is time we made a transition from strict subordination and a rigid hierarchy to partnership and mutual support. In this regard party-like comradeship and good will and close and businesslike ties in both directions are of great importance. Both in primary party organizations and on party committees it should be clearly understood that the enemies of our party are relying heavily precisely on a breakdown of the party's

structures and are attempting to sow mistrust and dissension in relationships between those structures and between the various branches of the party, especially along vertical lines. In order to achieve this they are making extensive use of an already well-worn stereotype: the "enemy image" in the form of the party apparatus, setting it against the great mass of communists.

It is appropriate to note that the leaders of the new parties presently being established who are calling for dismantling of the Ukrainian CP apparatus are very actively working to form their own apparatuses. They are willing to spend plenty of money on this, and clearly they have some sources of funding. And it is this apparatus which is dreaming up and organizing all the noisy public actions which are being passed off as popular initiatives.

Perhaps the strongest pressure is being felt by party raykoms and gorkoms. And that is not surprising: they have the closest contact with primary party organizations and are supposed to help them solve the most difficult problems in their organizational and political work and in intraparty affairs. No less an important function of theirs is coordination and unification of efforts by low-level party branches for the performance of tasks which affect entire groups of primary organizations, labor collectives and sometimes an entire rayon or city.

Party committees should organize studies for cadres and the elected aktiv in a new way, taking the realities of the current moment into consideration. That was the opinion of Ukrainian CP Central Committee members A. F. Lavrik, V. I. Nikonenko and A. S. Statinov, as well as communists in party organizations at the Ternopol Branch of Lvov Polytechnical Institute, Yuzhnoye Scientific PO and a number of party gorkoms and raykoms. Specifically, they propose that a differentiated system of study for the aktiv be established, covering such timely issues as the work of party organizations within a multiparty system and the methodology of sociological research.

Strengthening and deepening of ties between low-level branches and party gorkoms and raykoms should be encouraged by the establishment of primary party organization secretary councils. Experience shows that wherever such councils are established they augment party committees in their day-to-day work. But only on one condition: if these formations do not become parallel structures or alternative party committees.

Right now we are all going through a very difficult and, moreover, painful process: changes in the structure of party organizations and cutbacks in the staff of the party committee apparatus. Some branches will have to be eliminated altogether. Of course, in this regard we absolutely must not act in cookie-cutter fashion and impose the same cuts on everyone indiscriminately. In some places, for instance, it would be more appropriate to eliminate the party gorkom, retaining city raykoms; some places, in consideration of special circumstances, it

might be appropriate to do the opposite. We are prepared to consider each specific situation together with you.

The main criterion in this regard is obviously to get rid of superfluous branches and at the same time not leave gaps in the system of party organs which could weaken their ties with primary party organizations. We need an approach which will make those ties even stronger. And we can make serious decisions and carry out fundamental measures only by consulting in detail with communists.

Reorganization of the party apparatus is exceptionally important among these measures. In accordance with the decisions made by the 28th Ukrainian CP Congress the Politburo has passed a resolution regarding the structure and staffs of republic party organs. By the end of this year 5,600 senior officials and 3,900 technical personnel will be let go as a result of reorganization in the apparatus of republic party organs. These changes will affect all branches of the Ukrainian CP.

The number of persons working in party raykoms, gorkoms and obkoms will be cut by 40 percent. There will be a 45 percent cut in the Central Committee apparatus. Its new structure will look like this: five secretaries, seven or eight departments, a press center and the Party Control Commission. Of course, one should bear in mind that this structure could still be changed as events unfold.

Naturally, all these and other changes are not an end in themselves; they are prompted by necessity and have as their goal ensuring progress in the work of party committees. Their apparatus should become more mobile and flexible and more capable of functioning effectively by political methods under today's difficult conditions.

I would also like to inform you in regard to reorganization of party institutions. Party obkom and gorkom houses of political education are being transformed into cost accounting-based sociopolitical centers. The Ukrainian CP Central Committee House of Political Education is being eliminated, as well as the republic branch of the Scientific Atheism Institute and universities of Marxism-Leninism. The Kiev and Odessa higher party schools are being turned into institute of political science and social management, and the Party History Institute will become the Political Research Institute.

I must stress that these are not just name changes. All these institutions and facilities are moving closer to real-life needs and to practical party political work. At the same time it is envisioned that all these changes will be accompanied by a rise in the scientific level of new developments and research work.

Improvement in the structure and functions of the party apparatus is inevitable; it is dictated by life itself, therefore there is no point in dramatizing the situation. But all of us, from the Central Committee down to the raykoms, should take care to see that this process does not break.

does not cripple, the fate of even one human being—I am referring to the officials who will be let go. Incidentally, many of them are being eagerly sought after by enterprises, institutions and organizations, including those which sent them into party work. For by and large they are well-trained specialists who also have political experience.

Comrades! Today our country and our republic find themselves on the threshold of exceptionally important decisions. Above all I am referring to the transition to a market economy. And, of course, we must state the Central Committee Politburo's position on this matter. That position is that the transition to the market must be carried out above all on the basis of the Ukrainian SSR's Declaration of State Sovereignty and its Law on Economic Independence. In this regard we must act resolutely and waste no time. Yet at the same time we must do everything we can to ensure that the transition will be as painless as possible for the people.

In our opinion none of the programs of which we are aware at this time fits this criterion. Therefore the government in conjunction with many Ukrainian SSR people's deputies is currently preparing a draft republic program for the transition to a market economy. This draft, if deputies support our proposals in regard to the agenda, will be submitted for discussion by a Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet session in October. However, the people should also be consulted in regard to the most fundamental points. We feel that the program should provide solutions to the following fundamental problems.

Firstly, we must develop measures to stabilize the political and economic situation in our republic. Unless we do it will be impossible to implement any program. We can no longer tolerate constantly falling production volumes, failure to heed contractual obligations, flourishing speculation, growing shortages, rising prices and violations of the law. We need to combat effectively both economic crimes and political extremism. We will never be able to move ahead in an atmosphere of hysteria borne on a wave of rallies and strikes.

The situation has worsened to such a degree that we have a right to demand that communists working in the Supreme Soviet, the government and law enforcement organs immediately do everything possible to ensure the necessary conditions for normal functioning of the economy and to protect citizens' rights and lives. Today as never before we need discipline, organization, lawfulness and law and order. This is being demanded by the people, by all the people of the Soviet Ukraine.

Secondly, we must resolutely and yet at the same time in a well-balanced manner determine our position on privatization of the economy.

Above all those enterprises and production facilities which are working directly to meet people's needs should be removed from state ownership.

Thirdly, we must work to ensure strengthening of and protection for the state sector of the economy. I am referring above all to power generation, transportation, communications, heavy machine building, the coal and chemical industries and ferrous metallurgy, as well as basic and applied science. All these things form the backbone of the economy and determine the development of all the other sectors and forms of property, as well as our level of scientific-technical progress.

I would like to emphasize that a large-scale state sector as a basis for directed influence over spontaneous processes in the economy is being preserved and supported in many countries around the world.

Fourthly, while we share the belief that radical changes must be made in agrarian relationships, we nonetheless feel that land is the property of all the people and that we must approach any new distribution of it in an extremely thoughtful manner and with consideration for the people's opinions. Above all we must ask the peasants what they think.

Fifthly, the program should define itself clearly in regard to the future of unprofitable enterprises. Presently there are 1,500 such enterprises in our republic. And just look at the kind of enterprises they are, comrades! They include 90 percent of our coal mines, 226 out of a total of 251 mines. I want the miners to hear this. They will not all heed what communists say nowadays. They should be aware that the Ukrainian CP Central Committee, in contrast to certain "political horsemen" who are presently proposing that we halt state subsidies to unprofitable enterprises, is doing everything possible to prevent coal mines in the Donetsk Basin, Volhynia and the Dnieper region from being shut down merely because they are losing money. The lives of people, the lives of miners' families, should not be turned over to profanation by political adventurists.

This must be reiterated over and over again: the whole program should be imbued with concern over social protection for people. The state should bear the greatest burden of negative effects resulting from the transition to a market economy.

Comrades, I would like to place special emphasis on the following point. If we look at the people's interests and not at narrow political ambitions, as is being done by some parties and factions, then we see that the Ukraine cannot survive without the all-union economy. The objective necessity of this is dictated by its high level of economic integration with the other republics and the deep interdependence and intertwined nature of production and economic relations.

People who are either unscrupulous or poorly informed as to the real state of affairs are nowadays screaming at rallies that we can allegedly survive on our own. We would survive. Indeed, there are quite a few countries in the world which do not have their own natural gas, oil, timber and other resources. The question is, how well would we survive? We should bear in mind the fact that

the worldwide division of labor has come about over a period of centuries through the efforts of many generations. And juggling of comparisons about the relative capabilities of the Ukraine and France, the Ukraine and Italy or Japan is nothing more than an irresponsible attempt to lure the people into new and grave tribulations lasting many years.

Let us just imagine one thing: that tomorrow we would have to buy oil and petroleum products in the Western markets. Experts estimate that this reorientation would cost the Ukraine over eight billion dollars. And that does not include the cost of transportation, receiving, storage, etc.

Where can that money be found? Can we pull it out of thin air? Our republic imports over 13 billion rubles worth of goods from abroad, yet exports less than seven billion. No one has ever yet succeeded in changing a balance like that in 500 days. It is quite clear: we must make full use of our whole country's economic potential, a potential created by our common efforts, including the labor of the Ukrainian people. Today this is essential in order to avoid serious socioeconomic upheavals during the transition to a market economy. This is essential in order to perform other large-scale tasks which are simply beyond the ability of the Ukraine alone. The primary and most urgent of those tasks is recovery from the effects of the Chernobyl nuclear accident, something which, as you are aware, is problem of the entire state. Nor should we harbor any illusions that we will be helped by a generous uncle from abroad.

In this connection a question arises: why are communists working in the government slow to conclude mutually advantageous treaties governing economic, scientific-technical and cultural cooperation with other republics? For we are still lagging behind in this area as well. It is especially essential that we do so because clearly only through a process of further expansion of mutually advantageous interrepublic ties is it possible to define clearly those functions of state power and administration which it would be appropriate for the sake of our republic and our people to delegate to the center when a treaty between sovereign socialist states is concluded.

It is quite obvious that efforts to prepare such a treaty must be carried out on a qualitatively new level. We are opposed both to sweeping rejection of the very idea of a treaty and to oversimplification of approaches to this task. Our principles are free choice, equal cooperation and universal accord. The most important thing is to take the opinion of the entire Ukrainian people into account. Without such a treaty the sovereign republics will not be able to resolve effectively matters pertaining to their defense and security. Furthermore, without such a treaty there would be a real threat to the integrity of the Ukraine as a state. We must not forget that there are over 60 million people in the USSR living outside of their own national-state territories, with over 14 million of them in the Ukraine.

Over the long years that they have lived together people of various nationalities have become connected by thousands of threads of historical, cultural and family ties. Any attempt to break these could lead to serious social upheaval and cause new suffering and misfortune. And that is not just an assumption. The hundreds of thousands of refugees which already exist in our country are unfortunate proof of the reality of this threat.

Comrades! The Ukrainian CP has, despite all its difficulties and problems, great creative potential and substantial strength and capabilities. The most important thing for us today is to use all these for the success of perestroika and in the best interests of the people.

The Central Committee Politburo appeals to the members of the Central Committee and to all our republic's communists, urging them to participate as actively as possible in the realization of tasks connected with economic upturn and social and ethnic revitalization and to resolutely rebuff those forces which are hampering constructive work. Do not allow the people to be deceived by populist phrases. Today even politically inexperienced and trusting people are beginning to see that they mask demagoguery, provocation and calls to lawlessness, violence and cruelty. The events of recent days have once again graphically shown the true face of the leaders of the Ukrainian Republic Party, the Association of Free Ukrainian Youth, the extremist wing of Rukh and other similar organizations and factions.

Therefore the Central Committee Politburo deems it essential to appeal to communists and all working people in regard to the present situation in our republic.

The Central Committee, party obkoms, gorkoms and raykoms and primary party organizations should do everything in their power to ensure above all stability, tranquility and order in our republic. In this regard we are counting on popular support.

### **Draft Statute of Ukrainian Democratic Party**

91UN0059A Kiev LITERATURNIA UKRAYINA  
in Ukrainian 27 Sep 90 p 3

["Draft Statute of the Democratic Party of the Ukraine"]

### **[Text] Founding of the Democratic Party of the Ukraine Announced**

On September 22, 1990, at a meeting in Terebovlia, the Democratic Party of the Ukraine (DemPU) Preparatory Committee, oblast representatives and the Terebovlia rayon organization ratified a draft statute of the party, which will be in effect until the party holds its first convention.

Given this fact, and the fact that the ideological platform put forward in the published Manifesto of the DemPU (LITERATURNIA UKRAYINA May 31, 1990) is rallying the citizenry, and local, rayon and oblast party



organizations are being formed, we declare September 22, 1990, to be the date of the founding of the Democratic Party of the Ukraine.

*Preparatory Committee,*

*Oblast Preparatory Committee Representatives*

*Terebovlia DemPU Organization*

## **Draft Statute of the Democratic Party of the Ukraine**

### **I. General Principles.**

1.1. The Democratic Party of the Ukraine (DemPU) is a political organization which brings together voluntarily citizens of the Ukrainian Republic who support the party's program and promote the program's realization.

1.2. The DemPU considers human rights as the priority. The freedom of the individual should be restricted only if that person restricts the freedom of another individual. The rights of the family, nation and state stem from this fundamental right. These rights can be realized only within a legal state having a division of legislative, executive and judicial powers.

1.3. The DemPU supports freedom of economic activity, equal rights to all forms of ownership and economic activity, a market economy, ecological protection, the revival and free development of the culture of the Ukrainian people and of all national and ethnic groups who live on the territory of the Ukrainian Republic.

1.4. The DemPU believes that these principles can be realized only within a totally independent Ukraine.

1.5. The DemPU co-operates with all political parties and citizens' movements which adhere to principles that do not contradict DemPU aims. The DemPU will strive to attain political power by fielding candidates for election to state legislatures and working for their election by non-violent means.

### **II. Membership.**

2.1. Any citizen of the Ukrainian Republic who is at least 18 years of age and is not a member of another party or its youth organization may be a member of the DemPU. The party accepts as members all citizens of the Ukraine, regardless of their nationality, religion, education, profession, property ownership or employment status.

2.2. Acceptance of a new member takes place at a meeting of the local organization and requires a written application with two letters of recommendation from party members and a majority of votes of organization members.

2.3. To leave the party, the member makes a declaration to his local organization.

2.4. A member of the DemPU can be ejected from the party for transgressing its statute or general standards of morality, or for engaging in activity which goes against

the party program. Ejection takes place at a meeting of the local organization by means of two-thirds of the votes of its members. If the member does not agree with the decision that is taken, he may take his case to the appeals committee, which must review the appeal within two weeks. If the appeals committee disagrees with the decision taken by the local organization, the latter again reviews the case and its decision is considered final.

2.5. Citizens who sympathize with the aims of the DemPU can assist it financially or by their actions and take part in the meetings of local organizations with the right of deliberative vote.

2.6. A local organization is formed at a meeting of the initiators in the presence of a representative of a regional or the republican organization; this is followed by registration with the appropriate party body.

### **III. Procedural Principles.**

3.1. DemPU resolutions are passed by a simple majority of votes at meetings of local organizations, conferences and conventions, with the exception of cases covered by points 2.4, 5.3 and 7.3. Minorities have the right to have their view expressed along with the majority resolution.

3.2. DemPU members are obliged to implement resolutions for which they voted or which do not contradict their beliefs. Implementation of resolutions of the executive bodies of the party is regulated by point 5.3 of the statute.

3.3. Party executive bodies of all levels are elected by secret ballot, or if so decided at meetings, conferences or conventions, by an open vote. At the demand of 1/5 of those present, a secret ballot must be used.

### **IV. Rights and Obligations of Party Members.**

4.1. Party members have the right to discuss freely any question relating to party activity, and may approach any DemPU body in their own name or in the name of the organization which passed a given resolution. Party members who do not agree with a resolution may express their opinion, indicating whether this is the opinion of the minority or their personal opinion. The minority opinion is published along with the main resolution.

4.2. A DemPU member has the right to publicly express his position at meetings, conferences or conventions and may criticize the activity of any body or any individual member of the party. To do this he may use the party's or other organs of mass information.

The DemPU member has the right to:

- approach any party body with requests, questions or propositions and obtain detailed replies;
- choose the local organization within which he will work;
- propose candidatures (including his own) for elected positions, elect and be elected;

- be present during discussions of his activities at party meetings or within party organizations.

4.4. The DemPU member is obligated to:

- implement the party program and adhere to its statute;
- pay membership dues.

4.5. The party is obligated to defend its members in cases of transgression of their rights.

#### V. Local Organizations.

5.1. The basis of the DemPU is the local organization, which is created on a territorial basis: in places of habitation or of work, within unaffiliated citizens' associations.

5.2. The local organization consists of no fewer than three persons; its establishment is formally recorded and is registered with the rayon council of the party.

5.3. The local organization acts in accordance with the party program and statute and implements the resolutions passed at meetings, conferences and conventions. If it has the agreement of not less than two-thirds of its members, it implements the resolutions passed by party councils of all levels. In the case of disagreement, the resolution is not implemented, and a detailed request to review the resolution is submitted to the council which passed it. The council is obligated to consider this request of the local organization. If the resolution is then supported by more than two-thirds of local organizations, its implementation becomes mandatory.

5.4. The local organization accepts members into the party, keeps record of members, collects membership dues and disposes of them in accordance with the statute.

5.5. The local organization can be a legal entity.

5.6. The higher body of the local organization is the general meeting, which is called at the initiative of the president or at the demand of not fewer than 1/5 of the organization's members. One-third of the total membership constitutes a quorum. Resolutions are passed by a simple majority of the votes of those present, except for cases covered by points 2.4 and 5.3 of the statute.

5.7. The general meeting elects the organization's president, vice-president(s) and treasurer.

5.8. The president represents the organization in its dealings with higher party bodies and other local organizations.

5.9. The local organization can be disbanded by a higher party body for transgressing the statute. If the local organization does not agree with this decision, it may appeal to the appeals committee.

#### VI. Regional (rayon, city, oblast) Organizations.

6.1. The local organizations of the DemPU are organized into regional (rayon, city, oblast) organizations, which correspond to the administrative-territorial divisions of the Ukrainian Republic.

6.2. The higher body of the regional organization is the conference, which is taken place at least once each year. Regulations regarding representation and the method of delegate selection are established by the regional organization council.

6.3. The conference elects the regional council, the council's president, vice-presidents, treasury committee, auditing committee, editor of the council's printed organ and other committees as needed. The oblast conference elects an appeals committee.

6.4. The council president represents the regional organization in its dealings with other organizations and bodies of the party and calls meetings of the council at his own initiative or at the demand of one-third of its members.

6.5. The regional organization council adopts resolutions on issues relating to party activity between conferences, calls conferences and prepares questions for consideration.

6.6. The auditing committee audits the organization's income and expenditures.

6.7. Candidates for the regional organization council are proposed by conference delegates or by local organizations. The candidates need not be conference delegates; if they are not, they may participate in the conference with the right of deliberative vote.

6.8. The rayon organization council meets not less than twice per month, and oblast and city (in large cities) organization councils, not less than once per month. An extraordinary meeting may be called at the demand of not less than one-third of the members of the council or a lower-level organization.

6.9. Delegates to regional conferences keep their mandates until the calling of the next regular conference. At the demand of not less than one-third of the conference delegates, and also in cases covered by points 7.10 and 8.3, an extraordinary conference of the regional DemPU organization will be called.

6.10. The conference passes by a simple majority resolutions which are mandatory for implementation by the organizations. The regional organization council passes resolutions with are implemented according to point 5.3 of the statute.

6.11. The party regional council appoints a secretariat which is responsible for record keeping and other organizational and informational tasks. Candidates for secretariat membership are proposed by the president and ratified by the council. A council member may not be a member of the secretariat.

#### **VII. Highest Bodies of the DemPU.**

7.1. The highest body of the DemPU is the convention, which is called once every two years. The convention date and agenda are announced two months in advance. The number of delegates and the method of selection are established by the DemPU National Council. Two-thirds of elected convention delegates constitute a quorum.

7.2. An extraordinary convention is called at the initiative of the National Council at the demand of not less than one-third of the delegates of the most recent convention, or one-third of oblast organizations, and also in cases covered by points 7.10 and 8.3 of the statute. If the National Council refuses to call a convention, an organizing committee may be formed, which has the right to call a convention.

7.3. Convention resolutions are passed by a simple majority, and the party program and statute—and changes to these documents—are adopted by two-thirds of the votes of elected delegates.

7.4. The convention elects the party's National Council, its president and vice-presidents, the editor of the central organ of the party, treasury, auditing and appeals committees and other committees as needed.

7.5. The National Council meets not less than once every three months.

7.6. The treasury committee deals with the party's financial affairs and proposes a budget, which is ratified by the National Council.

7.7. The auditing committee controls the party's expenditures.

7.8. At the request of the president, the National Council appoints a secretariat, which is responsible for record keeping and other organizational and informational tasks.

7.9. Convention delegates keep their mandates until the next regular convention is called. If an extraordinary convention is called by the National Council, the same delegates remain. If an extraordinary convention is called by an organizing committee, new convention delegates are elected.

7.10. Members of an elective body who fail to fulfill their duties for a protracted period of time must resign; the resignation is ratified by a vote by two-thirds of the members of the body. If more than one-third of the

members of an elective body resign, an extraordinary regional conference or an extraordinary DemPU convention is called.

#### **VIII. Representatives' Groups.**

8.1. DemPU members elected representatives to government bodies leave the local organization for the period of their election and form a separate representatives' party group.

8.2. The representatives' group members elect from their ranks a group leader and his deputy. The group members' membership dues are paid to the appropriate level party council.

8.3. The representatives' group coordinates its activity with the appropriate level party council. In cases of differences in principle between the council and the representatives' group, an extraordinary conference of the regional organization or an extraordinary DemPU convention is called.

8.4. For the period of his election as a representative, a DemPU member cannot simultaneously hold party and government positions at the same level.

#### **IX. Funding.**

9.1. The income of the DemPU and its organizations comes from membership dues, publishing or other business activities and voluntary donations.

9.2. Membership entrance fees are three rubles. Membership dues are set at 1 percent of net monthly income. For individuals whose net income is below the officially-established poverty line, entrance fees are one ruble and membership dues are 20 kopeks per month.

9.3. The organization passes on to the highest party body no less than one-half of the funds it receives.

9.4. Local organizations, regional councils and the DemPU National Council may establish businesses, in accordance with the laws of the land, which will contribute a stipulated portion of their profits to the party.

#### **Lvov Oblast Head Views Drive for Independence**

91P50032A

[Editorial Report] Kiev LITERATURNA UKRAYINA in Ukrainian on 4 Oct, p 5, carries an interview with Vyachaslav Chornovil, chairman of the Lvov Oblast Soviet entitled: "We Live Openly And Freely", conducted by Serhiy Kozak. Chornovil, head of one of the first Ukrainian oblast soviets controlled by the opposition, begins by stating his political convictions: "I am a proponent of full independence for the Ukraine to be obtained by peaceful constitutional and democratic means, a proponent of broad political and economic decentralization, political pluralism, the deideologization of the political and economic structures, of cultural-national autonomy for national minorities, of freedom

of conscience, and of religious peace." Chornovil acknowledges that creating a democratic mechanism which will embody these principles will be difficult, as people are used to the previous authoritarian system.

Chornovil asserts that the local Communist Party has passed from the scene as a political force because of the unwillingness of the local party heads to adopt new ideas or reform the party. This has left a political vacuum that still has not been filled, except in part by the Ukrainian Republican Party. He sees a danger in this, in that the power vacuum could be filled by small populist parties incapable of constructive work. Nonetheless, he asserts that great progress has been made in democratization; there is now freedom of conscience, freedom of conviction, freedom of assembly, and freedom of the press.

As for the two measures passed by the Lvov Soviet, namely: Ukrainian soldiers serving in other republics who leave their units are not to be regarded as deserters and the cancellation of the autumn draft in Lvov oblast as long as there is no guarantee that Ukrainian soldiers will not be sent to serve outside of the Ukraine, he regards them as having legal force, even if republic authorities consider them to be unlawful.

As opposed to last session, Chornovil thinks that this session of the oblast soviet must deal with three economic issues: reorganization of agriculture, housing reform, and the entry of the Lvov area into the system of a premarket economy. In view of the general decline in the economy, the Lvov Soviet has taken some measures independent of republic authorities, which according to Chornovil, are doing nothing except for waiting to see what Moscow will do. "We, in essence, are delineating the line of further economic politics of the Lvov [Oblast] Soviet, the maximally operative introduction of the levers of regulation, the creation of mainly new forms of economy built on private and cooperative forms of ownership." However, Chornovil does not believe that aid or direct investment will help them the most; he prefers rather technical instruction and sending their people to study western methods so that they will have the knowledge to do the restructuring themselves.

Chornovil is against any Union treaty and believes that the people in the Lvov Oblast are also against it, but he thinks that its ultimate fate will depend on what those in the Eastern Ukraine want. He is convinced that the national revival that occurred first in the Western Ukraine will sooner or later happen in the east as well. Chornovil sees that people in the Eastern Ukraine, regardless of their nationality, are already in favor of sovereignty, which he equates with independence.

#### **Ukrainian Law on Constitutional Change**

91UN0237A Kiev PRAVDA UKRAINY in Russian  
28 Oct 90 pp 1, 3

[“Law of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic: On Changes and Additions to the Constitution (Basic Law) of the Ukrainian SSR”]

[Text] In connection with the adoption of the Declaration of State Sovereignty of the Ukraine, the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] decrees:

To make certain changes in the Constitution (Basic Law) of the Ukrainian SSR:

#### **1. In Chapter 1, “The Political System”:**

to present Article 3 in the following wording:

“Article 3. The organization and activity of the state is built on principles of electivity of all organs of state power, their answerability to the people, the responsibility of each state organ and official for the matters entrusted to them, and the compulsory nature of decisions of the higher organs for the lower ones in keeping with the distribution of their authority”;

to eliminate Article 6:

to present Article 7 in the following wording:

“Article 7. Political parties and social organizations and movements, through their representatives elected to soviets of people's deputies and in other forms, participate in the development and implementation of the republic policy and in the administration of state and public affairs on the basis of their programs and rules and in accordance with the Constitution of the Ukrainian SSR and current laws.

“The creation and activity of parties and other social organizations and movements whose goal is to change the constitutional system through violent means, to change the territorial integrity of the state in any illegal form, or to undermine its security and inflame national and religious hostility are not permitted.”

#### **2. In Chapter 4, “Foreign Political Activity and Protection of the Socialist Homeland”:**

to present Part 1 of Article 28 in the following wording:

“In its foreign political activity the Ukrainian SSR is guided by the goals, tasks, and principles of foreign policy determined by the Constitution of the Ukrainian SSR:

to present Article 29 in the following wording:

“Article 29. In keeping with the Constitution of the Ukrainian SSR, protection of the socialist homeland is one of the most important functions of the state and is the business of all the people.

“The procedure for military service by citizens of the Ukrainian SSR is determined by legislation of the Ukrainian SSR”;

to present Part 2 of Article 30 in the following wording:

“The duties of state organs, social organizations, officials, and citizens for ensuring the country's security and



strengthening its defense capability are determined by legislation of the Ukrainian SSR."

3. In Chapter 6 of the "Basic Rights, Freedoms, and Obligations of Citizens of the Ukrainian SSR," present Article 49 in the following wording:

"Article 49. Citizens of the Ukrainian SSR have the right to come together into political parties and other social organizations and to participate in movements that contribute to the satisfaction of their legitimate interests.

"The exercise of this right is not subject to any restrictions except those that are envisioned by the law and are necessary for the interests of state or public safety, social order, or protection of the rights and freedoms of citizens.

"Political parties and social organizations are guaranteed conditions for the performance of their duties assigned by the rules."

4. In Chapter 7, "The Ukrainian SSR—Union Republic as a Part of the USSR":

to eliminate Articles 2 and 3;

to present Article 71 in the following wording:

"Article 71. The supremacy of republic laws is ensured on the territory of the Ukrainian SSR."

5. In Chapter 12, "The Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet":

to present points 10, 11, and 21 of Article 97 in the following wording:

"10) the election of the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Court and judges of oblast and the Kiev city courts and the appointment of the Procurator General of the Ukrainian SSR, the chairman of the Committee for State Security of the Ukrainian SSR, the chairman of the board of the Ukrainian SSR National Bank, the editor in chief of the newspaper of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR, and the approval of the boards of the Procurator of the Ukrainian SSR, the State Arbitration Office of the Ukrainian SSR, and the Committee for State Security of the Ukrainian SSR."

"11) the election of the Constitutional Court of the Ukrainian SSR";

"21) the determination of the procedure for the organization and activity of republic and local organs of state power and administration, the court, the procuracy, and the arbitration office; the determination of general legal principles for the formation and activity of social organizations in the Ukrainian SSR";

to eliminate Part 5 of the article;

to present Part 1 of Article 103 in the following wording:

"The right to legislative initiative in the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet belongs to people's deputies of the Ukrainian SSR, the Presidium of the Ukrainian SSR

Supreme Soviet, the permanent commissions of the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet, the Constitutional Court of the Ukrainian SSR, the Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian SSR, the Supreme Court of the Ukrainian SSR, the Procurator General of the Ukrainian SSR, and the Head State Arbitrator of the Ukrainian SSR."

to present points 3 and 4 in the following wording:

"3) submits to the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet candidates for election to the positions of first deputy and deputy chairman of the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet and also proposals for the personnel of the Constitutional Court of the Ukrainian SSR;

"4) submits to the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet candidates for election or appointment to the positions of chairman of the Constitutional Court of the Ukrainian SSR, chairman of the Ukrainian SSR Council of Ministers, chairman of the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Court, Ukrainian SSR Procurator General, head state arbitrator of the Ukrainian SSR, chairman of the Committee for State Security of the Ukrainian SSR, chairman of the board of the National Bank of the Ukrainian SSR, and editor in chief of the newspaper of the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet";

to present Part 2 of Article 110 in the following wording:

"The election and appointment of officials to the Constitutional Court of the Ukrainian SSR, the Ukrainian SSR Council of Ministers, the Supreme Court of the Ukrainian SSR, judges of oblast and the Kiev city courts, and also the boards of the Ukrainian SSR Procuracy and the Ukrainian SSR State Committee for Security are effected when the corresponding permanent commissions of the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet have come to the necessary conclusion";

to present Article 112 in the following wording:

"Article 112. The Constitutional Court of the Ukrainian SSR is elected by the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet for 10 years from among specialists in the area of law and consists of a chairman, deputy chairman, and 23 members of the court.

"Individuals elected to the Constitutional Court of the Ukrainian SSR may not simultaneously serve in other state organs whose activity and functions are supervised by the Ukrainian SSR Constitutional Court, or be Ukrainian SSR people's deputies, or belong to any political parties or movements.

"Individuals elected to the Ukrainian SSR Constitutional Court are independent in performing their duties and are subordinate only to the Ukrainian SSR Constitution.

"The organization and procedure for the activity of the Ukrainian SSR Constitutional Court are determined by the law on the Ukrainian SSR Constitutional Court."

6. In Chapter 13 of "The Ukrainian SSR Council of Ministers":

present points 5 and 8 of Article 118 in the following wording:

"5) takes measures within the framework established by the Ukrainian SSR Constitution for providing for the country's state security and defense capability";

"8) provides leadership in the area of relations between the Ukrainian SSR and foreign states and its participation in the activity of international organizations";

to present Article 120 in the following wording:

"Article 120. The Ukrainian SSR Council of Ministers, on the basis of and in execution of the laws of the Ukrainian SSR and other decisions of the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet and ukases of the Presidium of the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet, publishes decrees and instructions and organizes and keeps track of their execution. The decrees and instructions of the Ukrainian SSR Council of Ministers are mandatory for execution throughout the territory of the Ukrainian SSR";

to present Article 122 in the following wording:

"Article 122. The Ukrainian SSR Council of Ministers unites and directs the work of Union republic and republic ministries and state committees of the Ukrainian SSR and other organs under its jurisdiction.

"The ministries and state committees of the Ukrainian SSR lead the branches of the administration entrusted to them or provide interbranch management while being subordinate to the Ukrainian SSR Council of Ministers.

"The ministries and state committees of the Ukrainian SSR are responsible for the condition and development of the spheres of management entrusted to them; within the framework of their authority, they publish documents on the basis of and in execution of the laws of the Ukrainian SSR and other decisions of the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet and its Presidium as well as decrees and instructions of the Ukrainian SSR Council of Ministers; and they also organize and keep track of their execution."

7. In Chapter 18 "The Court and the Arbitration Board":

to replace Part 3 of Article 149 with two new parts with the following content:

"The highest judicial control and supervision of the judicial activity of the courts of the republic are provided only by the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet.

"The organization and procedure for the activity of the courts of the Ukrainian SSR are determined by the laws of the Ukrainian SSR";

to add a seventh part with the following content to Article 150:

"Judges may not be people's deputies, and for the time of their performance of their duties their membership in any political parties or movements is suspended."

8. To present Chapter 19 of "The Procuracy" in the following wording:

"Chapter 19. The Procuracy

"Article 162. The highest supervision of precise and uniform execution of the laws by all ministries, state committees and departments, enterprises, institutions, and organizations, executive and management organs of local soviets of people's deputies, kolkhozes [state farms], cooperative and other social organizations, officials, and also citizens on the territory of the Ukrainian SSR is provided by the Procurator General of the Ukrainian SSR and procurators under his jurisdiction."

"Article 163. The Procurator General of the Ukrainian SSR is appointed by the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet, is responsible to it, and reports only to it. The procurators of the oblasts and the rayon and city procurators are appointed by the Procurator General of the Ukrainian SSR.

"Article 164. The term of office of the Procurator General of the Ukrainian SSR and all procurators under him is five years.

"Article 165. The organs of the procuracy are independent in exercising their authority and are guided by the Ukrainian SSR Constitution and laws that are in effect.

"The organization and procedure for the activity of the organs of the Ukrainian SSR Procuracy are determined by the law on the Ukrainian SSR Procuracy."

9. To eliminate Chapter 2 of "The Economic System," Chapter 16 of the "State Plan for the Economic and Social Development of the Ukrainian SSR," and Chapter 17 of "The State Budget of the Ukrainian SSR."

[Signed] L. Kravchuk, chairman of the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet

[Dated] Kiev, 24 October 1990

#### **Constitutional Commission Members Listed**

91UN0237B Kiev PRAVDA UKRAINY in Russian  
28 Oct 90 p 1

["Decree of the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet: On the Commission for the Development of the New Ukrainian SSR Constitution"]

[Text] The Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] hereby decrees:

1. To form a commission for the development of the new Ukrainian SSR Constitution consisting of the following members:

KRAVCHUK, Leonid Makarovich, Ukrainian SSR people's deputy, chairman of the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet (chairman of the commission).

ARTEMENKO, Nikolay Mikhaylovich, Ukrainian SSR people's deputy, general director of the Sad Scientific Production Association, Cherkassy Oblast.

BAGROV, Nikolay Vasilyevich, Ukrainian SSR people's deputy, chairman of the Crimean Oblast Soviet of People's Deputies.

BED, Viktor Vasilyevich, Ukrainian SSR people's deputy, attorney in the Tyachevskiy legal consulting office, Transcarpathian Oblast.

BOPKO, Vitaliy Fedorovich, Ukrainian SSR minister of justice.

BONDARCHUK, Andrey Ivanovich, Ukrainian SSR people's deputy, staff correspondent of the newspaper PRAVDA UKRAINY for Volyn and Rovno Oblasts.

BUTENKO, Georgiy Andreyevich, chairman of the Kiev City Court.

VASILENKO, Vladimir Andreyevich, doctor of jurisprudence, professor at the Kiev State University imeni T.G. Shevchenko.

VOLOSHCHUK, Mikhail Yuryevich, Ukrainian SSR people's deputy, chairman of the Transcarpathian Oblast Soviet of People's Deputies.

GAYSINSKIY, Yuriy Aleksandrovich, Ukrainian SSR people's deputy, procurator of Moskovskiy Rayon in the city of Kharkov.

GOLOVATYY, Sergey Petrovich, Ukrainian SSR people's deputy, senior scientific associate of the Institute of Social and Economic Problems of Foreign Countries of the Ukrainian SSR Academy of Sciences, Kiev.

GOLUBETS, Mikhail Andreyevich, Ukrainian SSR people's deputy, head of the Lvov branch of the Institute of Botany imeni N.G. Kholodnyy of the Ukrainian SSR Academy of Sciences.

GOPEY, Ivan Aleksandrovich, Ukrainian SSR people's deputy, chairman of the executive committee of the Poltava Oblast Soviet of People's Deputies.

GURENKO, Stanislav Ivanovich, Ukrainian SSR people's deputy, first secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Ukraine.

DEMYANOV, Vladimir Vasilyevich, Ukrainian SSR people's deputy, chairman of the executive committee of the Zaporozhye Oblast Soviet of People's Deputies.

DEMIDOV, Grigoriy Viktorovich, Ukrainian SSR people's deputy, procurator of the department of general oversight of the Azov-Black Sea Environmental Protection Procuracy, Crimean Oblast.

DIDYK, Nikolay Anatolyevich, Ukrainian SSR people's deputy, chairman of the executive committee of the Vinnitsa Oblast Soviet of People's Deputies.

DMITRIYEV, Yevgeniy Ivanovich, Ukrainian SSR people's deputy, chairman of the Chernovtsy Oblast Soviet of People's Deputies.

DOROGUNTSOV, Sergey Ivanovich, Ukrainian SSR people's deputy, chairman of the council for study of productive forces of the Ukrainian SSR of the Ukrainian SSR Academy of Sciences, Kiev.

DRACH, Ivan Fedorovich, Ukrainian SSR people's deputy, chairman of Rukh.

DUKHOV, Boris Innokentyevich, Ukrainian SSR people's deputy, head of the Military Academy for Air Defense of Ground Troops imeni Marshal of the Soviet Union A.M. Vasilyevskiy, Kiev.

YEMETS, Aleksandr Ivanovich, Ukrainian SSR people's deputy, chairman of the Human Rights Commission of the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet.

YERSHOV, Arkadiy Vitalyevich, Ukrainian SSR people's deputy, chairman of the executive committee of the Rovno Oblast Soviet of People's Deputies.

ZHELIBA, Vladimir Ivanovich, Ukrainian SSR people's deputy, chairman of the Kirovograd Oblast Soviet of People's Deputies.

ZAKHARUK, Dmitriy Vasilyevich, Ukrainian SSR people's deputy, secretary of the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet Commission on Planning, Budget, Finances, and Prices.

KARPENKO, Vitaliy Afanasyevich, Ukrainian SSR people's deputy, editor of the newspaper VECHERNYY KIEV, Kiev.

KOZYUBRA, Nikolay Ivanovich, head of the department of theory of state and law of the Kiev State University imeni T.G. Shevchenko, doctor of jurisprudence, professor.

KORNEYEV, Albert Vasilyevich, Ukrainian SSR people's deputy, deputy chairman of the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet Commission on Questions of State Sovereignty and Interrepublic and International Relations.

KOTSYUBA, Aleksandr Pavlovich, Ukrainian SSR people's deputy, chairman of the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet Commission on Legislation and Legality.

LISOVENKO, Vasily Trofimovich, Ukrainian SSR people's deputy, chairman of the Chernigov Oblast Soviet of People's Deputies.

LUKINOV, Ivan Illarionovich, director of the Institute of Economics of the Ukrainian SSR Academy of Sciences, vice president of the Ukrainian SSR Academy of Sciences, academician of the Ukrainian SSR Academy of Sciences, Kiev.

LUKYANENKO, Levko Grigoryevich, Ukrainian SSR people's deputy, chairman of the Ukrainian Republican Party.

LYUBENCHUK, Nikolay Ivanovich, Ukrainian SSR people's deputy, chairman of the kolkhoz [collective farm] imeni Kotovskiy in Kamenets-Podolskiy Rayon, Khmel'nitsy Oblast.

MARCHENKO, Vladimir Romanovich, Ukrainian SSR people's deputy, department chief of the Romenskiy plant for automatic telephone exchanges, Sumy Oblast.

MATSYUK, Anatoliy Romanovich, leader of a group of scientific and technical consultants of the Secretariat of the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet, doctor of jurisprudence.

MOROZ, Aleksandr Vladimirovich, Ukrainian SSR people's deputy, deputy chairman of the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet Commission on Law and Order and Crime Fighting.

NEKRASOV, Vladilen Petrovich, Ukrainian SSR people's deputy, member of the Military Council—chief of the political administration of the Red Banner Black Sea Fleet, Sevastopol.

NOSOV, Vladislav Vasilyevich, Ukrainian SSR people's deputy, member of the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet Commission on Legislation and Legality.

PAVLYCHKO, Dmitriy Vasilyevich, Ukrainian SSR people's deputy, chairman of the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet Commission on Foreign Affairs.

PAKHOMOV, Yuriy Nikolayevich, director of the Institute of Sociology of the Ukrainian SSR Academy of Sciences, Kiev.

POTEBENKO, Mikhail Alekseyevich, Ukrainian SSR people's deputy, procurator of the Ukrainian SSR.

SLEDNEV, Vladimir Petrovich, Ukrainian SSR people's deputy, director of the Donetsk Metallurgical Plant imeni V.I. Lenin.

SMETANIN, Vladimir Ilich, Ukrainian SSR people's deputy, deputy chairman of the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet Human Rights Commission.

TATSIY, Vasily Yakovlevich, rector of the Kharkov Law Institute, doctor of jurisprudence, professor.

FEDOROV, Vladimir Grigoryevich, Ukrainian SSR people's deputy, chairman of the Zhitomir Oblast Soviet of People's Deputies.

FOKIN, Vitold Pavlovich, USSR people's deputy, chairman of the Ukrainian SSR Council of Ministers.

KHANANOV, Eduard Akhatovich, Ukrainian SSR people's deputy, chairman of the executive committee of the Luganskaya Oblast Soviet of People's Deputies.

KHOMENKO, Nikolay Grigoryevich, Ukrainian SSR people's deputy, leader of the Secretariat of the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet.

CHERVONIY, Vasily Mikhaylovich, Ukrainian SSR people's deputy, staff worker of the Rovno Azot production association.

CHERNENKO, Vitaliy Grigoryevich, Ukrainian SSR people's deputy, head physician of the medical sanitation unit of the Nikitov mercury combine, Donetsk Oblast.

CHERNOVOL, Vyacheslav Maksimovich, Ukrainian SSR people's deputy, chairman of the Lvov Oblast Soviet of People's Deputies.

CHUMAK, Arkadiy Stepanovich, Ukrainian SSR people's deputy, member of the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet Commission on Law and Order and Crime Fighting.

CHUMACHENKO, Nikolay Grigoryevich, academician of the Ukrainian SSR Academy of Sciences, director of the Institute of Industrial Economics of the Ukrainian SSR Academy of Sciences, Donetsk.

SHEMSHUCHENKO, Yuriy Sergeyevich, director of the Institute of State and Law of the Ukrainian SSR Academy of Sciences, corresponding member of the Ukrainian SSR Academy of Sciences, Kiev.

SHISHKIN, Viktor Ivanovich, Ukrainian SSR people's deputy, deputy chairman of the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet Commission on Legislation and Legality.

SHULGA, Nikolay Aleksandrovich, Ukrainian SSR people's deputy, chairman of the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet Commission on State Sovereignty and Interpublic and International Relations.

YUZKOV, Leonid Petrovich, doctor of jurisprudence, professor at the Kiev State University imeni T.G. Shevchenko.

YUKHNOVSKIY, Igor Rafanilovich, Ukrainian SSR people's deputy, chairman of Narodnaya Rada, chairman of the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet Commission on Public Education and Science.

II. To instruct the Commission for the Development of the New Ukrainian SSR Constitution to create work groups to prepare individual sections of the draft of the Constitution, including in them the leading scholars and specialists in the corresponding areas of knowledge.

III. The Presidium of the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet is to submit the concept of the new Ukrainian SSR



Constitution for the consideration of the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet in December 1990.

[Signed] L. Kravchuk, chairman of the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet

[Dated] Kiev, 24 October 1990

### **Ukraine: Deputies Condemn Opposition Tactics**

91UN0142B Kiev PRAVDA UKRAINY in Russian  
14 Oct 90 p 1

["Declaration of Ukrainian SSR People's Deputies"]

[Text] We are compelled to issue this declaration by events which have taken place recently at and around the session of the Ukrainian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet. We believe that not only is the normal functioning of the session in essence threatened today, but also civil peace in the republic, people's rights, and security.

The record shows that in its present composition the Supreme Soviet is entirely capable of developing and adopting valid, comprehensive, well-reasoned decisions. In particular, such constructiveness is marked by the adoption of the Declaration on State Sovereignty of the Ukraine and the Law on Economic Independence of the Ukraine, major documents in the destiny of our people.

Unfortunately, however, the striving of the majority of deputies to accomplish productive work, to resolve urgent problems of vital importance to the people, is more and more frequently running up against the growing resistance of a parliamentary minority pursuing its own arrogant political goals. Completely engrossed in the "logic of struggle," it is feverishly calculating newer and newer "coups," seeking out diverse "variants" if only to more deeply penetrate a rival. And all this is called "parliamentary tactics," whose aim is to use any means to drag the Supreme Soviet into endless political discussions and divert the attention of deputies and all of society away from practical tasks of the first order.

The most aggressive component of the opposition is resorting to actions which have nothing whatsoever in common with democracy or political culture, nothing to do with elementary norms of a civilized society. Late in the evening of 10 October a group of deputies interrupted Ukrainian television programming, directly broadcast a statement of their disagreement with the will of the parliament, and issued an appeal for civil disobedience. This daring political move was directed towards impairing the already tense situation in the republic and discrediting the Supreme Soviet in the eyes of the people.

The Ukrainian people should know the truth: that the organizers of such power pressure tactics irresponsibly scorn their interests. Can it be there is no understanding of the fact, for example, that the republic government, formed just two months ago, simply has not yet had the opportunity to effect practical forward movement in the

socioeconomic sphere? Many of us have significant grievances against it as well, of course. But, after all, one must not fail to take into account the fact that the resignation of the government now would still further complicate the situation and would significantly retard the resolution of pressing problems.

We are deeply, humanely concerned about the fate of young people starving right now in the center of Kiev. At the same time we are forced to assert that we do not see any such real concern on the part of those forces which are striving at any price to impede the civilized development of political processes. Can it be that this act of self-sacrifice also enters into the tactical calculations of the non-constructive opposition as it hypocritically transfers responsibility for possible tragic consequences over to the entire Supreme Soviet?!

We again appeal to our youth—do not delude yourselves. Do not allow your destiny to be turned into small change in an unscrupulous political game!

We appeal to the workers of the Ukraine—let us not permit our people to be placed on the brink of catastrophe. Only through accord and mutual understanding, only through harmonious and conscientious labor will we be able to set the republic on the path towards political and socioeconomic progress.

We, people's deputies of the Ukraine, will do everything within our strengths and capabilities to execute the will of our electorate.

[Signed] Ukrainian People's Deputies S. Makarenko, V. Martynchuk, A. Mokrousov, A. Moroz, A. Ostapenko, I. Pasechnik, M. Parasunko, N. Petrenko, V. Prikhodko, N. Ryabchenko, N. Fesun, V. Shinkaruk, and others. More than 100 signatures in all.

### **Ukrainian Decree Meets Students' Demands**

91UN0232A Kiev PRAVDA UKRAINY in Russian  
24 Oct 90 p 1

["Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet decree: On Examination of the Demands of the Students Staging a Hunger Strike in Kiev Since 2 October 1990"—PRAVDA UKRAINY headline]

[Text] Having studied the demands of the students who have been staging a hunger strike in Kiev that were presented to the Ukrainian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet Presidium on 2 October 1990 and having taken account of the results of the work of the conciliation commission of the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet formed on 16 October 1990, the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet resolves:

#### **1. Concerning the holding of new elections:**

During the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet Second Session to enact a law on the referendum in the Ukrainian SSR, a law on public associations and organizations in the Ukrainian SSR, a law on the people's deputy of the

Ukrainian SSR provided for by the agenda, and a law on elections in the Ukrainian SSR on a multiparty basis.

To conduct in the Ukrainian SSR in 1991 a public ballot (referendum) on questions of confidence in the 12th Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet and, in accordance with the results, to decide the question of the holding of new elections before the year's end.

## 2. Concerning military service of Ukrainian citizens:

To assure Ukrainian citizens' compulsory military service outside of the republic only in accordance with the voluntary consent of the citizen.

To enact to this end prior to 31 December 1990 a law on Ukrainian citizens' compulsory military service on the territory of the republic and a law on alternative military service and also to form the necessary official authorities.

## 3. Concerning nationalization of the property of the CPSU and the VLKSM [All-Union Leninist Communist Youth League] on the territory of the Ukraine:

In accordance with the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet decree of 15 October 1990, to examine at a meeting of the session the findings of the Ukrainian SSR State Arbitration Tribunal, the Ukrainian SSR Ministry of Justice, and the Ukrainian SSR State Committee for the Economy on questions concerning nationalization of the property of the CPSU and the VLKSM on the territory of the Ukraine and prior to 1 December 1990 to form a temporary commission of the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet on this question.

## 4. Concerning the Union treaty:

In accordance with the appeal of the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium approved by the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet on 15 October 1990, to channel all the efforts of the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet into the stabilization of the political and economic situation in the republic, the building of a sovereign Ukrainian state based on the rule of law, and the adoption of a new constitution of the republic and, until this is achieved, to consider the conclusion of a Union treaty premature.

## 5. Concerning the resignation of the chairman of the Ukrainian SSR Council of Ministers:

To note the 17 October 1990 announcement by L.M. Kravchuk, chairman of the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet, concerning the resignation of V.A. Masol, chairman of the Ukrainian SSR Council of Ministers, and to decide this question in the procedure stipulated by Article 97, clause 9, and Article 108, clause 4, of the Ukrainian SSR Constitution.

## 6. For the purpose of the creation of a legal basis for fulfillment of this decree to bring prior to 30 November 1990 the current Ukrainian SSR Constitution into line with the provisions of the Declaration on the State Sovereignty of the Ukraine.

[Signed] L. Kravchuk, chairman of the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet.

[Dated] 17 October 1990, Kiev.

## Political Situation in Lugansk

91UN0196B Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA  
in Russian 31 Oct 90 p 10

[Article by S. Kiselev, LITERATURNAYA GAZETA special correspondent for the Ukrainian SSR: "Lugansk...Is Separating—Sociopolitical Portrait of the City in the Epoch of Perestroyka"]

[Text] Today, the situation that has developed in this 500,000-population city reminds one of a fight between a heavy-weight boxer who is managed by an experienced trainer and a novice who relies for his support on the audience. There is the conservative oblast soviet under the wardship of the Communist Party oblast party committee, and opposing it is the city soviet, where a strong democratic bloc has been organized—who will win? And will the city be delivered a knockout blow, if the oblast suddenly takes Lugansk in an economic blockade encirclement?

A very competent public opinion poll, conducted by the Lugansk Voters' Association, eloquently showed the following: One and four-tenths of a percent of the Lugansk residents are placing their hopes on the CPSU; five percent, on new parties, and a slightly larger number of people, on strike committees. The remainder of those polled do not believe in anything.

This is on the one hand. On the other hand, there is the warfare position between the Rukh [Ukrainian People's Movement for Perestroyka], Ukrainian Republican Party, and Union of Independent Ukrainian Youth organizations, and the CPSU. Both sides are shooting at each other from a corner. Salvos from the left: We do not believe the Communists! Salvos from the right: Bandera and Petlyura supporters! From the left: The fight with the party apparatus that at times slips into a fight with rank and file Communists—an effort not to let go of power that borders on hysteria of the doomed. Both sides, alas, are fighting not for something, but against someone, which, very likely, can lead to the appearance of a third force—the streets. But further—everything according to a well-known scenario: insubordination, riots, troops, a special situation, etc.

Passions, it is known, get aroused. Someone wants to stir up the Russians against the Ukrainians. Somebody, wants to stir up the workers against the cooperators. Lugansk residents against the miners (An announcement was hanging in the department store: "Carpets Only for Miners.")[. Miners against democrats: It is said that unemployment is expected with the transfer to the market. This almost led in September to a miners' strike in support of the program...of Ryzhkov. And when the famous writer and economist Vasilii Selyunin visited Lugansk in October, when he gave four lectures here

about the market, on the evening before his arrival, the oblast party committee sent instructions to the VUZ [higher educational institution] propagandists: Give battle to Selyunin during his speech as someone who is attempting to destabilize the situation in Lugansk. And someone tried to give battle.

In general, it could have been possible to think that everything that is happening in Lugansk is occurring in almost the entire country, if it were not for one feature. Somewhere, about half a year ago suddenly, literally like a UFO, there began to appear, well, how can this be put, not quite rumors, not even conversations, but something somewhat telepathic, a kind of transmission of ideas over a distance. We do not know where the ideas were being transmitted from, but their gist soon began to be known rather widely: autonomy. And then it was in whispers: autonomy. And then in a loud voice among our own: autonomy. Territorial autonomy. This splashed out onto the streets.

It was suddenly recalled in Lugansk that the Donetsk-Krivorog Soviet Republic, headed by Artem (F.A. Sergeyev), existed in 1918, and that on the laws of federation, it left the Ukraine for Russia. It was artificially created by the Bolsheviks (the congress that approved this decision consisted of 74 delegates), who naively supposed that this would save the region from the influence of the Central Rada and would prevent German occupation of the Donbas. The republic lasted from 30 January to 19 March 1918, after which it once again became part of the structure of the Ukraine as a territorial-production autonomy.

And so today in Lugansk talk has once again started about the restoration of the Donetsk-Krivoyrog Republic, and, above all, about territorial autonomy within the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] system. Now, why this? Perhaps the fact that Lugansk Oblast, in fact, boycotted the decision of the Ukrainian parliament on the switch to Kiev time (the time here as, by the way, in the Crimea, has remained Moscow time), and that it was a precursor of the fact that Lugansk is separating?...

"Historically, the Donbas was never a part of the Ukraine," explained V. Cheker, head of the philosophy department of the Lugansk agricultural institute and the cochairman of the sociopolitical organization "People's Movement of the Lugansk Area for Perestroika (this movement was established approximately about a year ago to counterbalance Rukh). "Therefore, we are against the Ukrainization of our region, and we think that granting the Donbas a new economic, political, and social status would be warranted. Our movement is for autonomy within the framework of the Ukraine, of course, if the republic signs a Union treaty. And if this does not occur, then we can talk only about a change to RSFSR jurisdiction."

"But how in your opinion will the residents of Lugansk Oblast feel about this?" we inquired.

"I think that more than half of the Lugansk residents will support the idea of autonomy within the RSFSR system.

But here is the opinion of Yu. Kozovskiy, a leader in the kray organization of Rukh and an assistant professor of the philosophy department of the Lugansk teachers' training institute:

"The faster the processes of democratization develop in Kiev and other cities of the republic, the more actively are attempts being made in our oblast to incite the population of the Eastern Ukraine against the Western Ukraine. The forces that are engaged in this understand very well that only the tension of the political situation in the region can keep them in their leadership seats. As for the idea of territorial autonomy, then thank God it is only an apparatus theoretical provision as yet, which can lead to still greater destructiveness and to the Ukraine's falling out with Russia. It is foreign to the population of the Donbas."

From lofty political and economic matters—to a way of life in the existence of Lugansk residents that is being determined.

On the main street of the oblast center, like a cry of despair by the city authorities who are weary from the struggle to get pedestrians to obey traffic laws, there are signboards with the inscription: "Path for asses. Uncultured people walk here." These inscriptions do not stop anyone.

Market prices, by comparison with Kiev and even more so with Moscow, are moderate: Beef at the market costs six rubles [R], and pork—R5. And, nonetheless, the people of the city cannot be called full—people often get into a line at night in front of stores that sell food products and manufactured items. Lugansk is moving to a ration card system. It is difficult to breathe in the city, the ecological situation is explosively dangerous.

This is today's general background against which perestroika is taking place in Lugansk. We tried to capture its individual details on film. And, therefore, we proposed to dozens of people—miners and metallurgists, people's deputies and ispolkom [executive committee] workers, and leaders of parties and sociopolitical movements—with whom we talked, as an experiment to be photographed against a background they themselves selected.

However, our undertaking did not work out in every way. For example, we were unable to photograph Yu. Kozovskiy, the leader of the kray Rukh organization, in People's Friendship Square against the background of the wooden cross erected by Lugansk residents in memory of the victims of Stalinist repression: One night the cross was "removed" on instructions of the local authorities....

Or—the recently rehabilitated O.A. Lyadskaya, who for 47 years was considered a traitress by MOLODAYA GVARDIYA, and who slaved for 13 years in Stalinist camps. She was unwell and, therefore, was unable to

come to be photographed against the background of the Lugansk gorispolkom [city soviet executive committee], where as a former repressed person she went with a request to grant her family, which is housed in a one-room apartment, at least a two-room apartment. But a petty official by the name Isayev did not even stop to listen to her, suggesting that Olga Aleksandrovna herself was to blame for the tragedy.

We were also unable to find a map of Switzerland against whose background we intended to photograph O. Borisov, a senior teacher in the department of history of the USSR and the UkSSR of the Lugansk teacher training institute, and a city soviet deputy. There is a city in Switzerland with which Lugansk parliamentarians intend to establish a twin cities relationship. It is called Lugano, and, starting at least from the 13th Century, it has not been renamed even once to Voroshilovgrad.

And now about those we photographed.

V. Cheker, cochairman of the "People's Movement of Lugansk Area Residents for Perestroyka," against the background of the Lenin monument standing next to the oblast party committee of the KPU [Ukrainian Communist Party].

Father Boris Panov, dean of the Useknovskiy Temple, people's deputy of the city soviet and Artemovskiy Rayon Soviet—against a background with one of his constituents who came to him for help and advice

N.F. Minenko, a teacher pensioner, against the background of his own house, which the Zhovtnevy Rayon Executive Committee took away from him in 1986 "without compensation" (that is what is written in the decision of the rayon court). And it was converted into a music school. This illegal decision was protested by the USSR Public Prosecutor's Office and twice by the Oblast Public Prosecutor's Office; and all to no avail.

Student protesters of the Lugansk medical institute against the background of a placard rejecting the decision of the scientific council of the VUZ on collecting money from future doctors for repeating an examination and tests, and for missing classes; 40 percent of their "self-financed" sums will be received by teachers of the medical institute.

Yu. Petrov, chairman of the Lugansk ispolkom, who, holding two positions, is still the first secretary of the city party committee, against the background of the Leninskiy Rayon party committee of the KPU; on an initiative of the city soviet, the city executive committee, the rayon party committees in the city are being abolished, and the Leninskiy will be converted to a "First Aid" station.

V. Plachinda, chairman of the oblast soviet of miner strike committees, which are fighting for the economic independence of the mines, against a background of delegates to the second congress of miners of the country.

And, finally, a stooping old woman against the background of a monument to Voroshilov, who still remains a Lugansk symbol.

### Declaration on Ukrainian-Polish Relations

91UN0194A Kiev PRAVDA UKRAINY in Russian  
17 Oct 90 p 3

[Declaration signed by A.M. Zlenko, foreign minister of the Ukrainian SSR, and Krzysztof Skubiszewski, foreign minister of the Republic of Poland, in Kiev on 13 October 1990: "Declaration on the Principles and Basic Directions of the Development of Ukrainian-Polish Relations"]

[Text] 1. The Ukrainian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] and the Republic of Poland declare their aspiration to the establishment between them, as sovereign states, of good-neighbor relations and to the maintenance and development of mutually profitable cooperation corresponding to their national interests and not directed against third parties. The basis of these relations are the principles of the UN Charter, the Helsinki Final Act and other CSCE documents, specifically, the principles of sovereign equality, inviolability of borders, territorial integrity, noninterference in internal affairs, and the peaceful settlement of disputes. Both states proceed from the fact that the comprehensive development of peaceful good-neighbor Ukrainian-Polish relations is a specific contribution to the strengthening of regional cooperation and to the building of a common European home

2. The Ukrainian SSR and the Republic of Poland confirm that, in accordance with the principle of nations' self-determination, the Ukrainian and Polish peoples have the inalienable right under conditions of complete freedom to determine their domestic and foreign policy status without outside interference and pursue their political, economic, social and cultural development

3. The Ukrainian SSR and the Republic of Poland have no territorial claims against one another and will not advance such claims in the future. The state border that exists between the Ukrainian SSR and the Republic of Poland and that is enshrined in the "Treaty Between the USSR and the Polish Republic on the Soviet-Polish State Border" of 16 August 1945 and that was adjusted in the "Treaty Between the USSR and the Polish Republic on an Exchange of Parcels of State Territory" of 15 February 1951 is viewed by the parties as inviolable at the present time and in the future and consider this an important component of peace and stability in Europe.

4. The parties exchanged opinions concerning the prospects of the establishment of diplomatic, consular, and commercial offices. As a first step in this direction, they agreed on the establishment of consular relations and an exchange of consular establishments. In the very near future the parties will continue consultations concerning the establishment of full diplomatic relations



5. The Ukrainian SSR and the Republic of Poland intend to develop mutually profitable cooperation in the political, economic, environmental, S&T, information, cultural, humanitarian, and other spheres. For the purpose of strengthening mutual understanding, good-neighborliness and friendship between the Ukrainian and Polish peoples, the parties will facilitate the objective notification of the public of the processes occurring in the two states.

6. Proceeding from the need for a stimulation of trade and economic, industrial and S&T cooperation on the principles of mutual benefit, the Ukrainian SSR and the Republic of Poland agreed to discuss these issues at intergovernmental level. The parties will promote the direct cooperation of Ukrainian and Polish enterprises.

7. The Ukrainian SSR and the Republic of Poland confirmed their respect for human rights and basic liberties, including freedom of thought, worship and political beliefs for all, regardless of race, nationality, language, sex, property situation and religion. They emphasized that respect for human rights and basic liberties is an important factor of peace, security, mutual understanding and cooperation in a free, democratic Europe.

8. In this context the parties advocated consistent respect for and guarantees of the rights and also an improvement in the position of national minorities—the Ukrainian national minority in Poland and the Polish national minority in the Ukraine—including the guarantee for them of opportunities for the complete satisfaction of cultural and religious requirements and the need for instruction in the native language and also the creation of proper conditions for maintaining essential contacts with the Ukraine and Poland respectively. The parties understand that these minorities, while preserving and developing national distinctiveness, will play an appreciable part in the rapprochement of the Ukrainian and Polish peoples. The parties proceed from the fact that constructive cooperation in the sphere of the assurance of the rights of the national minorities will be an important contribution to the creation of a common European humanitarian space.

9. The Ukrainian SSR and the Republic of Poland will extensively develop cultural, scientific and humanitarian cooperation, which is of particular significance for the mutual cognition and understanding of the two fraternal peoples. The parties will pay the necessary attention to the preservation of monuments of Polish history and culture in the Ukraine and of Ukrainian history and culture in Poland. For the purpose of mutual notification of achievements in the scientific and cultural spheres, the Ukrainian SSR and the Republic of Poland will consider the question of future creation of information and culture centers, Ukrainian in Warsaw and Polish in Kiev respectively.

10. The Ukrainian SSR and the Republic of Poland will encourage Ukrainian-Polish relations in every possible

way, recognizing the ethnic and cultural proximity of the Ukrainian and Polish peoples and displaying concern to preserve the positive legacy of their centuries-old relations. To this end, the parties will work on the creation of the necessary conditions for development of direct contacts of public and political organizations, state establishments and local authorities, cultural and scientific centers and artistic and trade unions and other contacts between people. Considering the particular role of youth in the shaping of relations of the mutual understanding and good-neighborliness of the peoples of the two states, the parties agreed to prepare an agreement on cooperation in the sphere of youth exchange. For the purpose stimulating border cooperation, the parties will adopt the measures necessary for the normal functioning of border points and simplification of the border-crossing procedure.

11. The Ukrainian SSR and the Republic of Poland will cooperate closely in the sphere of environmental protection and the rational use of natural resources to ensure mutual environmental safety and prevent pollution with transborder consequences. To this end, the parties will keep one another informed and conduct periodic consultations.

12. The Ukrainian SSR and the Republic of Poland welcome the building of confidence in Europe and declare that they will promote the processes to lessen military confrontation, reduce arms and to exclude for all time the danger of war and the threat of the use of force from interstate relations on the continent.

13. The Ukrainian side gave notice of steps aimed at realization of its intention of taking direct equal part in the all-European process and European structures. The Polish side declared its readiness to contribute to a positive solution of this question.

14. The parties agreed to conduct consultations between the foreign ministries of the Ukrainian SSR and the Republic of Poland on all matters concerning their bilateral relations and cooperation in the international arena, specifically, in the all-European process, within the framework of the United Nations and other international organizations and also on international problems that are a subject of interest of the two states.

[Signed] A.M. Zlenko, foreign minister of the Ukrainian SSR

[Signed] Krzysztof Skubiszewski, foreign minister of the Republic of Poland

[Dated] 13 October 1990, Kiev

#### French Consul in Kiev Interviewed

91UN0232B Kiev PRAVDA UKRAINY in Russian  
24 Oct 90 p 1

[Report on interview with Hugo Pernet, French consul general in Kiev, by Yu. Ovsyannikov; place and date not given: "'Communication Is My Business'"]

[Text] A new foreign diplomatic establishment is to open in the capital of the Ukrainian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic]. A general consulate of the French Republic.

M. Hugo Pernet has been working as consul general in Kiev for some time now. A correspondent of PRAVDA UKRAINY asked him to tell our readers about the French mission that is being established and to answer other questions.

Hugo Pernet said in the interview:

[Pernet] The opening of the French General Consulate in Kiev (and, correspondingly, the USSR General Consulate in Strasbourg) was provided for by the government agreement which was recently concluded between the Soviet Union and France. We are now at the culminating stage of realization of the agreement.

[Ovsiyannikov] And when is the opening expected?

[Pernet] The official opening of our General Consulate could take place very soon. This fall, possibly. But what is needed first of all is a conclusive agreement with the Soviet side. An agreement, specifically, with the Kiev City Soviet on the leasing to us of a suitable building for the general consulate. So we are actively engaged in this currently.

[Ovsiyannikov] Permit me now to ask you this.... What is your credo?

[Pernet] It is necessary in day-to-day activity to find time for much planned and unplanned business. The consul general has an opportunity to communicate with a broad range of people. They may be members of parliament and politicians, a trade union official, and simply the "man in the street," as they say. This is not always easy.... But this is what attracts me.

I consider constant contacts with people most important for myself, for my work. This, if you will, is my credo in life.

[Ovsiyannikov] What is your attitude toward meeting journalists?

[Pernet] This question should most likely be addressed to my wife, Francoise Pernet, who is in charge of the press department in the general consulate.... But since it is for me to answer I will say that I value the opportunity for business meetings with the press, television, and radio, in a word, with representatives of the mass media of the host country. I had the first such meeting, I would observe, shortly following my arrival in Kiev. Namely, on 13 July of this year, when the consul general of the French Republic gave a news conference in the Ukrainian SSR Foreign Ministry press center.

[Ovsiyannikov] It was at that time, it would seem, that the journalists learned that you are the youngest consul general in Kiev?

[Pernet] They say about youthfulness also that this defect passes with time. But, seriously.... I was quite young in 1974. I joined the staff of the French Embassy in Moscow at that time.

I remember 1974 for the added reason that the 50th anniversary of diplomatic relations between France and the USSR was being commemorated then. Twenty-eight October is the anniversary of the establishment of these relations, incidentally.

[Ovsiyannikov] It may be said in this connection, evidently, that our states have accumulated considerable experience in the business of good-neighborliness and mutually profitable cooperation in various fields. Is this not so?

[Pernet] There has been useful experience, of course. But its development and extension are very important. And this is in evidence also in this case.

The mere fact of the decision to create a general consulate of France in Kiev testifies to the dynamics in Franco-Soviet relations. This is simultaneously evidence of one another's growing interest in France and the Ukraine specifically, which are entirely comparable in terms of size of population and territory....

[Ovsiyannikov] You have mentioned, M. Pernet, your work in the embassy in Moscow. Describe yourself please, in a little more detail.

[Pernet] Your readers might be interested to learn that I am not a member of any party. I was educated in the capital and graduated from the Paris Political Sciences Institute and university.

I have had two tours in our embassy in Moscow: from 1974 through 1976 and from 1984 through 1986. I was secretary to the ambassador. But during my second tour I dealt with certain aspects of French-Soviet relations. I took part, for example, in preparing for visits by the president and the premier to your country (it was during our president's visit in 1975 that I visited Kiev for the first time). I dealt in the embassy also with questions of the economic relations of the USSR and the East European countries.

I have worked also in the apparatus, as they say in your country—in the French Foreign Ministry, in the Ministry of Power, and in the premier's office.

[Ovsiyannikov] And what directly preceded Kiev?

[Pernet] I came here from the United States. In Washington I had been in charge in the embassy of economic issues connected specifically with nuclear problems and transportation.

[Ovsiyannikov] Has the structure of the general consulate already been determined?

[Pernet] As a whole, yes. We will have several departments. Their task will be to contribute to the development of French-Soviet relations in the commercial-economic, scientific-technological, and cultural spheres.

Let us take the scientific department. A physician has been appointed its leader. He will, in particular, conduct a search for new opportunities for French pharmacologists' cooperation with their colleagues in the Ukraine. We expect that a Franco-Soviet joint venture for the production of medical preparations could emerge as a result. We have perceived certain interest on the Soviet side also as regards the creation of joint works.

And, generally, it seems to me, particular urgency is attached to economic issues in your country on the threshold of the market. This can be seen from, say, the place which advertising has now come to occupy in many Soviet newspapers and journals.

[Ovsiyannikov] Don't take amiss a "shop question": is PRAVDA UKRAINY regularly on your desk?

[Pernet] I try to make your newspaper part of my reading.

[Ovsiyannikov] Do you get appeals and requests concerning visas?

[Pernet] Of course. Visa work is, after all, a principal function of any general consulate. But I would call your attention to the fact that we as yet have practically no opportunity to decide visa questions. The consulate has not, I repeat, officially been opened.

[Ovsiyannikov] But even now, as far as I can tell, you have quite a substantial "workload." Outline for us your usual working day.

[Pernet] We have, I believe, already talked about this... However, I will, if you wish, now glance at my business diary and acquaint you in more detail with my daily routine. Do you wish to know everything?

[Ovsiyannikov] Everything? What about diplomats' secrets?

[Pernet] They have them. But few. They account with me for about two percent of all business, no more. And they are more often than not from the economic sphere. They could be, going by my past experience, details of some contract or other.

But let us return to my "customary day." You know, the session of the Ukraine's Supreme Soviet currently takes up a considerable part of it in one way or another. I endeavor to be present at your parliament regularly to better understand the tone of events in Kiev and the republic.

I write reports on all that seems to me material in the palette of your life. I hope that my ideas about the Ukrainian SSR acquire a more precise coloration and projection in Paris through the medium of my messages.

[Ovsiyannikov] And if I were to ask you not from the standpoints of the consul general but, simply, as a citizen of France, to share your impressions and opinions in connection with the present political and economic situation in the Ukraine...

[Pernet] ...I would say that you are right to make it clear that it would be inappropriate for the consul general to give advice on this score. But simply, as a citizen, I would say the following: The situation with you is quite complex. But we hope that your people will have sufficient powers and common sense to find the right, optimum solution of the accumulated problems. This would be in the interests of the whole common European home.

## CENTRAL ASIA

### Former Kazakh Party Chief Kunayev on Ouster, Current Developments

91US0024A Alma-Ata QAZAQ ADEBIYETI in Kazakh  
17 Aug 90 p 10,11

[Interview with Dinmukhamed Akhmetuly Kunayev, recorded by Serik Abdirayymov: "I Must Tell the Truth"]

[Excerpts] [Abdirayymov] This is a good time, sir, to ask you what you think about Kazakh as an official language, and making national holidays such as nauryz part of republic tradition. What requests do you have to make as an elder statesman?

[Kunayev] I am human, and now old, with little time left. Thus, it would be wonderful for us to move from the slogan to the concrete effort stage in carrying out these decisions.

[Abdirayymov] Not to speak of the good L.I. Brezhnev, who considered Kazakhstan his second home, has done us would be an injustice...

[Kunayev] "A sabre should not be used to cut out a scabbard." So it is properly said. Our people and our land are written about in detail in the book "Virgin Lands." He himself came to Kazakhstan eight times. Each time he came he decided republic needs and burning questions. The decision to build the Alma-Ata Subway was another decision taken at our request during the time of his very last visit in 1980.

[Abdirayymov] What did you think about the situation in Czechoslovakia, and about the war in Afghanistan?

[Kunayev] I had no connection with these problems. These are things attributable to the "Moscow five."

[Abdirayymov] You have been in retirement for four years. This has been not a little time to take a good look at yourself, and to look over your past life. Sir, what do

you think you contributed during your time of power, to your people, your nation and your land, and what were you unable to accomplish?

[Qonayev] The root of a man is in the people, the root of a people in the land. We come on the scene, and we depart. The people, the golden hitching post, remains. At the end of one's journey, it is proper to ask where one has led the people, what one has accomplished. I want the people themselves to answer that.

[Abdirayymov] The political rubric "Years of Stagnation" has been attached to a twenty-year period of history. How just do you think this rubric is?

[Kunayev] What is at stake is not the rubric which has been applied, but what errors were made during those years, and our not repeating them. We must not forget that the past must become the teacher of the present. Thus, whatever you name a period, one should not forget the origin of events.

[Abdirayymov] Dear Dimash, a number of criticisms were advanced at the XVI Congress of the Kazakhstan CP. What do you think about them?

[Kunayev] That which completes things is words, that which spoils things is also words. Not to dwell in detail on the long path behind us is neither indifference nor arrogance. What we fail to find is the truth of the matter. What benefit in listening to such gossip. It is like a covering to someone's mouth.

[Abdirayymov] What do you think about the vital questions of the day, such things as republic sovereignty and political and economic independence? And what do you think about the solidarity of the five nations with a common base, Kazakhstan and the Central Asian republics.

[Kunayev] This is a correct party policy. But the matter requires not heated words but deeds, deeds alone.

[Abdirayymov] A great deal has been seen in the pages of the republic periodical press about "alien" cadres. For example, Yakovlev, Shmelkov, Plevin, Grebenyuk, Demidenko, Levintsov, Yerpilov, Protazanov, Morozov and others, as soon as they have been relieved of their posts have immediately left the republic. The impression is left behind that these people, rather than representing the basic interests of Kazakhstan, were the "eyes and ears" of the central authority in the local areas. Is this not a matter of "bringing in people from outside?" Is this not irregularity in the choosing of cadres? What, in general, do you think about this in view of your own circumstances?

[Kunayev] In this case the problem is not a matter of the nationality of cadres, but of their nature. The persons mentioned all honorably fulfilled the tasks they were assigned. They were party and soviet officials who have made their contributions to our common tasks. A person is free to live where he chooses after leaving office, or retiring. If they have committed some offense before the

people, this should be stated openly. I do not approve of slandering them because they came from outside.

In general it is difficult to be in charge of things. It is also difficult to support the masses.

I will not say that we have made no errors in the cadre question. There were errors. When you try to accomplish something there will always be errors. The people will also discuss them. Criticism and reservations expressed in the press in my time about certain officials of the government were also proper.

[Abdirayymov] Certain comrades have said that there should be percentages set for students studying in institutions of higher education, and that orders and medals should be allotted for Kazakhs. A certain group has subjected citizens to persecution, first claiming that "we are suffering from a complete lack of ideological cadres," and then later proving completely their own ideological purity and honor. Is this the error of someone in power, or is it the fault of society as a whole?

[Kunayev] There has been negative discussion about this in the Central Committee. I have heard that the persons responsible for this deviation have been subjected to sharp criticism. I am in complete agreement. It is a great abuse to attribute to society the errors of individuals. What we call society is the people. In general, we do not love those deeply who have offended one, who have inflicted scars on the soul.

[Abdirayymov] What is the reason why the question of establishing a German autonomous oblast in the Aqmola land was not resolved successfully, and do you think that the time has come for this problem to be resolved?

[Kunayev] The politburo made its decision on the question of autonomy from Kazakhstan. When it came time to carry out the decision, local people, above all the Germans themselves, were opposed. The Yedil Valley was the territory first settled by them. They wanted that. Various measures were carried out to promote German culture. The paper FREUNDSCHAFT was moved to Alma-Ata. We began to carry out work to restore the former philharmonic orchestra in order to move the theater.

[Abdirayymov] I myself remember how in your speech to the XXV Congress of the CPSU you sounded the alarm by saying: "Comrades, the time has also come to take a look at the Aral problem and the problem of increasing the amount of water in the rivers feeding into the Aral."

[Kunayev] Better late than never. I spoke at the XXVI Congress also, in the politburo and at other important meetings. In the end, it was decided to turn the waters of the Siberian rivers south. A proposal and a plan were drawn up. Later, as is well-known to you, this decision was disregarded.

[Abdirayymov] Conditions have grown still worse than before. It has become a world catastrophe.



[Kunayev] The level of the Aral is dropping 0.7 meters a year. If measures are not taken swiftly, in ten years at the most, not even the mud of our beloved sea will remain. We cannot take even a spoon-full of water from the Amu-Dariya. And the water we can take from the Syr-Dariya can be a maximum of 7-10 percent at most. Those in control of the sources of these rivers are the gentlemen in Central Asia.

[Abdirayymov] If this continues will we not lose the Aral?

[Kunayev] In my view, we must listen to the scientists. The main points of what they are suggesting are as follows: 1) We must turn the Siberian rivers south quickly. Only when this has been accomplished will the Amu-Darya and Syr-Darya Rivers be given time to breathe. 2) We must reduce radically the amount of rice and cotton growing. We must utilize water resources efficiently, we must avoid poisoning them and conserve water to the greatest degree possible.

[Abdirayymov] Today the Balqash question is considered no less important than that of the Aral. The view is being advanced that the damage from utilizing the Qapshagay Artificial Reservoir and the Great Alma-Ata Canal is greater.

[Kunayev] It is wrong to pay attention to every rumor that comes along. The Qapshagay Reservoir and the Great Alma-Ata Canal, however one looks at it, are unquestioned benefits to the people. The plan for the canal was not carried out completely. It needs to be continued. It would be good to establish one or two sovkhoses along the lower reaches of the canal. Thereby a major foundation would be established for supplying Alma-Ata and other similar large cities with vegetables. Lake Balqash is not going to dry up. We are not utilizing its waters efficiently. We must protect Lake Balqash from industrial wastes and waters produced by the Balqash copper combine. We plan to irrigate many fields along the Ili. We must not, in doing so, poison a wonderful child of nature. At present we have raised Balqash waters by more than one meter. We cannot rest on our laurels and be late in carrying out the measures we need to carry out.

[Abdirayymov] At present there are two kinds of ecological danger destroying the lands and constricting our throats. The first involves making mother nature sick. It is uncertain at this point to what degree the damage can be cured. But it is better late than never that we discuss the problem. In truth, is the "blackening," the poisoning of the Kazakh land, due just to nuclear testing, the launching of space vehicles, rockets cleaving the breast of the earth and nuclear wastes becoming "treasure pits," or is it not also, at the same time, due to the negative results of concentrating industry in our mineral-rich region. That is to say, is it not due to over haste in carrying out measures for the further development of the Pavlodar-Ekibastuz, Qaratau-Zhambyl, Mangqystau,

and Eastern Kazakstan industrial regions? What do you, as a scientist, say about this?

[Kunayev] I am in no disagreement. I only wish to add that there is such a variety of resolutions about improving ecological conditions. What benefit is there in not carrying them out? To get to the heart of the problem, it is time to set to work.

[Abdirayymov] Secondly, there is the problem of human ecology. The situation is that we are being deprived of our national characteristics given to us through the blood of our fathers and the milk of our mothers. We love the culture of others, we imitate it and are stupified. The illness is getting worse, and becoming harder to bear. What is the cure? Your Great Mukha has said: "hold the cradle." What do you say?

[Kunayev] This is our great national weakness. For that reason the party and the Komsomol must do everything possible in this area. The present generation must be saved from spiritual deficiency. With this aim in mind, we must show concern for mothers, the masters of the cradle. This is the nourishment of life.

[Abdirayymov] Sir, you will perhaps take offense that I seek to return to a theme heart-breaking for you. However, I cannot disregard questions of vital importance. One of them is whether you knew a day in advance about the 16 December 16, 1986, V Plenum of the Kazakhstan CP Central Committee, which lasted a total of 18 minutes (as we later found out), and the selection of G. Kolbin?

[Kunayev] I knew that there was to be a plenum. However, I only heard in the evening that the plenum to be held the next day was going to elect someone.

[Abdirayymov] Two things are said to support the life of the people: not to get tired of something after you have become accustomed to it, and not to get tired of getting accustomed to what you are accustomed to. Did you not have in mind someone as your intended successor?

[Kunayev] Indeed I wanted to. There is the saying: "Even if you can shear a sheep of many colors, the wool will be no good." If I showed favoritism to anyone, who should it be. I had to look at abilities as a human being, not at the face or at the nationality.

[Abdirayymov] What kind of state were you in the day after the plenum, and during the difficult time when for two days the youth of the entire city refused to leave the square, when they were chilled to the marrow by snow and ice and were absolutely unyielding.

[Kunayev] It is difficult to express in words.

[Abdirayymov] G. Kolbin is said to have spoken with you for two hours in public meetings after that plenum.

[Kunayev] I endeavored to inform him completely about the life of the republic and hid nothing.

[Abdirayymov] I still remember how G. Kolbin spoke at the VII Congress of Kazakhstan Journalists. In his speech he said that it was the request not just of himself, but of the entire bureau membership, that you speak before the young people collected in the square on 17-18 December, and that you explain the situation to them. But he said that you refused and said that if the mass request were to be defied, and this made clear to the young people, in the end it would cause no harm. We need the truth. The people are of two minds; we cannot get to the root of the matter. If things go on like this we will be in difficulty not knowing whether we should believe Kolbin or not. I would like to hear the facts of the matter from your own mouth.

[Kunayev] Do you believe that Gennadiy Vasilyevich studied Kazakh for two years and gave reports in the local nationality language?

[Abdirayymov] I do not.

[Kunayev] What Kolbin said is a complete fraud. At 11:00 on the 17th of December the telephone rang at Miroshkhin. After I greeted the caller:

—Oleg Semenovich, are you all right?—I asked. When he muttered that young people had gathered in the square, I said:

—Gennadiy Vasilyevich has asked that you come. He wants to ask your advice,—he said.

I was utterly uncertain whether I should go or not. The person who was summoning me was a Kolbin man. I left a short time later. After I had waited for a short while in the waiting room, they guided me to the office. This is what was said:

—Go back again. We have decided what to do,—he said. I was astonished, totally surprised and returned home.

I had never heard of such a thing.

[Abdirayymov] Then there was no discussion with you at all about speaking to those collected in the square?

[Kunayev] That is the problem.

### **Kirghiz CP 5-Year Action Plan Detailed**

91US0046B Frunze SOVETSKAYA KIRGIZIYA  
in Russian 15 Sep 90 p 2

[Unattributed report: "Action Program of the Kirghiz Communist Party"]

[Text] The Kirghiz Communist Party supports the Program Statement of the 28th CPSU Congress, "Toward a Humane and Democratic Socialism" and the CPSU Statutes, and it declares its adherence to the political course determined by the congress.

According fundamental importance to the processes of renewal and restructuring, and having assumed leadership of daily practical work to eliminate previously

committed deformations from all spheres of life, the Kirghiz Communist Party expresses serious concern over the existing domestic political situation in the country and the republic and over the crisis phenomena in the economy.

State and labor discipline have declined. A wave of violence and crime has arisen, and ethnic conflicts have grown more acute. The activeness of party organizations has diminished. A good many Communists have grown confused under the pressure of sharp criticism and open attacks on the party, and some of them have chosen the path of resignation from it. A number of Communist executives have proved incapable of working under the new conditions and of leading their collectives. The restructuring of the work style and methods of the Central Committee, the party obkoms, gorkoms and raykoms, and the personnel of party agencies has been proceeding too slowly and ineffectively.

At this complex and critical moment, the Kirghiz Communist Party believes that only through the joint and conscious actions of all Communists, working people and healthy social forces is it possible to overcome the crisis and move forward. Without conscientious work, strong discipline, order and organization, no transformations are possible.

The republic's Communists share the proposition in the Program Statement to the effect that in a period of political stability that is fraught with the potential for social and economic chaos, the Communist Party sees its task as becoming the party of civil accord and ensuring constructive cooperation in getting out of the crisis and in the democratic reordering of society, and as uniting, supporting and defending all who through their honest labor are creating, have created and will create the well-being and spiritual values of the people. It resists forces that would like to turn society back to the barracks system, or to push it toward anarchy and civil confrontation and the disunity of nations and peoples.

The Kirghiz Communist Party favors the state sovereignty of the Kirghiz Soviet Socialist Republic. It will continue to defend and assert the historic choice of Kirghizia's peoples in favor of socialism, and it will strive for the broad utilization of the accomplishments of world civilization in socioeconomic construction and the development of democracy.

Intense work remains to be done on the scientific interpretation and theoretical substantiation of the processes that are occurring, especially those connected with the changeover to a market economy, on the concrete elaboration of party committees' strategy and tactics, and on mastery of the methods of political leadership.

Expressing the will of Kirghizstan's 154,000 Communists, the 19th Congress of the republic's Communist Party proposes the following Action Program for the upcoming five-year period, a program which may be clarified and supplemented in the Communist Party's practical activities.

### **I. The Main Thing Is the Human Being and His Interests**

In the center of its policies, the Kirghiz Communist Party places the human being, his material and spiritual interests, and the provision of worthy living conditions.

Proceeding from this basis, the principal efforts of Communists and party organizations are concentrated on accomplishing the following tasks:

- strengthening political and legal guarantees of the realization of human rights;
- excluding any discrimination on the basis of national or ethnic, political, religious, or sex or age characteristics; and creating reliable legislative protection of citizens' person and dignity, the inviolability of their residence and property, and their freedom to choose occupations, determine their place of residence, and leave and enter the republic;
- implementing the food program, normalizing the consumer market, and improving the supply of foodstuffs, consumer goods and services to the population;
- carrying out a housing program that envisages providing every family with a separate apartment or individual home by the year 2000;
- improving the environmental situation in cities and industrial centers, utilizing natural resources rationally, and preserving the unique resources of the Issyk-Kul other protected zones;
- enhancing the prestige of public education, science and culture, endeavoring to this end to increase budget allocations for the development of physical facilities and equipment; and encouraging socially useful initiatives, charity and philanthropy in the interests of the human being's spiritual development;
- fundamentally improving medical service to the public and the protection of motherhood and childhood, implementing major health-care and preventive programs, and enhancing medical institutions' physical facilities and equipment;
- providing social protection for low-income groups of the population—disabled persons, war and labor veterans—and implementing measures to improve the working and living conditions of women and the material situation of mothers of many children;
- creating a flexible system for the maintenance of employment, job placement, and the retraining of citizens;
- providing equal opportunities for young people's vocational, political and cultural growth; flexibly studying and satisfying their requirements, needs and interests, and acting promptly to solve problems that arise among young people.

The Kirghiz Communist Party will defend and wage propaganda for the scientific-materialist world view, while respecting and ensuring freedom of conscience and religious belief, and will proceed from the premise that religion, as part of peoples' spiritual life, may actively contribute to the formation of humanistic awareness, moral upbringing, and the strengthening of peace.

The Kirghiz Communist Party favors businesslike and constructive cooperation and dialogue with all movements and new public political organizations that support perestroika and contribute to the consolidation of society. At the same time, it will resolutely resist destructive forces that attempt to destabilize the situation in the republic.

Sharing people's concern over the rise in lawlessness, the Kirghiz Communist Party is directing the activities of Communists employed in state agencies and public organizations toward combating crime, enhancing preventive work, raising the legal literacy of the public, and working actively to establish in our life respect for legality and law and order, and for the eradication of abuses of office. It will systematically inform the population regarding a broad range of problems that are of concern to people, especially the production and distribution of material goods, as well as housing construction, the state of the environment, and the campaign against speculation and crime.

### **II. Principal Goals of Social and Economic Policy**

The Kirghiz Communist Party considers the restructuring of the economic system and the step-by-step transition to a regulated market economy to be a top-priority task. It favors the creation of conditions for the development of diverse forms of ownership; the granting of real autonomy to enterprises, associations, kolkhozes and sovkhozes; and the elimination of unwarranted administrative supervision.

The ministries and departments are called on to become equal partners with the enterprises. The chief criterion of their performance is the economic effectiveness, the saturation of the market with diverse goods, and receptiveness to scientific and technological advances. To these ends, the republic party organization supports all progressive forms of economic management: leasing, cooperatives, concerns, associations and others.

Through initiative, enterprise, and collective and individual incentives for work, there is a need to create a different type of relations among people in production activities, and to shift from the mechanical fulfillment of plans and programs to independent creative work. These tasks will be accomplished primarily by political methods, through persuasion and propaganda for market relations, on the basis of appropriate legislative and other state normative acts, and in close cooperation with trade union organizations and labor collectives' councils.

The Kirghiz Communist Party reserves the right to ask an accounting, within the framework of its statutes'

requirements, of Communists who are responsible for specific sectors of economic development. It favors the decisive strengthening of labor discipline.

In relations with union agencies and the republics, the Kirghiz Communist Party will direct its efforts to preserving a unified all-union market on the basis of multiple variants of mutually beneficial ties that ensure the equality and interest of all parties. The prospects for Kirghizia's further development are as part of a renewed federation and on the basis of a clear delimitation of the jurisdictions of the union and the republic in planning, the financial and credit sphere, and price setting. Kirghizia's Communists favor rational territorial specialization and cooperative production arrangements, and favor having every republic find its own place in the all-union division of labor. At the same time, they are opposed to regional self-sufficiency and the establishment of autarkic regional economies, which will inevitably result in economic and, subsequently, political isolation.

The Kirghiz Communist Party, together with the soviets of people's deputies, will work for the following:

- a fundamental restructuring of the pricing system, especially of prices for agricultural products and raw-material resources. The existing price policy distorts the republic's real contribution to the country's development and creates a false impression of its dependency;
- a fundamental change in the republic's financial situation, and the elimination of money-losing enterprises and farms;
- achieving the maximum processing of raw-material resources at the place of their production, overcoming one-sided agricultural and raw-material specialization, and increasing the percentage of economic branches that produce end products, which will make it possible to carry out a structural restructuring of the economy;
- improving the policy for the citing of productive forces, and creating a network of branches and shops and small enterprises in regions of labor surplus in order to fully enlist the unemployed part of the population in socially useful activity;
- developing foreign economic ties, creating joint ventures with foreign firms on a mutually beneficial basis, forming a hard-currency fund and utilizing it independently.

On questions of agrarian policy, the Kirghiz Communist Party proceeds on the basis of the following principles:

- to give the peasant the full right of a proprietor, no matter where he may work—on a kolkhoz or sovkhos, individual or cooperative, family or leased farm;
- to grant every rural resident, or those who would like to live and work in the countryside, the possibility of setting up his own home and auxiliary household

farming operations; to improve the availability of social facilities and services in the countryside; and to make work on the land socially attractive and economically effective;

- and to work to achieve equivalency in economic relations between the city and the countryside.

The Kirghiz Communist Party will strive to have social and economic policy based broadly on the results of scientific research. It will concentrate its efforts on the following:

- the development and deepening of democratic principles for the management of science, and the provision of self-government and autonomy for the republic's research collectives;
- the enhancement of the effectiveness of scientific work in the most important areas of exploration and of basic and applied research, and the introduction of scientific and technological advances into the economy and social practice;
- ensuring the competitiveness of scientific ideas and opinions, and enhancing the role of the Academy of Sciences as the coordinator of academy, higher-school and economic-branch science.

### III. For Democratization and the Self-Government of the People

The Kirghiz Communist Party favors the reinforcement and development of citizens' constitutional rights and liberties, the creation of a socialist rule-of-law state that guarantees the supremacy of laws in all spheres of public life, and the operation of the political system on the basis of legality and the equality of everyone before the law.

The Kirghiz Communist Party favors effective work by the legislative, executive and judicial authorities, the independence of the courts and the procuracy, and the enhancement of their role in society.

Proceeding from the fact that the fullness of authority is concentrated entirely in the soviets, the republic party organization will pursue its political line through Communists working in the soviets of people's deputies.

The Kirghiz Communist Party believes that its role and prestige as a ruling political organization do not need legislative codification but should be supported by real deeds. It sees the need for the development of a new Constitution of the Kirghiz SSR that fully reflects the principles of the Soviet federation, and for the creation of an updated system of civil, land, criminal, labor, housing and family legislation.

The party committees and primary party organizations direct their efforts toward an uncompromising struggle against crime, drug abuse, drunkenness, mismanagement and abuses in the economic and social spheres. To these ends, they will cooperate with public formations



and encourage new forms of participation by working people in the preservation of public order.

The Kirghiz Communist Party supports the position of the 28th CPSU Congress's Program Statement on ensuring the country's security and carrying out military reform on the level of reasonable sufficiency. The republic's Communists will strive to enhance the prestige of military service and show concern for improving the living conditions of servicemen and their family members.

The Kirghiz Communist Party believes that under present conditions ensuring the defense of socialist social relations against criminal encroachments, strengthening order, and enhancing the legal protection of the population are tasks of priority importance for internal-affairs and state-security agencies. Organizing the campaign against crime demands the strict observance of legality. It is necessary to raise the level of professional training and material compensation of employees of law-enforcement agencies.

#### IV. Activities in the Area of Internationality Relations

In the sphere of internationality relations, the Kirghiz Communist Party takes the positions of the 28th CPSU Congress's Program Statement and the CPSU platform, "The Party's Nationalities Policy Under Present-Day Conditions," it repudiates obsolete theoretical orientations toward the forced convergence of nations, as well as the erroneous conclusion that the nationalities question in the country had been solved, and it admits the deformations and distortions of Leninist nationalities policy that have been committed. At the same time, it resolutely opposes attempts to denigrate the real accomplishment of the great friendship of the USSR's peoples: the acquisition of statehood by the peoples in the outlying national regions, the establishment of a multi-branch industry in the republics, and the mighty upsurge of all the peoples' culture.

Kirghizia's Communists clearly realize that the success of perestroika today is impossible without the harmonization of internationality relations, a fundamental updating of the Soviet federation, and civil peace and accord. They believe that the preservation of an integral, voluntary and multinational union of sovereign states is in the interests of all peoples, and they favor the conclusion of a new union treaty.

The Kirghiz Communist Party favors the consistent implementation of the Leninist principle of nations' right to self-determination and the adding of new qualitative content to that principle, and it supports the republic's political and economic autonomy. In this connection, it condemns and will persistently fight against nationalism, chauvinism, and manifestations of extremism.

In its practical activities the Kirghiz Communist Party will:

- strive to achieve the republic's real sovereignty within the context of the Soviet federation; its independent resolution of all questions of state and public life, except for those voluntarily delegated to the union's jurisdiction; and its right to choose the economic forms of the management of its foreign-economic activities and its entrance into the international arena;
- concern itself daily with questions of international relations; resolve them democratically, openly, and in the interests of all nations and nationalities residing in the republic; and put a stop to any attempts to sow ethnic discord among people;
- support in every way possible the desire of people of any nationality to take part in the work of party, Soviet, state, economic-management and public agencies, taking their personal qualities into account, and work to create the necessary conditions for this;
- support a fundamental improvement of the training of national personnel in the working class and the technical intelligentsia, the internationalization of labor collectives, the solution of the problems of employing the population, and the development of productive forces with a view to the demographic situation;
- work to carry out constant organizational and political work on implementing the Law on the State Language of the Kirghiz SSR, on ensuring the guarantees of freedom to choose the language of instruction and upbringing in preschool and educational institutions, on introducing national language-Russian and Russian-national language bilingualism in all spheres, and on the creation of conditions for the free use of the indigenous language by the representatives of various nationalities residing in the republic;
- take steps to improve the investigation and study of Kirghizia's history and the problems of the Kirghiz people's ethnogenesis and its national-liberation and revolutionary struggle, national-state development, and mutual relations with the USSR's fraternal peoples. Orient the social sciences toward an in-depth treatment of the theoretical problems of the CPSU's nationalities policy.

The Kirghiz Communist Party will devote priority attention to the internationalist upbringing of the working people, and the utmost strengthening of fraternal friendship, mutual understanding and cooperation among the representatives of all nationalities.

To these ends, the following will be at the center of its attention:

- the implementation of a complex of socioeconomic, political and ideological measures to eliminate the causes and effects of internationality conflict in Osh Oblast and to enhance the internationalist upbringing of the working people;
- the revival and development of the cultural traditions of the Kirghiz and other peoples living in the republic,

and of their customs, ceremonies, folk and applied arts and crafts, and national forms of sport; the showing of solicitude toward the cultural legacy; the restoration and preservation of historical, architectural and cultural monuments and their utilization in aesthetic and moral upbringing; and the creation of national cultural centers, clubs and associations to reinvigorate this work;

- the creation of an atmosphere and conditions for the free development of multinational literature and art, supporting the creative intelligentsia in its assertion of truth, artistry and professionalism, and in the formation of a spiritually and intellectually developed personality;
- the deepening of fraternal ties, economic and cultural cooperation, and good-neighborliness with the republics of Central Asia and Kazakhstan, and with other regions of the USSR;
- the establishment and strengthening of relations with fellow countrymen living abroad, the provision of assistance to them in their national-cultural development, and the enlistment of their participation, to the extent that they are able, in the renewal processes being carried out in the republic.

#### **V. On the Path of Renewal of the Kirghiz Communist Party**

The Kirghiz Communist Party, as a constituent part of the CPSU, acts within the framework of the Constitution and laws of the Kirghiz SSR and the USSR, is guided in its activities by the CPSU's program documents and the interests of people residing in the republic, and directs the efforts of party organizations toward solution of the problems of the socioeconomic development of labor collectives, regions and the various territories.

It autonomously decides organizational, personnel and financial questions, conducts publishing activity, takes part directly in deciding fundamental questions pertaining to the life of the entire party, and puts forward its representatives to executive bodies of the CPSU.

The Kirghiz Communist Party resolutely repudiates political and ideological monopoly and favors the creative interpretation of the ideological legacy of Marx, Engels and Lenin and the historical experience of socialism, and the development of a modern concept of socialism. It directs all means and forms of ideological influence toward the forming of moral and humanistic ideals in people.

The republic's Communists support the need to step up mass political and upbringing work at people's places of residence. They deem it necessary to make wider use of the experience and influence of elders [aksakaly], party and labor veterans, labor collectives and public opinion in upbringing work, and to assert the moral norms that have characterized our peoples since ancient times.

The Kirghiz Communist Party will defend its right to political leadership and work to strengthen Communists' ideological and moral steadfastness.

Through Communists, the elective party bodies of the Kirghiz Communist Party carry out the development and implementation of political, social and economic programs and personnel policy, and politically campaign to win a majority in elections to soviets and to public organizations and movements of socialist orientation. The party resolutely repudiates dogmatic stereotypes, dogmatism and formalism, and opposes attempts to denigrate the significance of the Great October Socialist Revolution and to consign its revolutionary, combat and labor traditions to oblivion. It rejects charges directed against honest Communists of both past and present generations, the vast majority of whom have selflessly served the people and unselfishly worked and courageously fought for the homeland's freedom and independence.

The Kirghiz Communist Party wages propaganda for communist ideas and agitates for them, attracts new members into the CPSU, organizes intraparty activities, works to strengthen party ranks, and monitors the observance of statute and program requirements and discipline. It strives to revive the Leninist understanding of the principles of democratic centralism. In this connection the implementation of party decisions should continue to be Communists' primary duty.

The Kirghiz Communist Party favors extensive cooperation with the creative and scientific intelligentsia in the development of political guidelines and the treatment of questions involved in restoring Kirghizia's authentic history, preserving customs, traditions and historical and cultural monuments, and forming a fundamentally new concept of the development of public education that is aimed at strengthening its ties with the sources of national culture and the accomplishments of our country's and world social thought, and at solving the problems of the population's intellectual, moral and physical upbringing.

In order to establish the authority of the party masses, the role and prestige of elective bodies are being enhanced. Elections to them, as well as of delegates to congresses and conferences, will be conducted on the basis of secret ballot with multiple candidates. Conditions are provided for the free and collective discussion and adoption of decisions and consideration of diverse opinions.

The party apparatus is subordinate to the elective body and is staffed with competent, professionally trained and politically mature workers in accordance with the recommendations of primary party organizations.

The Kirghiz Communist Party fully supports the provision in the 28th CPSU Congress Program Statement to the effect that the party's foundation is the primary organizations. Taking specific conditions into account, they independently determine their objectives and forms

of activity, the structure and size of their agencies and apparatus, the frequency of meetings and political actions, and the procedures for conducting them, and they possess the final right of accepting members into the CPSU. Decisions taken by them within the framework of powers granted by the CPSU Statutes are not subject to revocation by higher agencies. The Kirghiz Communist Party also believes that the territorial-production principle of party structure needs to be adjusted. While preserving party organizations in production collectives and other collectives, it is also necessary to develop strong and active primary territorial organizations.

The primary party organizations will be freed of morally unscrupulous Communists who have compromised the party through their conduct.

The Kirghiz Communist Party supports the renewal of trade unions and their endeavor to act in the working people's interests.

The Kirghiz Communist Party sees the Komsomol as an independent sociopolitical and Communist organization of young people and will foster its direct participation in the development and implementation of party policy.

In its personnel policy, the Kirghiz Communist Party will follow democratic approaches, act on the basis of Leninist principles, conduct purposeful work to train a reserve, and recommend the most worthy Communists to serve on bodies of state authority and administration. It will devote special attention to work with women, and will strive to create equal conditions for their advancement to executive positions.

The Kirghiz Communist Party repudiates administrative bureaucratic methods of work, ivory-tower management and red tape, and it is oriented toward active involvement in party organizations and labor collectives. Its executive bodies operate openly and in a collegial fashion, and they inform Communists and party non-members through the mass media of their decisions, which are taken with consideration for minority opinion. The democratization of intraparty work, including work with documents, will be accompanied by a liberation from obsolete norms and provisions and excessive secrecy.

The practice of direct interference in the activities of various agencies is being stopped, and attempts by individual executives to shift administrative-command functions to party committees are being eliminated.

The Kirghiz Communist Party regards the party press as the collective organizer of the renewal and consolidation of the party and society that objectively reflects the processes of perestroika. The party's relations with journalists are built on partnership and respect for the Law on the Press and the Mass Media.

The Kirghiz Communist Party will develop criticism and self-criticism in every way possible. It will support and develop glasnost so that all channels of communication

with the masses are operating; will carefully study public opinion, the working people's criticism, complaints and letters, and citizens' appeals; and will work to promote their resolution, but only through those institutions that are required in accordance with law to concern themselves directly with the issues that people raise. It will strive for an enhancement of the culture of relations between party agencies, on the one hand, and state and public organizations, on the other, and for a sensitive and attentive attitude toward the needs of the individual.

It will conduct a candid and direct dialogue with people; more fully take into account the social, vocational, nationality and other specific features and interests of the working class, peasantry and intelligentsia; and support the free conduct of debates and comparison of diverse viewpoints and opinions.

The objectives of the democratization of intraparty life, improvement of control and inspection work, and insurance of reliable guarantees against bureaucratism, subjectivism, arbitrariness, and the influence of personal and chance circumstances on party policy will be served by the unified control agencies created according to the new party Statutes.

The Kirghiz Communist Party autonomously controls its own monies, seeks ways to increase its revenues, and determines its expenditures on the basis of publicly open control from the primary party organization to the Kirghiz Communist Party Central Committee.

The republic's Communists express confidence that the Kirghiz Communist Party Action Program will receive the support of all the republic's working people, and that they will actively take part in its implementation.

#### **Niyazov Address on Turkmen SSR, CP 66th Anniversary**

*91US0096A Ashkhabad TURKMENSKAYA ISKRA  
in Russian 28 Oct 90 pp 1-2*

[Address by S. A. Niyazov, chairman of the TSSR Supreme Soviet and first secretary of the Turkmen CP Central Committee, at the ceremonial meeting held in Ashkhabad on 26 October: "On the 66th Anniversary of the Formation of the TSSR and the Communist Party of Turkmenistan"]

[Text] Dear fellow countrymen, fellow citizens, friends!

Today we have gathered on the occasion of a national holiday—the 66th anniversary of the formation of the TSSR and the Communist Party of Turkmenistan. On 27 October 1924 the second session of the USSR VTsIK [All-Russian Central Executive Committee] approved the decision of the peoples of Central Asia on establishing national boundaries. The Turkmen Soviet Socialist Republic appeared on the country's political

map. The Turkmen people, who had dreamed of unification and freedom for centuries, acquired their own statehood and the absolute right to determine their own fate.

October, realization of Lenin's nationalities policy, and the formation of the USSR made it possible for the Turkmen people to achieve statehood. We must not belittle or try to minimize the significance to the Turkmen people and the Turkmen SSR of the fact that we joined the USSR voluntarily.

The development of the economy, the transformation of social and cultural life, and the spiritual development of nations took place with the fraternal mutual aid of all republics and peoples of the country.

Questions of Soviet national-state construction in Central Asia were a constant focus of Vladimir Ilyich Lenin. In his notes on the draft of the Turkmen Commission of 13 June 1920, he instructed that the conditions for merging or breaking up Turkestan into national republics be clarified in detail.

At that time, the Turkmen SSR occupied 42 percent of all the territory of Central Asia. The republic's population was more than a million people, among whom 80 percent were Turkmens while the rest were Russians, Uzbeks, Kazakhs, Beluchis, Kurds, and others.

In subsequent years this issue was thoroughly studied by the country's state and party organs and at the same time posed locally. By October 1924 preparations for the draft of the national demarcation were finished and a broad discussion of this question among the masses and legal formulation of it in Turkestan's highest organs of state power had taken place. This issue was also discussed at meetings of local soviets, extraordinary congresses of all peoples of Central Asia, and sessions of the Central Ispolkom and plenums of the central committees of the republics and of the Central Asian bureau of the VKP(b) [All-Union Communist Party (of Bolsheviks)] Central Committee. Decisions were made there to carry out national-state demarcation and create national formations.

In November 1924 the make-up of the Turkmen Revolutionary Committee—the first government of the Turkmen SSR—and the Organizational Bureau of the Communist Party (Bolshevik) of Turkmenistan [KP(b)T] was confirmed. The Revolutionary Committee and the Organizational Bureau of the KP(b)T were made up of people who stood at the sources of Soviet power both in Turkmenistan and in Central Asia as a whole—Kaygysyz Atabayev, Ivan Mezhlauk, Nedirbay Aytakov, Nikolay Paskutskiy, Khalmurad Sakhatmuradov, and others.

The First All-Turkmen Constituent Congress of Soviets was held 15-24 February 1925. It adopted the "Declaration on the Formation of the Turkmen Soviet Socialist Republic." "... The working Turkmen people, in the person of the First Congress of Soviets," the Declaration

says, "solemnly declare the formation of an independent Soviet Socialist Republic on the territory long occupied by the Turkmen people."

In this way, Turkmens were united into a unified national state for the first time in their many centuries of history.

The announcement of the Turkmen SSR's voluntary joining with the USSR is exceptionally important. The Declaration proclaimed: "True to the aspirations of workers and the peasant masses for solidarity and fraternal unity, the working Turkmen people solemnly declare to all working people their desire... to join the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics with the rights of an equal member."

This Declaration of the First All-Turkmen Congress of Soviets, just like the free expression of will by the Turkmen people to join the USSR on an equal basis, was a historical act which was of enormous significance in the life of the Turkmen people.

A great deal has been done during the years of Soviet Power to develop the economy, education, and national culture of the Turkmen people; spheres of spiritual culture which were not traditional for the Turkmens appeared and were substantially developed. The first Turkmen composers, artists, sculptors, masters of the stage, and the like appeared.

An invaluable contribution to the development of the spiritual wealth of the entire Soviet people was made by Berdy Kerbabayev, Khydyr Deryayev, Beki Seytakov, Maya Kuliyeva, Annagul Annakuliyeva, Aman Kulmamedov, Alty Karliyev, Bazar Amanov, Sakhy Dzhabarov, and many others.

Even now the Academicians Agadzhan Babayev and Bibi Palvanova, people's artists of the USSR and the republic Sona Muradova, Maya Shakhberdiyeva, Mukhamed Cherkezov, German Bobrovskiy, and Khodzhauli Narliyev, the composer Veli Mukhatov, people's artist of the TSSR Izzat Klychev, the writers Berdynazar Khudaynazarov and Klych Kuliye, and many others are rightly considered the pride of the Turkmen people.

At the same time, however, since the late 1920s administrative diktat has revealed itself in various spheres of social life in the republic, as in the entire country.

The study of the cultural-spiritual legacy of the Turkmens was banned. The works of Makhtumkula and Mollanepes, the epics of Gorgut-at and Korogla, and the works of a number of prominent compatriots of the thinkers of the East were forbidden to be published, customs which had been established for centuries were taken away, the nation was persecuted for its religious beliefs, and uniform thinking was forcefully implanted.

The economy was developed lopsidedly and irrationally and many social problems, especially in rural areas, were left unresolved.



The mass repressions which were committed by the Stalinist leadership in the name of revolution, the party, and the people against many thousands of people who were devoted to the cause of the party and the Soviet State is a heavy legacy of the past. Just as in the rest of the country, in Turkmenia thousands of people were morally and physically tortured and many of them were exterminated, for the most part by extrajudicial reprisal. Among them were such prominent figures of the party and the Soviet State as Kaygysyz Atabayev, Ivan Mezhlauk, Nedirbay Aytakov, Nikolay Paskutskiy, Garadzha Annamukhamedov, Yakov Popok, Chary Vellekov, Gurban Sakhatov, Khalmurad Sakhatmuradov, and many hundreds of simple kolkhoz members, workers, and rank-and-file communists, fine sons of the Turkmen, Russian, Ukrainian, Kazakh, Uzbek, and other peoples of the country. Members of their families and people close to them who were guilty of nothing were subjected to many years of hardships and humiliations. And only now, in the years of perestroika, is the great work of rehabilitating and perpetuating the good name of all those illegally repressed being done. And we will continue to rehabilitate this truth.

Comrades! The working people of Turkmenistan proved their boundless devotion to the Motherland, the party, and the friendship and brotherhood of Soviet peoples in the years of the Great Patriotic War. The sons and daughters of the Turkmen people heroically fought on the fronts and forged the victory in the rear. More than 70,000 Turkmenistan people were given combat decorations of the Motherland for the courage, bravery, and heroism they showed in battle, and of them 78 were awarded the high title of Hero of the Soviet Union. A considerable number of veterans and living eyewitnesses to those fiery years have gathered in this hall. We bow low with filial respect to you for your heroism, courage, and enormous endurance! (Applause.)

Despite all the difficulties, distortions, and deformations, great changes have occurred in our republic in all fields of economic, social, and cultural construction in the years of Soviet Power. The volume of capital investments in developing the republic's economy alone amounted to some 40 billion rubles.

Today Turkmenistan is a modern state with multisectorial industry and mechanized agriculture. Sectors which determine the economy's progress have been substantially developed; they include the power-engineering, chemical, gas, petroleum-extracting, petroleum-refining, machine-building, and electrical engineering sectors. At the present time the republic's industry is represented by enterprises of more than 17 consolidated sectors and its share in republic income is 22.5 percent, while the total volume of output produced has increased 170-fold as compared to 1924.

The construction of the Karakum Canal imeni V. I. Lenin is one of the prominent achievements of the past period. The "river of life" and the "river of happiness" realized a century-old dream of the Turkmen people to

develop and irrigate the dry southern territories and the arid regions of the republic's southwest. Since the time of the construction of the canal, hundreds of thousands of hectares of once-barren land have been put into economic circulation, and the production of output of agriculture has increased nine-fold.

Soviet Turkmenistan is in second place in the USSR for explored deposits and extraction of natural gas and raw cotton production and is one of the leading centers of the country's major chemical industry. Our output enjoys great demand. It is exported to more than 60 countries of the world, among them such developed capitalist states as the United States, the FRG, England, France, Japan, and many others. But mutually advantageous business cooperation and the utilization of our economic potential on behalf of the socioeconomic revival of Turkmenistan are now beginning.

Comrades! The historical course of time has brought us to a new line which we are crossing, carrying with us the limited but positive experience of perestroika. This is where we find its objective, specific, and not at all borrowed uniqueness, which is characterized for the most part by a calm sociopolitical situation which insures the progressiveness of the republic's development in this stage. It is from this standpoint, a position of loyalty to the course we have chosen, and as I was persuaded in my pre-election trips, a course which received the approval of the people, that I would also like to discuss our future tasks.

Of course, we certainly have had and do have difficulties and errors. But despite all that, the volume of output produced in the republic so far in this most complicated year has increased by almost four percent. Positive changes have occurred in the structure of production of consumer goods. The growth rate of deliveries to trade of cultural and domestic and household goods has increased.

On the whole, work to harvest the crops is going successfully. The plans for procuring grain, potatoes, and feed have been fulfilled. A satisfactory harvest of vegetables has been obtained; 14,000 tons more than last year have been gathered.

But the cotton growers' successes make us especially happy; they grew a superior yield of this most valuable crop. On behalf of the republic's leadership, allow me, with all my heart, to congratulate all the workers in agriculture upon successful fulfillment of the state plan for procurements of raw cotton. It is very difficult to single out anyone in particular; everyone did the work conscientiously. Thank you very much, our dear laborers of the fields! (Applause.) We are certain that the day when 1.5 million tons of "white gold" is obtained is not far off.

All this creates favorable conditions for further transformations in the socioeconomic sphere and the republic's transition to a market economy.

Now I would like to say a few words about the transition to the market. We are for the market. But for a market mechanism to function efficiently, a fundamental change in the established system of management is essential. A market economy is an economy of contracts and deals between equal partners. It is an economy of a developed system of consumer ties which rely on the market infrastructure—wholesale enterprises, stock exchanges, banks, and other financial structures, strong laws which respect the people, and regulated interrelations of economic subjects. To a significant degree, the role of many vertical structures is decreasing. That is the reason for the need to leave only crucial ministries and departments which determine the general strategy and tactics of development and help activate the market mechanisms.

For us the market is not an end in itself. The point should be and is developing the individual and people's creativity and creating reliable and effective mechanisms for increasing the efficiency of the economy and steadily raising our people's well-being. As one of the voters said, as a result of the transition to the market, we must realize the slogan, "Creation of material goods with our own hands and distribution of them through our own hands."

The republic has unique natural-climatic conditions which are now being utilized extremely inefficiently. The main way to resolve this problem also lies through fundamental changes in the structure of the economy. Let us move consistently toward increasing the volume of processing of raw material resources in this republic. This creates the real prerequisites for increasing national income, stabilizing and increasing the budget, and improving people's material living conditions. Even now all the conditions exist to eliminate a large part of our present dependence with respect to consumer goods. The following are our proposals to the Union:

The republic supports preserving and developing the all-Union market, which consists of independent markets of the sovereign republics. In our opinion, the sovereign republics should jointly resolve questions of forms of protection of common economic space, eliminate discrimination, and regulate the import and export of goods.

The Turkmen SSR will independently determine the procedure for forming and using budgets and will develop and employ systems of taxation, fees, and mandatory payments. All the subjects of economic activity on republic territory will make deduction payments only to republic and local budgets.

The republic will transfer a certain part of its income received on the republic's territory to exercise the powers delegated to the Union.

We support keeping a unified Union bank, in a new form. It should be independent and should be removed from the government's subordination and be accountable only to the USSR Supreme Soviet.

Based on the sovereignty of the republic, the USSR Central Bank should act as a joint-stock company formed by all republic banks. In light of that, the central bank should bear responsibility for the operation of the money-credit system on a nation-wide scale.

We believe it is necessary to preserve a uniform monetary system. In light of that, a new mechanism of currency emission must be formulated and the total mass of currency in circulation and protection of the ruble's purchasing power must be monitored.

On the question of price setting, we think it is necessary to set stable prices for a limited list of food products and goods with the consent of the republic.

The state order for the transitional period (1991) should remain the main form of direct state regulation of economic ties. However, the state order must be put on a contract basis, that is, a contract price is set which covers production costs and provides moderate profits. And, the state order must be completely supported with material resources.

The product list and volume of the state order must receive the consent of the republic.

The Turkmen SSR considers it necessary to set up a uniform system of social guarantees for the population and an employment policy. The following should be the key links of this system: employment of the population through the creation of new work places and training and retraining of cadres; social support for the unemployed and a reliable mechanism of compensation and income indexing and creation of material-physical goods to meet the monetary incomes of the low-income population.

Regulation of foreign economic ties with foreign countries, including questions of licensing and quota-setting, is under the jurisdiction of the Turkmen SSR.

The republic is creating a hard currency fund to finance its own foreign economic activity and some of the powers delegated to the Union.

Unfortunately, the political and economic situation in the country is arousing serious concern and requires immediate action focused on stabilizing the situation, achieving harmony among nationalities, and bringing the country out of crisis; the paramount tasks here are renewing the multinational Union state and moving to a market economy. Delay in performing these tasks may lead to serious consequences for the country and the people.

Democratization, glasnost, and the formation of political pluralism and real people's power have created favorable preconditions for a reasonable and fair answer to the question: what is the Union to be like in contemporary conditions? From the very start, the concept of perestroika included refining nationalities relations, increasing the role of Union and autonomous republics,

and eliminating injustices committed against some peoples. However, people did not realize immediately and fully how critical the contradictions which had accumulated in this sphere were, nor the scale of the changes ready to take place.

In this sense, the last five years were of enormous significance. The entire path taken after October was reinterpreted and the mistakes and distortions in nationalities policy and everything that does not correspond to the ideas of democracy and socialism, which should be ruled out forever from the life of our society, were honestly and directly stated. Our people, like other peoples of the country, got the opportunity to independently decide their own fate and dispose of the fruits of their labor.

However, even in the years of perestroika the country has been approaching the abyss being dug by interethnic hostility. We see where nationalist passions artificially fanned by extremist groupings, attempts to resolve problems by force, and disregard of the equal rights of all citizens regardless of their nationality can lead.

The republic's leadership recognizes that every people has the natural and inalienable right to freedom and independence. Our multinational state cannot be really strong if this right is not guaranteed in reality by a complex of social, economic, and political precepts and the corresponding organization of power and management. A union of free peoples can exist only on the basis of voluntary consent, in those forms and conditions dictated by their common interests.

But at the same time we affirm the vital need to preserve the multinational Union state, after it has been radically changed. The deep economic ties and spiritual bonds which were formed over more than 70 years favor that. The enormous advantages which flow from the union of national potentials, which allows us to reliably guarantee general security and allows each people to discover their creative powers in an enormous economic, cultural, and scientific-technical space, also favor that.

The present situation in the economy clearly attests to what the Union means to our republic and what the consequences of its weakening would be. The disruption of ties between sectors of the economy and enterprises located in different republics and regions has become one of the causes of the crisis condition of the economy and created serious difficulties for people's survival. It should be clear now that we will be unable to overcome these difficulties if we do not restore cooperation within the framework of an integrated national economic complex. Any other decision or reliance only on one's own strength will lead to chaos and nationwide calamity.

Every one of our conscientious citizens for whom the fate of the Fatherland is dear should understand the significance which concluding a new Union Treaty has. It should, first, affirm the continuity of the historical existence of our country and, secondly, transform it at the will of the peoples to conform with present realities.

The need for a new Union Treaty is being recognized more and more broadly in our country. Many people now see it as the only possible means to prevent the growth of destabilizing trends, restore the normal activity of state and social institutions, and create the prerequisites to bring the country out of crisis as quickly as possible. Our republic supports the immediate creation and conclusion of a new Union Treaty.

For that reason we have prepared our own draft of the Treaty.

In our conception of the Treaty, we favor transforming our state into a Union of sovereign republics. The sovereignty of the Union should consist of the sovereignty of the republics which are part of it. The republics voluntarily transfer the powers to perform tasks which represent the common interest to the Union state. In addition to general powers, the particular republics may at their discretion entrust the Union with fulfilling additional functions. The republic laws should have supremacy with the exception of questions attributed to joint or Union jurisdiction; the Union laws have supremacy on all Union territory on questions referred by the republics to the Union's jurisdiction.

The Treaty should envision institutions and procedures for the interaction of Union and republic organs (including resolving conflicts, disputes, and collisions) without encroaching upon the rights and interests of either the republics or the Union.

In order to implement the Union's powers, it would be a good idea to create Union organs of power and administration. The republics should participate in their formation and work.

The Union Treaty should fix the structural principle and the structure of the main Union organs. They are the president and vice-president, elected by all the people and requiring a positive vote from more than half the republics, and the Supreme Soviet with two equal chambers, one of which is formed of representatives of the republics while the other is elected by all the people of the country.

Questions of delineating powers between the Union and the republics are made more complicated today by the fact that the negative aspects involving the supercentralist system of power and administration are still fresh in our minds. Therefore the radical transformation of the character and functions of the Union organs and everything that we call the Center will be important. There obviously should be only one principle here: the Center represents a joint institution of republics to perform their common tasks. It is therefore not alienated from the republics and will be conceived by them as an institution of power created at their will and expressing their common interests.

We believe that the Union should act in the international arena as a sovereign state which expresses, with the republics' consent, the interests of the country's entire

population as a fully empowered representative of its peoples in international affairs.

In implementing their sovereign rights, the republics also participate in international relations.

Comrades! The third session of the Turkmen SSR Supreme Soviet adopted an important political decision—the presidential form of government has been established in the republic.

It seems that in the development of processes that we observe today, only a strong executive power in the person of a president will allow us to preserve the necessary stability in the republic and create new political and legal mechanisms which operate permanently and realistically and will forever preclude the very possibility of deformation of the socialist principles of people's power.

It is important to single out several fundamental features here.

First of all, with the introduction of the presidential form of government, the gap between legislative and executive activities is eliminated.

Furthermore, it is well known that law-making activity is often subject to emotions. Before putting a law which has been adopted into operation, the president has the opportunity to consider all its aspects and possible consequences well and return it to the Supreme Soviet for more work.

And, finally, it is important to take into account that now all organs of power may act only on their own level. It turns out that this is a major obstacle on the path of change. But the president is a kind of core of the political system whose sphere of influence extends both horizontally and vertically. And, he remains under the control of the Supreme Soviet. Departments present reports on the socioeconomic position in the republic to him. Any deputy may query him.

It is profound and symbolic that the elections of the first president of the Turkmen SSR will take place on the anniversary of the republic's formation. This very day will mark the beginning of a new stage of fundamental change in the political system and the formation of a socialist law-governed state.

I have been given an enormous honor—to be nominated for the post of first president of the republic. I would like to take this opportunity to sincerely thank my dear compatriots for the trust they have shown me. For me this is not only a high honor. To live among one's own people and be their president, it seems to me, is, first of all, to clearly realize the responsibility which lies on one's shoulders for the work and order in our home and to be a citizen in the highest sense of the word and an example of patriotism, genuine service to the interests of the people, and loyalty to the course which is being followed and which has received such powerful support. I assure the people of Turkmenistan that I will always

faithfully follow these basic principles and try to the fullest degree to justify this trust! (Applause)

The combination of executive and administrative powers and the introduction of strict personal responsibility for decisions made and their execution opens completely new all-encompassing perspectives for the republic.

A law-governed democratic socialist state, a civil society, the priority of common human values, harmony between man and nature, socialism for man—these are the contours of future Turkmenistan, looking into the 21st century. In this sense, it is particularly important to consolidate and comprehend the sovereignty of the republic. The adopted Declaration on the State Sovereignty of the Turkmen Soviet Socialist Republic is the natural desire of the people who received such a possibility with the formation of the republic in 1924 but as a result of well-known deformations were unable to realize it fully.

How soon these contours will appear and take root depends on our common resolve, wisdom, and responsibility, and at the same time on many conditions both in the republic and outside its borders. Understanding this, we should not forget about good, constructive relations with other republics of the country. Interrepublic ties and exchange of know-how and spiritual values must be employed even more actively. We have an interest in this not only from a political standpoint but also from an economic one.

These days I have had quite a few meetings and talks with the republic's working people. There was business-like, principled, and at times frank talk of perestroika, of successes and difficulties, of problems and ways to resolve existing problems, and of the prospects and future of Turkmenistan. But one request was heard everywhere: preserve the peace in the republic and do not allow interethnic dissension. I should mention that along with this request a demand was made: make those who one way or another promote hostility on interethnic grounds more strictly responsible. I think and hope that you will support me in this, that if I am elected president, a law envisioning the necessary measure of responsibility for such violations will be the first law. (Applause)

Today society must reach a general understanding that without consolidation and civic harmony it will be impossible to overcome the crisis phenomena, to say nothing of moving forward.

Our republic has all the prerequisites for insuring that positive processes pick up speed. Kindness and the desire to live in peace and good will with the people of different nationalities populating our republic are typical of our people—and I never tire of emphasizing this. Every people, while treasuring their history, culture, and traditions which come from centuries past, must understand that this right has been given to every other people too. Only in this respectful relationship toward one another can harmony be achieved, the harmony which is



so essential in our turbulent times. From this tribunal I would like to address all residents of our republic, no matter what nationality they are: you have no reason to worry, neither the people nor the republic's leadership will permit the rights of its citizens to be violated. (Applause.)

Curbing violence and crime, putting an end to mass theft, blocking the path of speculators, bringing order into our lives, insuring calm and security for people, and stopping drunkenness and alcoholism are no less important. They are the ulcers of society which if not treated will nullify our aspirations. We will try to do this with all possible and available measures and by means of all state and political structures. Criminals should feel that all society, which has the necessary legislative means, is against them. I assume that an ukase focused on the struggle against car thieves should also be one of the first ukases of the president. There is no such ukase in the Union, so let us issue one ourselves. (Applause.)

Comrades! I would like to say a few words to clarify the situation which is taking shape on our consumer market and affects people's vitally important interests and reflects on the mood of every family and their confidence in tomorrow. I have spoken of this more than once, even during my prelection trips around the republic, but I will repeat once again in this hall: the republic's leadership is taking all possible measures to insure that the very complicated stage of the transition to a market has as painless an effect on our people as possible. Money is being sought in the budget, and at the present time it makes up a respectable amount, to cover expenditures which we will have in connection with our decision not to raise prices for basic foodstuffs until the end of the year.

As for flour, we will try to provide a guaranteed norm for each resident without raising the price. We hope that with the realization of the program which we have laid out to develop grain production, we will be able to completely supply ourselves with flour by the year 1995.

I would also like to emphasize that we have substantial reserves of sugar, tea, and potatoes, and we continue to procure them. The government is seeking all opportunities to procure meat.

In addition to what I have already said, I would like to mention the following circumstance, and it is very important that everyone understand. No matter what ways we seek to find the least harmful variant of a transition to the market for our people, we must not forget that we cannot live in isolation from the country. We have already ascertained how destructive violation of agreements on deliveries is for our economic position. Whether we want to or not, life forces us to adjust prices for certain types of goods like carpets, cigarettes, and vodka.

Comrades! Ahead of us is a great deal of varied, extremely intensive, and to the highest degree responsible work. Fulfilling the tasks we face is inconceivable

without political stability and well-considered and realistic steps and without the consolidation of all political and social forces, and state tact and wisdom.

For 66 years we have followed a by-no-means easy but truly glorious path. The Turkmen people have shown themselves to be up to fulfilling the tasks to restructure society on new principles.

We are proud of our achievements. But this obliges us even more to see the problems which have built up in society and recognize the new demands which life dictates.

I believe that everyone understands this, and we will be able to employ enormous unspent forces and opportunities and the creative energy of the people for the prosperity of our beloved Turkmenistan.

Happy holiday to you, dear compatriots! Peace and happiness to you and well-being in every home, in every family! (Applause.)

#### **Uzbek Sovereignty, Informal Groups Examined**

91US0067A Tashkent PRAVDA VOSTOKA in Russian  
29 Sep 90 p 2

[Unattributed Article: "Lie for Export"]

[Text] As the wind of change began blowing in the country, the journalists found themselves in a state of euphoria because of the untranslatability of our concepts of "glasnost" and "perestroyka" into foreign languages.

Subsequently, thinking about it, they began to note that it was practically impossible to translate in many other languages phenomena in our life, such as waiting in line for everything, bare shelves everywhere, unemployment despite vacancies in enterprises, scarcity of food while crops are rotting on the ground and, finally, the forced migration of Soviet people.

What is understood everywhere, however, is the playing of political games instead of political stabilization, and economic adventurism involving the "market" while retaining "planning" instead of structuring market relations. This was clearly apparent to politicians and businessmen who were studying possibilities of cooperating with our country and its republics.

We ourselves can see this as well, better than others. We do not stick our heads in the sand like ostriches in the face of objective and subjective difficulties. The objective ones were the result of the command-administrative system, the party diktat over the economic mechanism, the suppression of the people's initiative and the long years of total lack of enterprise. The subjective were inertia, incompetence, political ambitions and populism, and speculating on social deformations.

The results are the following.

From the report of the USSR State Committee for Statistics: In the first half of the year 10 million man/days were lost in the country as a result of strikes and mass no-shows at work, resulting from interethnic and sociopolitical conflicts. This is the equivalent of the daily absence from work of approximately 75,000 people. The production shortfall amounts to almost 1 billion rubles. One can already confidently say that the second half will be a twin of the first in this respect.

The conflict is worsening in Moldavia, with its "separation" into Gagauz and Dniester Republics.

Not even worth mentioning are the events in the Baltic area, where today a resident of Uzbekistan will not be sold even a shirt made out of our own cotton.

The Transcaucasus is seething with passions which, thank God, are more political than involving physical violence.

A general republic strike and a nationwide demonstration are being planned for in Kiev, and should the Ukraine yield to the element of meetings, as wrote in IZVESTIYA V. Masol, chairman of the Ukrainian Council of Ministers, "even despite this year's good harvest we could be left without food."

What about Moscow and Leningrad where, as an imbecile maliciously said, efforts are being made "to build communism in a separate city?"

Two days ago, PRAVDA VOSTOKA published the article: "Who Needs a Rotting Potato?" The article triggered a tempestuous and, as the saying goes, "positive" reaction on the part of our readers and there is no need to repeat its content. Let us merely recall some of its points.

The threat of a hungry winter is building up in Moscow. The capital has stored for food purposes only 3.7 percent of the potatoes it needs and slightly more of other vegetables. Yet, on the eve of this same winter, Moscow pompously celebrated a "city day" which lasted three days.

This was a pharisaic holiday in the center of fields with rotting crops. None other than the mayors of Moscow and Leningrad publicly called for revoking the "country day"—the October Revolution anniversary, claiming that we are presently not in the mood to celebrate.

Why did we need this "city banquet at a time of plague?" the author of the article asks. Was it the inexperience, irresponsibility or views held by the new "democrats" and their closely rallied supporters? The author is convinced that it was their views. For that reason the "celebrations" were saturated with demands for strikes, picketing, "organized mass actions," civil disobedience campaigns, "acts of transfer of ownership," resignation of the government, and the premature disbanding of the congresses of people's deputies and supreme soviets.

Perhaps we could leave Moscow's problems for the Muscovites to deal with. However, not even perestroika "eliminated" the age-old wisdom that "the fish begins to rot from the head."

All sorts of "democrats" from the provinces are being attracted by the stink of the rot, including from our republic. The latest destructive months in the former and the present capitals of the country were no exception.

What is this in reference to?

This is described by Radio Ozodlik, which, in the years of perestroika, was selected by the leaders of our informal associations as the regular spokesman for their ambitions. Here is what the outside "voice" said a few days ago:

"During the first half of September, Abdurakhim Pulatov, one of the leaders of the Birlik People's Movement, and Gulchekhra Nurullayeva, leader of the Tumaris Women's Movement, visited Moscow and Leningrad to study the democratization processes in those cities."

What came out of this is then described in an extensive interview with the Tashkent visitors to Moscow and Leningrad. The Birlik representative preached methods of democratic struggle against the leadership in power and described some of the long-term program of the movement: find the reasons, organizers and executors of the tragedies in Osh and Uzgen, "solve the problem of the death of Uzbek soldiers in the Soviet Army," establish contacts with the democratic forces in Moscow and Leningrad, "so that if necessary we can turn to them for help." There is a detailed description of the fact that during those days the Birlik leader joined the hungry refugees on Red Square, participated in a Moscow meeting and, in the final account, saw to it that the Uzbek government demanded a political assessment of the events in Osh and Uzgen.

The other "leader" told Ozodlik that Uzbek boys were dying in the armed forces although, true, not concealing that Russian, Belorussian, and Ukrainian boys were dying as well. The situation in our republic was described as follows: its population can no endure, while the leaders of Uzbekistan are unable to get anything done. The appearance of those who were crying on someone else's shoulder was so pitiful that even Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin could not hold back his tears.

All of these are details. The main idea is that the informals raise problems and that the republic's government is forced to support them after that. The implication is that not the president, government or public of Uzbekistan but the informals are the initiators of all innovations in the republic and are more interested than others in stabilizing the situation and improving the life of the working people.

The interview ended with the wish that "in our republic as well true democracy may triumph, similar to the one which is winning in Leningrad and Moscow." Obviously, this also applies to the democracy attained by the Baltic republics, for Birlik had already mentioned this at the March meeting "in support of Gorbachev's perestroika," in the third (kurultay) of its movement. In their view, all perestroika in the republic will begin once the Uzbek leadership has been replaced.

A duplication of the "democracies" is a senseless occupation, the more so since we have a very recent example: a group of tourists from Lithuania timidly crowded into the shoe store at the Dustlik Hotel where, apparently, to this day these tourists are staying. The reason for the timidity soon became clear:

"How will they sell us shoes without having a Tashkent internal passport?"

"They will."

"If they do not, can you purchase shoes for us with your own document?"

"No document is needed!" the Tashkent people were already getting irritated by such lack of understanding.

The problem was resolved simply: the Lithuanian tourists purchased several pair of Tashkent shoes each, although still confused. True "democracy" was not considered part of their lives without being dressed in formal clothing and showing their internal passports in stores.

It may have been unnecessary to mention this strange case, had the euphoria created by someone else's "well-being" not made some "politicians" blind.

Yes, there are a number of serious economic problems in our lives and we are still in the clutches of the command-bureaucratic system with which we are fed up. In numerous letters to the editors of PRAVDA VOSTOKA, the people of Uzbekistan are fiercely commenting on this situation. Unlike some other people, however, they submit constructive suggestions while essentially approving the course charted by the party and the government, aimed at improving their lives.

Yes, perestroika is not developing smoothly in our republic and everyone—the people and the leaders—are concerned about it. However, there are people who would like to acquire political capital from such difficulties, for a purpose which cannot be described as other than the desire to usurp the power.

Therefore, the leaders of the local "democrats" are traveling in cities and villages, "to show themselves up and to look at the people." They heap lie upon lie concerning consumption in the Union and abroad. They have the right to establish contacts with anyone they wish. It is only their own conscience that could make them think about the following: Why is it that our names and our statements are being so willingly repeated by

outside voices? Perhaps their own ideological concepts about the breakdown in our country would make our glasnost and perestroika weaker while they are thoughtlessly scoring points.

It is a question of the aspiration of the "movements" and the people they have deceived to paralyze the work of the government and the local authorities and to destabilize the situation. All means could be used to this effect, above all, the instructions of the president and the party authorities and the republic's information media. They are irritated by the fact that PRAVDA VOSTOKA is following a firm line and acting on the basis of internationalist positions, in an effort to stop the drain of specialists from Uzbekistan.

In issue after issue, the newspaper describes the working people—Uzbeks, Russians and members of all ethnic groups and nationalities living in the republic. It is they who keep things going and it is only their persistent daily efforts that are a guarantee for the solution of the crisis.

However, it is via that same Ozodlik leader that the informals criticize precisely our support and the support of some other newspapers of the working man. In the West, however, such a topic is not newsworthy.

In the West, this is considered past history. Work to the point of exhaustion, under the conditions of a market which was created there a long time ago, no longer requires any "moral encouragement." There they have reached a level of greater political, stock exchange and entertainment news. In the countries within our community as well, naked beauties on the front page of newspapers are of greater interest to the readers than stories about crimes committed by totalitarian regimes.

Meanwhile, we have our own line, our own life and problems and we shall not undertake to copy foreign and alien publications which some informals supporters of "uniform democracy" intend to create, hoping for disturbances in Moscow, Peter or Tallinn.

Life is going on normally, although not everything in it pleases us. However, if we want to improve it we must act. We must act with our own hands, head and heart.

At this point it would be suitable for those leaders of all kinds of organizations, who had been sent to Moscow or Leningrad, to think and see in those places the wild outbursts of gangsterism and the smoke-filled stalls, the lines for bread and trade discrimination against the "unregistered." Let them go to Kazan, Novosibirsk, and Sverdlovsk and in those same Kiev and Minsk and look with eyes free from ambition at everything which our journalists, whose job it is to travel outside Uzbekistan can see.

Or perhaps look without hatred at life in their own republic, how much more peaceful and better it is compared to other areas.

Let them look at what our working people have been able to achieve, led by their own Communist Party, which is trusted by the people although from the positions of today's critical way of life.

It would be worthwhile at this point to recall, once again, that it was only the ukases of I.A. Karimov, the president of Uzbekistan, the resolutions of the republic's government and the numerous political steps taken by the Uzbek Communist Party that make it possible constructively to resolve the accumulated problems. Putting an end to the growing of cotton as a single crop, the stabilization of cotton procurements and supplements paid for unginned cotton, aid to the low-income population and to war and labor invalids, free food to young school children, and to sick pregnant women, increased private plots to the rural population, housing and supplying them with loans, materials and feed for their animals, increased scholarships, concern for the quality of army service for our children, including the construction units on the territory of our district and, finally, the recently passed resolution on the reorganization of consumer services are among the many items included in the ukases of the president of Uzbekistan and the resolutions of governmental authorities.

All of this reflects the expectations of the people. If, along with the concern shown by the president of the republic, some of these problems also became the concern of the informal movements then, God willing, as the saying goes, let us jointly resolve these problems. It is hardly necessary to assign priorities as to who should be first and who should be second. Let us take their reputations into consideration. There is work enough for everyone, the more so since the "first" is familiar to the people and he alone can appreciate things properly. Meanwhile, beating of one's chest and shouting somewhere on the side as to how outstanding someone may be, and that everything that is being done to improve life in the republic and rescue its boys from army difficulties is exclusively the "merit of the informal leaders," forgive me, one can do this only if one has fever.

The more so since here, locally, no one can be misled: radical steps in solving the existing problems in the republic are being taken up by no one other than the Uzbek leadership. Even with the demand for an evaluation of the Osh events, the people of Birlik were late with their most recent actions in Moscow, for the political assessments of these events were demanded by the Uzbek delegates to the 28th CPSU Congress already then, at the congress. They raised this question at press conferences with foreign and Soviet journalists, and with the USSR KGB chairman, whose answer was also published in PRAVDA VOSTOKA and, finally, in the telegram sent by the president of Uzbekistan to the chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet on this subject, on the eve of the Supreme Soviet session, and not as a result of someone going on a hunger strike.

Many further steps have been taken by the leaders of the republic, the people's deputies and the representatives of

public organizations who raise with the center submit, on a principled basis, all the problems! Is this fact unknown to those who, in their ambitious zeal think of themselves as the only people who care about the destinies of the people? They know it. However, to acknowledge it means to acknowledge their practical uselessness which they embellish with shrill self-importance.

The aspiration to "displace" events in time and thus to prove the pressure which the informals apply on the resolutions made by our government is the origin of the lies meant for export, both to the rest of the country and abroad.

Interviews and talks are proper and it is a personal matter of where to go and who to talk to and on what topic.

How can some of them look at their own people if those same people ask them: For the sake of what are you doing all this? Why do you call white what is black and vice versa?

It is unlikely that sincere answers will be given to such questions, answers which are constructive, which unite the people for the sake of splendid objectives. The demand for "bread and circuses" is age-old. People must be fed and only then can they think of other things. This is both an economic and political principle.

While leading people away from work and from constructive efforts, we are offered above all entertainment—debates, meetings and hunger strikes. Some people may possibly believe that that is how they are helping perestroika.

There are those, however, whose aims are different.

Let us remember the meeting whose topic was "support of Gorbachev's perestroika." How was it "supported?"

Here are a few thoughts expressed by the speakers. "We must annul the results of the last elections to the republic's Supreme Soviet. Today the party is a sinking ship and we should swim away from it farther. The attitude toward the people displayed by the party and Soviet apparat is a fascist one. People going to mosques for services have been killed by military units made up of ethnic Russians. No one is defending Uzbekistan, for which reason we need a national army. Our children should not be allowed to join the present army. Whether a dog is white or black it is still a dog. We must demand the resignation of the entire apparat and then hold new elections under UN supervision."

Here are statements made later:

"Why do the Russians not go back to their homeland? Our main objective is the establishment of a national army. We reject a dialogue with the party. The other basic objective is secession of Uzbekistan from the USSR. We must struggle for the establishment of an Islamic party state. Let us unite all Central Asian republics within Turkestan."



This is not the complete list but even this shows that the difficulties of the people have been ignored and all that is left is their true face: the face of political adventurism.

Against such a background the question of what should come "first" in resolving the crucial problems of the republic becomes senseless.

But enough about this sham.

It will take a tremendous amount of effort for us—for the country, the party and the republic—to leave the crisis behind. We shall come out of it if we consolidate the healthy forces, abandon personal ambitions and get to work everywhere, from the parliament to the cotton fields.

Speaking of what matters most, how can this be accomplished?

The entire world knows that the Uzbek people have always, in sorrow and in joy, behaved with particular

respect toward other nations and nationalities, sacredly caring for fraternity and friendship among the peoples of the country. These are values which we must cherish sacredly and for which we must struggle. We must continue to strengthen unity among the Soviet people and create the type of moral and political atmosphere in which life in Uzbekistan will become ever better.

To criticize right and left today does not require great intelligence. The party itself is eliminating all "areas where criticism is forbidden." Shortcomings are plentiful.

Yet constructive suggestions are somehow lacking. We are convinced that such suggestions are bound to be closely considered by the republic's leadership and the Uzbek Communist Party. Therefore, we must strengthen the republic's political and state sovereignty and its economy, for the sake of the better life of the people and for all the ethnic groups in the republic.

**USSR Judicial System Reforms, Crime Problems Discussed**

91UN0204A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 2 Sep 90  
Morning Edition p 3

[Interview with Yu. Golik, chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Committee for Questions of Law and Order and the Struggle Against Crime, and Yu. Severin, RSFSR first deputy minister of justice, by Yu. Feofanov, observer of IZVESTIYA: "What Will Our Court Be Like"]

[Text] [Feofanov] It seems, a curious composition of participants was selected for the discussion. You, Yuriy Vladimirovich, you represent legislative power, Yuriy Dmitriyevich—executive power. The press is sometimes called the "fourth power." Nevertheless, I do not risk representing any power, but I act as no more than the leader. And our subject is the "third power," the judicial power. The goal is to create an independent court, subjected only to the law, which in a number of cases "putting into place" the two other powers. Do you believe that the new procedure of forming the judicial system will make it possible to attain this goal?

[Golik] No, I do not believe it. For the time being, I do not yet believe it. If, of course, we have in mind genuine independence, and not some emancipation from the tutelage of the Ministry of Justice or other authorities. You do not make the court independent through some legislative acts and a different election procedure. This depends, above all, on respect and self-respect. Who earlier were the most respected people? The teacher, the physician, and the judge. We have made these professions the least prestigious, we have driven them into the corner.

[Feofanov] But the judge is nevertheless a respected person. Or at least the judge of whom people are afraid.

[Golik] That is it. But from this it is far to independence. They fear the militiaman even more, but in what is the independence here? At the second session, we adopted laws on the status of judges, on responsibility for disrespect for the court, and the government raised the salary of judges. That was when a person told me: "That means, on the sly they raised the salaries of the punitive apparatus." Do you understand? The court is perceived exclusively as a repressive organ. The court—as the servant of power, and not as the "third power," which is equal to the two "first" and which, incidentally, in a certain sense must "judge" both legislative and executive authority.

[Severin] There is nothing surprising in this. The administrative system regarded the court as an integral part of itself, it did not even think that the court can defend the rights of the citizen against the government. This ate its way so much into the consciousness of the officials of the party and Soviet apparatus that they were incapable of treating the court in any other way. Hence the difficulties

in the organization of the elections and the selection of candidates. Worthy and honest people were elected to the oblast and republic Soviets. But by far not all understand the role of the court in the state. For this reason, the concept of "independent judge" is an abstraction of them. They look at summaries of "indicators," but, in my view, they see the judge as a person, as a special, unique mission in the state.

[Feofanov] But does this not depend on the law itself? More correctly, on the contradictions embodied in it? I would advance the following question for your discussion. Article 155 of the USSR Constitution reads: "The judges and people's assessors are independent and are subordinated only to the law." Precisely as if it were unequivocal. But—the end of Article 152 of the same Constitution: "Judges and people's assessors are responsible to the voters or the agencies that elected them, report to them, and may be recalled by them according to a procedure established by law." So what independence is it if they demand an answer, if they hold them to account, and, what is more, if they can remove them from work ("recall them"). As far as I know, in the civilized world judicial power least of all is subordinated to anyone. Judges occupy their posts for life, and if they do not become ill, if they do not commit any crimes—there are no reports, and no one recalls them. Not for nothing was the "third power" endowed, if one can say so, with special permanency: I think in order for no command system to extend its tentacles to the court: He is irremovable and thereby protected. Ten years in our country is also a decent term—but they can call [judges] to account, hold them responsible.

[Golik] As regards any accountability of judges and courts—this is a norm of the past. One which is incompatible with the rule-of-law state. But, unfortunately, even legislators themselves, who are building our legal society, do not understand this. When a candidate for chairman of the Supreme Court was discussed at the session, I came out against the formulation that the USSR Supreme Court renders an account of itself before parliament. I suggested: Once every six months, the chairman of the Supreme Court provides information to the deputies. Information, no more. They corrected me from the hall: "renders an account of itself." I insisted on my position. It did not pass. During the recess deputy colleagues came up to me and simply were perplexed: How is this, we elected the Supreme Court, and he does not render an account of itself before us? Where, they said, is the logic?

[Feofanov] For this reason, remember, they included the courts also in the provisional committees for the struggle against crime.

[Golik] Fortunately, these committees were left to die. But I would go further. Here you made mention of the life-long appointment of judges. I am impressed by this idea. True, with one correction. It is necessary to think out a system of, so to speak, qualified supervision for lifelong judges. But what? In a number of countries,

qualification examinations are held. But as soon as he receives a lifelong office, he ceases to read the codes.

[Severin] I share the idea of excluding from the law any accountability of judges: Before the Soviet, before the population, or before the labor collective. Naturally, I am talking about the professional side of the matter, and not about the moral side. In his professional activity, the judge renders an account of himself only before the law and his conscience. Anything else means dependence, command. But this we have already gone through, as you know. And there must not be any loop-holes or logical justifications. They elected them for 10 years—and that is all! The power of the Soviet over the court has ended. They have become equal branches of state power, each with its own functions, each independent of the other. But to make a note concerning the periodic provision of information about the court's activity—this is completely correct.

[Feofanov] From theory, however, let us go over to practice. The Soviet elects the judges, moreover the higher one. But how is this realized in practice? You see, the elections are already coming to an end. One needs to take into account that the elections of judges are special elections. Professional lawyers should become candidates. They were elected by deputies of the Soviet, who are often from jurisprudence. How did they assess the professional merits of the candidates? You agree: A strict judge is by no means necessarily a bad one. You see, besides the "indicators," a judge must also have such qualities as adherence to principles, incorruptibility, staunchness in legal convictions, which sometimes run counter to public opinion. Meanwhile, there are many cases where the deputies looked least of all at the qualifications of the judges, failed to take into account the opinion of the qualification commission, but simply settled old scores.

[Golik] Yes, to elect a judge is not simple. Here you do not say in the election campaign: I put so many in prison. Incidentally, in civil cases two sides dispute, and one will always be dissatisfied. And what can one say about the convicted persons? But meanwhile I heard of cases where the deputies made inquiries to the Bar in regard to candidates. Moreover, among the convicts they studied "public opinion." This is already not within any gateways, as they say.

I think that those who nominate judges, that is the deputies of the Soviet, must be above passions coming from noisy cases. I am frightened by considerations in the election of judges that reflect the current situation. And there have been and are such considerations. But we also need to look ahead. Here it is the turn of the Ministry of Justice and its organ to have their say. Their role is to cultivate a court corps, to select, and to look after lawyers from the time they are students. You see, judges—this is a special profession. For it, a knowledge of the laws is not enough, there is also a need for humanity and compassion. You do not elicit this through questionnaires. At the session candidates must

be presented who are almost indisputable. This is not the appointment of a bureaucrat [chinovnik]: One did not suit, let us at once call out another. It is important to exclude the emotions. And indeed, someone at the session shouts: "But he gave two years for a murder"—and they fail to elect him. Although, it is possible, in a given case, two years are a lot for murder.

[Severin] Indeed, why murder. At a session of the Maritime Kray Soviet, a deputy gets up and says: "Judge Molchanov is not suitable, he did not decide a labor case correctly." Someone was not reinstated at work, probably an acquaintance of the deputy. It was a good thing that the judge had the decision of the higher court at hand, which confirmed the legality of the decision.

If we talk about the procedure for the recommendation of candidates and about the election campaign, the law introduced qualified collegia of judges. These are qualified public-professional organizations of the judges themselves. Our Ministry of Justice candidate takes an examination before us, and only after this they recommend him for the Soviet. I should say that in many places the deputies show maturity. Let us say, in Northern Ossetia they rejected four of our candidates, taking into account their civic positions and their sense of justice. And they were right: We nominated unworthy candidates, this should be recognized.

But there are also still many emotions. In Maritime Kray and in Moscow, for example, they almost advanced the slogan: To replace all the old judges, they say they are the pupils of the command system and the children of stagnation. Replace them—with whom? With chaste students? I am already not talking about the fact that there were courageous judges in the most dismal times. Incidentally, Stalin circumvented the court with its mandatory procedure—he created the secret "troikas" and "special conferences." But this by the way. The court is thus being seriously rejuvenated. At present, the judges in the people's courts of the RSFSR with three years of service account for 37 percent, the number with more than 10 years of service decreased from 34 to 21 percent, in the oblast courts—from 71 to 26 percent.

[Feofanov] I would not call this positive. All the same, judges must be, as they say, grown wise with life experience.

[Severin] The natural replacement of cadres is under way: We are getting older. But it is alarming when the experienced nucleus leaves. The deputies of the Soviet should keep this in mind.

[Feofanov] And concerning the polls of the convicts?

[Severin] As scientific, sociological research, why, . . . them carry it out. But if they put the polls before the deputies, they will only introduce turmoil. I completely reject the innovation of the deputies of the Moscow City Soviet: They turned to the city college of advocates with a request for an assessment of the judges. That way one can obtain not so much an objective assessment as a

subjective compromising one [kompromat]. No, the matter is too serious. It is necessary to follow the path established by the law: The organs of justice—qualified collegia of judges—committees of the Soviet—the Soviet itself.

[Feofanov] Everywhere around us people talk about alternative elections. Such suggestions I heard with respect to judges as well. Well, let us imagine a fine judge, about 20 years old, occupying his chair. To say that the majority of the convicted send them him thanks from the [labor] colonies is risky, you agree. In civil cases, we have already said, one of the parties will certainly be dissatisfied. But an alternative candidate has not yet sentenced a single person, he has only just completed a diploma on the humaneness of jurisprudence. Who will be victorious in such alternative elections? One can suppose. But then why they, the alternative [candidates]?

[Golik] I would divide this question into "today" and "tomorrow." To talk about the alternative election of judges today is naive. First of all, there are simply not enough judges (Yu. Severin: In Tula Oblast they could not find 10 persons, and in Moscow Oblast—12, to recommend to the Soviet). But this is nevertheless not the main thing. On the basis of what parameters will we nominate alternative candidates for sessions of the Soviet? If there would only be two names?

[Feofanov] It seems to me, alternative elections of a deputy, minister, and even President are logical. But judges? In many countries judges are not elected, they are appointed by kings or presidents.

[Golik] But we have a law, and it is necessary within the limits of the possible to use it in the most clever manner possible. An experienced judge always has fewer chances to get through than a young lawyer.

[Severin] In principle I agree. But there is also no need to exclude alternativeness. In 14 cases, with more or less equal qualities, we ourselves recommended alternative candidates to the Soviets. But the deputies, too, manifest activeness and maturity. Thus, in the Mary Republic the deputies nominated their candidate for the post of chairman of the court: A member of the Supreme Court, a Mary by nationality. A worthy man and a competent jurist.

[Feofanov] Let us now [talk] about tomorrow. I am talking to you, Yuriy Vladimirovich, as to a legislator. Do you not regard it as necessary to change the law in such a direction so as for the post of judge, an ordinary rayon judge, to become the pinnacle of the dreams of a lawyer: A large salary, a large apartment, but in so doing—an obligatory 10-12 year length of service in the procuracy, the Bar, or in investigation. The purpose of the recommendation is the same: In the post of judge there must be a heap of competitors. Then the Soviet will really make a choice.

[Golik] I think, the law will change in the direction of strengthening the position of the judge. But here about "the pinnacle of dreams" for every lawyer.... With this, I do not agree. To judge is a peculiar thing. Some like investigation, someone is a born detective. I believe, judging is a special quality of activity: A judge should have the inclination to scrutinize the fate of people, even their squabbles, to strive to understand the action, to see in the defendant the man, and only then the criminal. In order for him to be able to be better oriented, it is perhaps worthwhile to raise the years to a five-year age qualification? Let the future judge work somewhere these five years.

[Feofanov] As an investigator, as a lawyer....

[Golik] No, no, somewhere. The point is that during the work in these organs there takes place what I would call "professional deformation." For a judge this deformation is extremely dangerous. Let him work wherever he likes, even if he hammers in spikes in the BAM [Baykal-Amur Main Rail Line], only as long as he is among different people and has close contact with them.

[Severin] But let BAM take care of BAM! All the same, vocational training must be "on the level." According to the law, a candidate for people's judge must have two years of legal work service, a candidate for oblast judge—no less than five years of work in a rayon court.

[Feofanov] Judges had their salaries raised. Do you not think, Yuriy Vladimirovich, that the salary of a judge should all the same be still higher?

[Golik] I am convinced. Not only among jurists, but also among all state employees, the judge must be distinguished by their position. Let him not look down on others, but people should look up to him from below. He is "the third power."

[Severin] It is still very far to this. Here I will cite you an example, from Kuybyshev. The deputy chairman of the gorispolkom sent the court an ultimatum. The point was that before the court had recognized as ineffective an order for an apartment issued by the ispolkom. Here this document appeared, read it: "If in the future the court will decide cases in this manner, then let the four judges who need apartments not count on them."

[Golik] I frequently have the occasion to hear: "Since when is Soviet power being called into court as the defendant? Why is this being done in our country? What have we come to!...." Such are the problems with the feeling for law and order.

[Feofanov] But since July, the courts are considering suits of citizens not only against official plaintiffs but also against the organs of administration, and against the very government—this cannot be excluded. But are the courts ready for this? Will they not simply be timid in the presence of such "parties"?

[Severin] The process, the mandatory ritual comes to the aid of the court. From it there is nowhere to go. And the



representative of the government will be obliged to occupy the platform as the defendant. Will the judge be equal to the task? It is difficult to say. Unfortunately, at the present time, even before the procurator he is sometimes timid.

[Golik] Also bad is the fact that our brother, the people's deputy, does not remember what a court is. Recently I have met with many court representatives. And everyone showed me a bundle of letters from people's deputies. "I believe that this case should be decided..."—and further [the deputy] advises how to decide the case. I meet with the deputy and ask him: "On what basis did you write?" "I talked with my constituent," he says.

[Severin] The qualification collegium in Kalinin did not recommend Judge Kharlamova: Lacking in self-control, unnecessarily emotional. And suddenly a letter from a USSR deputy: I ask that the decision be abolished and that Kharlamova be recommended, since my constituents believe that this is an attempt to get rid of an honest and principled judge. We carefully verified everything and considered the decision of the qualification collegium to be correct. But does the deputy really not understand that his interference disorganizes the elections?

[Golik] I think that the judge must be completely delivered from such qualities as "class feeling," "proletarian consciousness..." If such an "ideology" exists in his consciousness, he is no "judge."

[Feofanov] Yes, as if all this had receded into the past.

[Golik] But the meetings stir up these stereotypes, which are far from having sunk into oblivion. Other meetings, it seems, are ready to pronounce sentence. On the judge included—for a decision that is disagreeable to the meeting. This is where the judge must be staunch.

[Severin] Do you know for what reason they recommended at a session of one Soviet not to elect a judge? He had examined a case connected with a non-sanctioned meeting. . . .

In many places elections of judges have already been held, somewhere they have not yet been held.

As is evident, not everything in this process is so smooth. The formation of the "third power" proves to be a laborious and conflictual matter.

#### **Correctional Labor Colony Strikes Over Demands**

RU N0204B Moscow *RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA*  
in Russian 31 Aug 90 p 4

[Article by S. Sadoshenko, *RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA*'s own correspondent: "Strike in a Correctional Labor Colony"]

[Text] And again a conflict situation in the Sinebnikovskiy Strict Regime Correctional Labor Colony. In

January of the current year, a number of convicts here seized hostages and demanded weapons and an automobile. At present the events are unfolding peacefully.

In this Correctional Labor Colony, 1,300 convicts—murderers, robbers, rapists, and drug addicts are serving their sentences. Almost half of them have ended up behind barbed wire for the second time, but there are also those who have 6 to 10 previous convictions.

On 27 August a large part of the prisoners declared a strike and refused to go out to work—to make seating frames for Zaporozhe automobiles, springs, fans, and spare parts for combines—and sent two packets of demands to the local and republic authorities.

The convicts demand that the norms of detainment in the correctional labor colony be brought in conformity with international requirements, that a by-the-hour work week be established, etc. One of the basic demands—to completely remove the medical service from the Ministry of Internal Affairs system and to consider those convicted for the use of narcotics not as criminals, but as people who are ill.

At present there are representatives of the Ukrainian SSR Ministry of Internal Affairs and the oblast procuracy, as well as people's deputies, in the Sinebnikovskiy Correctional Labor Colony, who will have to settle the conflict.

#### **USSR MVD Commentary on Need To Upgrade Technology**

RU N01984 Moscow *CHLOVEK I ZAKON*  
in Russian No 9, Sep 90 pp 15-17

[Commentary by B. Mikhaylov, colonel of internal service, candidate of juridical sciences: "Commentary from the Press Center of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs"]

[Text] One of the essential elements in restructuring both preliminary investigation as well as operational work is the provision of a foundation of evidence and proof when investigating criminal cases. This must be based on the achievements of scientific and technical progress.

It is precisely this which determines the role and place of the Specialized Criminal Law and Technology Service. It occupies a prominent place within the service system of the MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs].

The Specialized Criminal Law and Technology subdivisions have at their disposal quite a wide assortment of technical means, comprising about 400 models and brands. They range from sets of equipment for examining the sites where events have occurred and investigatory instruments to a complex, analytical apparatus which allows us to investigate and study the tiniest particles of substances and materials which might constitute items of material evidence. The methods of

criminal law and technology utilized by the internal-affairs organs are on a par with the analogous achievements of the developed foreign countries. This has been confirmed by exchanges of experience and by the participation of Soviet specialists in international symposiums devoted to criminal law and technology.

The sphere of activity engaged in by the criminal law and technology sub-divisions with regard to the fight against crime in our country is quite diverse: introducing proposals for crime prevention, participating as specialists in investigatory activities and operational-search measures, producing expert opinions, and participating as specialists or experts when cases are tried in court.

An example of this service's preventive activity can be provided by the proposals made by the USSR MVD Specialized Criminal Law and Technology Service to the USSR Sberbank [Savings Bank] concerning a new method for protection against the forgery of blank checkbooks. The specialists noted that in several of the country's republics, krays, and oblasts checkbooks forged by one and the same method had begun to come to their attention for expert advice. Subsequent analysis of all these instances, conducted jointly with Sberbank staff members, showed that the problem of discovering forged checkbooks, as well as providing reliable protection for these payments documents, are topical, urgent matters for the normal functioning of this country's banking institutions. In this connection, the advice furnished by the criminal law specialists and technologists proved to be extremely necessary and timely.

The utilization of the special skills and know-how of the experts in criminal law and technology is also a great help in the direct discovery and investigation of specific crimes.

In June 1989, while the luggage-rack of a taxi was being loaded in the city of Minsk, a policeman standing alongside the car's headlights noticed a passenger behaving suspiciously. Upon checking his papers, it was ascertained that the man was a military construction worker, a private in the SA [Soviet Army], who was AWOL from his service post. During the course of the investigative actions a checkup was carried out in those population centers which he had visited while absent from his military unit. Based on information from these population centers regarding thefts presumably committed by a military serviceman, a check was made of the suspect's fingerprints. As a result, three thefts were discovered from stores in Latvia, and in Vitebsk Oblast, as well as four thefts of auto parts in the city of Minsk. And so the "tour" of this "strolling player" was cut short.

The high level of operational results achieved by the investigative apparatus in the unit concerned with providing proof of a suspect's guilt has recently been linked more and more frequently with the potentials of the Specialized Criminal Law and Technology Service. Thus, for example, in August 1989 staff members of the OBBKhSS [Division for the Struggle Against Theft of

Socialist Property and Speculation], while investigating the sales of pieces of wire and gray, metallic powder, arrested a certain Golosov, a scientific staff associate at one of the scientific research institutes in the city of Minsk. When interrogated, he denied that the items taken from him contained precious metal. The staff members of the Probirnaya Inspectorate were unable to confirm the version given by the policemen concerning the presence of platinum in the items which had been taken, inasmuch as these staff members lacked the methods for assaying the samples for this metal.

Experts of the Belorussian SSR MVD who had such equipment at their disposal were able [sic] to solve the problem regarding the presence of platinum in the objects under study. However, from various scientific sources they well knew the possibilities of using the method of a microstructural, spectrum analysis with the help of an electronic scanning microscope having an X-ray attachment. Their knowledge of this method and the instrument center at one of the republic's scientific production associations allowed them to establish the presence of platinum, as well as alloys, in the sample from the items taken from Golosov. This, in turn, enabled the investigators to discover the method whereby precious metal was being obtained from the stolen parts of electronic instruments or components (chips, transistors, etc.).

In April 1989 the citizens Metreveli and Merzikashvili, with the aim of committing theft, broke down a day and entered an apartment in a building located on the Pervomayskiy Embankment in the city of Kalinin. When they came out of the apartment with the stolen items, they caught sight of some non-departmental or supernumerary guards, and they rushed back. The sound of glass being broken was heard. Upon examining the courtyard of this multi-story apartment building, investigators discovered and removed a Parabellum pistol. A study by the experts subsequently ascertained that this weapon had on it microscopic particles of window glass, as well as microscopic fibers which were identical in kind and in their composition to the fabric of Merzikashvili's pants and jacket and to Metreveli's pullover jersey.

At the same time I would like to note that, as of today, possibilities of the Specialized Criminal Law and Technology Service cannot fully satisfy the constantly growing requirements of the practical work of stepping up the fight against crime. Also influencing the results are the insufficient personnel staffing of this service and the need to raise the degree of professionalism and improve the technical outfitting with up-to-date apparatus, etc.

Thus, the number of specialized criminal law and technology sub-divisions of the internal-affairs organs at the present time is such that, when the workload is heavy, the specialists are capable of investigating scarcely half of the crimes in which their participation is needed. According to statistical data, for each staff member in the Specialized Criminal Law and Technology Service

there is the following average number of crimes being investigated: in Bulgaria—170, the CSSR—128, the FRG—180, and in the USSR—381, and that includes only those handled by the UR [Criminal Investigation] and the BKhSS [Struggle Against the Theft of Socialist Property and Speculation].

Serving as the principal center for training highly skilled experts for the internal-affairs organs is the Department at the USSR MVD Higher School in the city of Volgograd. It graduates only 100 specialists a year, whereas the need for them is at least 200 a year.

Precipitous technical progress has led to the rapid obsolescence of equipment, and the appearance of new models with increasingly greater possibilities. In connection with this factor, what is required is a constant renovation of apparatus, including that obtained by purchasing a considerable amount of imported analytical equipment which have no analogous counterparts in our country. The need to acquire foreign equipment has been brought about by the necessity of keeping the achievements of our country's specialized criminal law and technology up to the world level and, in the final analysis, to successfully fight against crime and to upgrade the guarantees of protecting citizens from errors of the investigation and the courts. All this requires considerable monetary expenditures, including those in hard currency, of which the police so far have only a limited amount at their disposal.

In conclusion, it must be emphasized that, with regard to the unsolved problems, the appropriate proposals have been introduced by the USSR MVD for consideration by the competent levels, and these proposals are at various stages of being solved.

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#### **Planned Reorganization of RSFSR MVD Departments Described**

9JUN02034 Moscow SOVIETSKAYA ROSSIYA  
in Russian 18 Sep 90 Second Edition p 2

[Interview with Viktor Pavlovich Barannikov, RSFSR minister of internal affairs, by V. Lyashenko: "Police Reorganization: The Minister Proposes a Program"]

[Text] Nowadays the Russian Federation's internal affairs organs are on the threshold of abrupt changes. What we are talking about, in essence, is a radical reform in the work of this republic's MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs], a fundamental revision of its methods and style and a new approach to the most important law-enforcement problems. Discussion of the new operational concept for the USSR MVD was the principal focus of attention of a recently held session of this ministry's collegium. Taking part in its work were the following persons: N.S. Silayev, chairman, RSFSR Council of Ministers; V.I. Bakatin, USSR minister of internal affairs,

and the leading officials of all the MVD's and UVD's [internal affairs administrations] in this republic....

Today we are interviewing V.P. Barannikov, the Russian Federation's minister of internal affairs.

[V. Lyashenko] Viktor Pavlovich, what is it, after all, that has caused such a decisive break?

[V.P. Barannikov] Let me reply unambiguously: life has compelled it. It is no secret that the complex social, economic, and political which are taking place in society these days are also exerting serious influence on the situation giving rise to crime in this republic. Judge for yourself: during the last six months alone the total number of crimes increased by more than 14 percent, whereas the number of serious crimes went up by more than 20 percent. The crime level in the RSFSR is one of the highest among the Union republics; the Russian Federation accounts for about 70 percent of all the crimes registered in the entire country. In order to break this dangerous trend of escalating violence, we must reorganize ourselves and concentrate our forces on the main lines.

[V. Lyashenko] But just how is the restructuring in the work of the RSFSR MVD and its sub-divisions to be expressed in specific terms?

[V.P. Barannikov] First of all, what we are talking about is a new status for this republic's MVD organs and sub-divisions, as well as creating new structures and new principles for their activities. The First Congress of the RSFSR People's Deputies proclaimed Russia's sovereignty, and we in our present-day work are, naturally proceeding from the decisions which were taken by the Russian Congress and Supreme Soviet. In accordance with that, the RSFSR MVD is subordinate solely to the RSFSR Council of Ministers, and the ministry's powers are being significantly expanded.

[V. Lyashenko] What does that mean—"are being significantly expanded"? To the edges of what framework? To what limits?

[V.P. Barannikov] That means that virtually all the powers with regard to administering the Federation's internal affairs organs must now be shifted by the Union-level ministry to the competence of the RSFSR MVD. This includes all organizational-structural and personnel matters, as well as the organization (fully) of operational-service and economic activities. For example, the RSFSR MVD must now take over the task of meting out punishments by the institutions located in the territory of the RSFSR, the financial, material, and technical support of all the MVD's and UVD's in the Russian Federation....

However, I am not going to weary you by enumerating these expanded powers. Let me just say that a great deal of active work is now being done with regard to precisely specifying the competency and functions of the RSFSR MVD.

[V. Lyashenko] But on just what principles will your relations with the Union-level organizations and, above all, with the USSR MVD now be based?

[V.P. Barannikov] That question was also discussed in detail at the session of the ministry's expanded collegium. The need for a permanent and mandatory cooperation with the Union-level MVD is obvious; the reports and documents of the RSFSR Congress and Supreme Soviet cast no doubts on this. It is another matter when it comes to the need to built cooperatively on the basis of agreeing to set limits of competence and the mutual obligations of the parties involved. This pertains, for example, to the leadership of the internal troops, the special police sub-divisions, and so forth...

But, of course, the closest cooperation between the ministries must be in the discovery of crimes which are inter-regional and international in their nature, in apprehending criminals and person, for whom an All-Union warrant has been declared, and in eliminating the consequences of natural disasters, major accidents, and catastrophes.... And, in general, we are engaged in working in one, common cause. In any event, at the present time, taking into account the proposals which we are setting forth, a mutual understanding has arisen between the USSR MVD and the RSFSR MVD. And I would like to believe that this process will move forward without any great complications.

[V. Lyashenko] And what about relations between your ministry and, let us say, the internal affairs organs of the autonomous republics, krais, and oblasts? Proceeding from the documents of the Russian Congress, the autonomous units, krais, and oblasts should, after all, also obtain a specific independence, should they not?

[V.P. Barannikov] Yes, in our concept of restructuring the work of the MVD's Russian organs, we are proceeding on the basis that a considerable portion of the powers and functions of the RSFSR MVD should be handed over to the localities, to the autonomous republics, krais, and oblasts.... It seems to us that they should be fully and absolutely in charge of, for example, the patrol-and-guardpost service, the highway-patrol service, guarding facilities and residences, and firefighting sub-divisions.... Such a demarcation of functions, in the final analysis, will naturally and logically lead to the creation of a local, or, as people say, a municipal police force.

[V. Lyashenko] What is new on the leading edge, on the front of the fight against the sharks of the shady economy, the bandits and killers, in the fight against the illegal drug business, and with everything that we call the "world of crime"? Certainly these things cannot be left under a dual system of subordination....

[V.P. Barannikov] Yes, of course, you are right. Here, in contrast, we must decisively overcome the present-day intra-departmental divisiveness. With this goal in mind, we are proposing to merge all the present-day operational services into a single, integrated service—the criminal police. That is to say, we would bring together

all the existing forces into a unified, powerful, well-equipped bloc. At the same time, we would set up an operational-investigation bureau of criminal police. This sub-division—together with its own colleagues in the localities—would wage an offensive fight at the leading edge which you mentioned.

And there is another innovation. We plan to create a service to provide organizational and legal support. Its functions will include analytical work, planning, and "fine-tuning" the cooperation between the MVD and the other law-enforcement organs for the purpose of making forecasts, sociological studies.

We likewise deem it as a matter of fundamental importance to create a service for corrective matters and social rehabilitation. I probably do not need to "decipher" or interpret its functions—we all know how matters stand with regard to correcting convicts and socially rehabilitating those persons sentenced by the courts.

[V. Lyashenko] And now, Viktor Pavlovich, something about those people who work in the internal affairs organs.... We endlessly read about the personnel turnover, social lack of protection, and loss of prestige among MVD staff members.

[V.P. Barannikov] Yes, that is all true. And we need to put an end to this kind of thing as quickly as possible, we must lay a foundation of universal humanistic principles in our personnel policy. This means a bit less careerism or a "service mentality," and a bit more of the simplest, most elementary concern for people. We consider that these matters too should be regulated by legislation. For example, the length of the work day, compensations for the intensity of the work, for working on what would normally be days off and on holidays, for the loss of one's health, and the establishing of time periods of service.

At the expanded collegium a proposal was introduced to establish an occupational association of internal affairs staff members, our own kind of sectorial trade union. If this proposal finds support in the localities, then we will immediately proceed to implement it. And why would it not find support? It has to find support.

[V. Lyashenko] What crimes nowadays would you single out as among the very worst?

[V.P. Barannikov] If we are to judge by the criterion of quantity, then, of course, it would be crimes against property, and ranking first—thefts of personal property. But if we judge by trends, if we are to look, so to speak, into the criminal future.... There is present a precipitously changing criminal situation in the economic sphere. It is no secret to anyone that the shadow or underground economy nowadays has become organizationally strong and is operating in a number of instances like a well-adjusted mechanism. Regional groups of underground "wheeler-dealers" are becoming more and more frequently directly connected with state sources for obtaining supplies; they sometimes have solid though



corrupt ties in state administrative organs, including, it must be confessed, those in the law-enforcement field.

And to the present-day, so to speak, "classical" machinations, we must add some fundamentally new types and forms of economic crimes—embezzling monetary funds with the help of unsecured credits, creating "puffed up" or "inflated" joint enterprises and cooperatives, "laundering" money, and so forth. They simply cannot fail to appear under the conditions whereby a multi-faceted economy is forming a reality, when the country is making a transition to market-type relations, when there is a strong emergence of shareholding societies, joint enterprises, and banks.

We are restructuring precisely because the MVD organs are not yet fully prepared for such a turn of events. No matter how bitter it may be to acknowledge this, we do not hold the initiative nowadays in the fight against organized crime. And we cannot take this initiative into our own hands without decisively changing, for example, the strategy and tactics of our operational-investigative work. It is obvious even to the untrained eye, for example, that the BKhSS [Struggle Against Theft of Socialist Property and Speculation], its present-day structure has proved to be unprepared for operating under the new conditions, and, even more so, is not carrying out its own tasks under the conditions whereby market conditions are a reality. Here is the way things stand now: We must attack crime rather than have it attack us, as is frequently the case these days. But to do this, I repeat, it is necessary to see to it as quickly as possible that all the MVD services are fully up to the complicated tasks which confront them. We are supported in this by Russia's Supreme Soviet and Council of Ministers.

#### USSR MVD Press Report on Prison Tensions

91UN0203B Moscow MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA  
in Russian 15 Aug 90 p 1

[Report by V. Gulyayev, chief, USSR MVD GUID: "Crisis in the Zones Grows Worse: A Press Conference in the USSR MVD"]

[Text] One out of every three persons released from places of incarceration commits another crime. V. Gulyayev, chief, USSR MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] GUID [Main Administration for Corrective Activity], reported on this situation yesterday.

In recent times the situation in the corrective-labor colonies has become sharply worse. There has been a five-fold increase in the number of hostages seized and attacks on staff personnel. Some 126 ITU [Corrective-Labor Administration] staff members and military service personnel have already been killed or wounded. Mutual relations between the personnel staff in these zones and the convicts have reached a stage of open hostility. A significant role in the situation which has evolved has been played by the conditions under which the "zeks" [convicts] serve out their sentences.

The USSR MVD has worked out a concept for reforming the criminal-executive system which it proposes to implement during the next few years. First of all, the specialists consider that the conditions of incarceration should not inflict harm or damage to people's physical or psychological health.

It is no secret that former zeks constitute the majority of the large army of homeless and vagrants. And it is not their fault that they cannot obtain housing or jobs for years after leaving the zone. It is for this reason that the reform concept envisions legislative regulation for a system of adapting the convicts to a life of freedom; it also provides economic motivation, i.e., incentives for enterprises to give jobs to such ex-convicts. And in order that a prisoner not lose contacts with his family and friends, he should serve out his sentence in the same general region where he used to live. This, by the way, will allow us to reduce the considerable outlays spent on transporting prisoners.

#### Amendments to Belorussian Criminal Code

91UN0206A Minsk SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA  
in Russian 18 Aug 90 p 3

[Law of the Belorussian SSR: "On Changes in and Additions to the Belorussian SSR Criminal Procedures Code"]

[Text] In connection with the 10 April 1990 USSR Law on Changes in and Additions to the Basic Principles of Criminal Judicial Procedures of the USSR and the Union Republics, the Supreme Soviet of the Belorussian Soviet Socialist Republic decrees:

To make the following changes in and additions to the 29 December 1960 Belorussian SSR Criminal Procedures Code (Belorussian SSR Collected Laws, 1961, No 1, Art 5; 1970, No 12, Art 147; 1972, No 21, Art 331; 1983, No 27, Art 445):

1. To word articles 14, 49, 50, 51, 52 and 53 as follows:

#### "Article 14. Ensuring a Suspect, an Accused Person and a Defendant the Right to Defense

"A suspect, accused person and defendant have the right to defense.

"The person who conducts the initial investigation, the investigator, the procurator and the court are required to provide a suspect, accused person or defendant the opportunity to defend himself with means and methods established by law, and also to ensure the protection of his personal and property rights."

#### "Article 49. The Defense Attorney's Participation in Criminal Procedures

"The defense attorney is admitted to participate in a case from the moment that charges are brought.

"In the event that a person suspected of committing a crime is arrested, all measures to ensure his appearance are applied to him in the form of his being placed in custody until charges can be brought, the defense attorney is admitted to participation in the case from the moment that an official notice of his detention or a decree on the use of this measure is presented to the person, but no later than 24 hours from the moment of arrest or placement in custody.

"Defense attorneys may be lawyers, representatives of public organizations concerned with the affairs of those organizations' members, or, by a ruling of the person conducting the initial investigation, the investigator, procurator or judge, or by a ruling of the court—other persons.

"One and the same person may not be the defense attorney for two suspects, accused persons, or defendants, if the interests of the defense of one are contrary to the other's interests.

"The person in charge of the legal consultation bureau, or the presidium of the college of lawyers is required promptly, but no later than 24 hours from the moment of request, to designate a lawyer to handle the defense of a suspect, accused person or defendant. The head of the legal consultation bureau or the presidium of the college of lawyers, as well as the agency handling initial and preliminary investigation, the procurator, and the court under which the case is being processed, have the right, according to procedures stipulated in USSR and Belorussian SSR legislation, to relieve a suspect, accused person or defendant fully or partially of paying for legal assistance. In the event that such relief is provided, payment for the defense attorney's work is made to the head of the legal consultation bureau or the presidium of the college of lawyers out of the funds of the college of lawyers or, in other cases, out of budget funds.

"According to procedures determined by the Belorussian SSR Council of Ministers, expenditures to pay for the work of lawyers are also charged to the budget in the event that a lawyer has taken part in the initial and preliminary investigation and the trial by appointment. In this case the compensation of the state's expenditures may be charged to a convicted person.

#### **"Article 50. The Invitation, Appointment and Replacement of the Defense Attorney**

"From among the persons indicated in Article 49 of this law, a defense attorney is invited by a suspect, accused person or defendant, or by their legal representatives, or by other persons on the instructions of or with the consent of the suspect, accused person or defendant.

"At the request of a suspect, accused person or defendant, the defense attorney's participation is provided for by the person conducting the initial investigation, the investigator, procurator or the court

"In cases in which the participation of the defense attorney chosen by a suspect, accused person or defendant is impossible for more than 72 hours from the moment that such a request is made, and in the case of arrest, within 24 hours from the time of the arrest, the person conducting the initial investigation, the investigator, procurator or the court has the right to propose that the suspect, accused person or defendant invite another defense attorney, or to supply him with a defense attorney through the legal consultation office.

#### **"Article 51. The Mandatory Participation of a Defense Attorney**

"The participation of a defense attorney is mandatory in judicial proceedings in the following cases:

"1) in which a procurator or public prosecutor takes part.

"2) involving minors.

"3) involving the mute, deaf, blind and other persons who by virtue of physical or mental impairment cannot themselves exercise their right to a defense.

"4) involving persons not speaking the language in which the judicial proceedings are taking place.

"5) involving persons accused of committing crimes for which the punishment may be capital punishment.

"6) involving persons whose interests are in conflict with one another, if at least one of them has a defense attorney.

"The participation of a defense attorney is also mandatory in carrying out the initial and preliminary investigations in cases stipulated in points 2, 3 and 4 of this article from the moment indicated in the first and second parts of Article 49 of this code, and in the case specified by Point 5 of this article—from the moment that a charge is lodged.

"The person conducting the initial investigation, the investigator, the procurator and the court have the right to deem the participation of a defense attorney necessary in other cases if they believe that the complexity of the case and other circumstances may make it difficult for a suspect, accused person or defendant to exercise his right to a defense.

"If, in cases specified in this law in which the participation of a defense attorney is mandatory, a defense attorney is not invited by the suspect, accused person or defendant himself, or by his legal representative or other persons at his instruction or with his consent, the person conducting the initial investigation, the investigator, the procurator or the court is required to provide for the participation of a defense attorney in the case.

#### **"Article 52. The Refusal of Defense**

"A suspect, accused person or defendant has the right at any moment in the processing of his case to refuse a defense attorney. Such a refusal is permitted only at the

initiative of the suspect, accused person or defendant himself and cannot be an obstacle to the continuing participation in the case of the procurator or public prosecutor, or—by the same token—of the defense attorneys of other suspects, accused persons or defendants.

"The refusal of a defense attorney in cases stipulated in points 2-5 of Article 51 of this code is not binding on the court or, correspondingly, on the person conducting the initial investigation, the investigator, or the procurator.

"If a petition to this effect has been made prior to the beginning of the judicial investigation, it is in all cases subject to satisfaction. A petition regarding the participation of a defense attorney that is made in the course of the judicial investigation is resolved by the court taking the circumstances of the case into consideration, and in the interests of ensuring the defendant's right to defense.

#### "Article 53. The Defense Attorney's Duties and Rights

"The defense attorney is required to utilize all means and methods of defense indicated in the law for the purposes of identifying circumstances that exonerate a suspect, accused person or defendant, or mitigate his liability, and to render them the necessary legal assistance.

"From the moment that he is admitted to participation in a case, the defense attorney has the right: to be present during the formal charging, to take part in the interrogation of a suspect or accused person and also in other investigative actions conducted with their participation; to take part in the judicial hearing of the case; to present evidence; to file petitions; to make challenges; and to lodge complaints against the actions and decisions of the person conducting the initial investigation, the investigator, the procurator and the court. After the charges have been formally made, the defense attorney has the right to hold private meetings with the accused without any restriction on their number or duration.

"A defense attorney who is present during the conduct of investigative action has the right, with the permission of the person conducting the initial investigation, investigator or court, to put questions to the suspect, accused person or defendant, a witness, a victim, an expert or a specialist.

"The defense attorney has the right to make written critical observations concerning the incorrectness or incompleteness of notes in the formal record of an investigative action.

"The person conducting the initial investigation, the investigator or the court may refuse to answer the defense attorney's questions but is required to enter the questions to which answers have been denied in the formal record.

"The defense attorney does not have the right to make public information reported to him in connection with his carrying out of the defense. The defense attorney is held liable in accordance with the Belorussian SSR

Criminal Code for making public information from the initial or preliminary investigation.

"A lawyer does not have the right to abandon a defense that he has accepted of a suspect, accused person or defendant."

2. To eliminate Point 1 from Article 117, Part 2

#### Legislation on Belorussian Court System Discussed

91UN0206B Minsk SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA  
in Russian 3 Aug 90 p 2

[Article by V. Krygin, member of the Belorussian SSR Supreme Court, and M. Pastukhov, candidate of legal sciences: "What Should the Court Be Like? Concerning the Draft Law on the Judicial System in the Belorussian SSR"]

[Text] There are three branches of authority in the country: the legislative, executive and judicial. Measures to strengthen one of them, the judicial, will be the subject of discussion in connection with the adoption of an all-union Law on the Judicial System, on the basis of which the Belorussian SSR is drawing up its own law.

For the reader the concept of judges for administrative and executive proceedings will evidently be a new one. According to Article 5 of the Basic Principles of Legislation of the USSR and the Union Republics on the Judicial System, they are formed under rayon (city) people's courts. The task of judges for administrative and judicial proceedings comes down to hearing cases on violations of administrative law for which some sort of administrative penalty, rather than criminal penalty, applies, and to monitoring the implementation of judicial decisions. They will also hear complaints against the actions of agencies and officials having the right to impose administrative penalties (the administrative commissions of ispolkoms, internal affairs agencies, commissions for juvenile affairs, State Automotive Inspectorate employees, and others).

What is the status of judges for administrative and executive proceedings? How are they supposed to be elected? Until republic laws on the judicial system are adopted, we can debate this topic a bit. Some practitioners believe that administrative judges are ordinary judges who administer legal justice within the limits of their jurisdiction. Others believe that they are not really judges at all in the usual understanding of the word, and that the USSR Law on the Status of Judges in the USSR does not fully apply to them. We support the first viewpoint. Legal justice is not just the hearing of criminal and civil cases in court sessions, but also the hearing of other categories of cases by the court and by judges individually. Administrative judges will resolve a number of questions as members of the court together with people's assessors. The elective status of administrative judges is one more feature they have in common with people's judges.

We propose that the Law on the Judicial System in the Belorussian SSR indicate that legal justice in the Belorussian SSR is administered through the hearing in court sessions of civil and criminal cases, cases of the violation of administrative law, and other cases. The status of judges for administrative and executive proceedings is equal to the status of people's judges, and all the provisions of the USSR Law on the Status of Judges in the USSR apply to them. In practice, the necessary conditions must be created in order that the court (or an administrative judge) may administer justice independently of anyone whosoever, and administrative judges should be elected by higher soviets of people's deputies for the same term as people's court judges.

The specific regional features of courts in Belorussia include the fact that one-third of the people's courts have only one judge. But Article 11 of the all-union law on the court system stipulates that in courts of the first instance civil and criminal cases are heard collegially, by judges and people's assessors. That means that either the corps of judges must be increased throughout the republic, or the possibility must be allowed for cases to be heard by one judge and two or more people's assessors in cases where courts continue to have only one judge. Evidently, we will not succeed in increasing the numbers of judges overnight. Therefore, the Belorussian SSR law must state that in courts of the first instance cases are heard collegially by judges (or a judge) and people's assessors.

The new judicial legislation admits the consideration of the question of a defendant's guilt in a trial by jury (an expanded collegium of people's assessors) in cases involving crimes for the commission of which the law specifies the death penalty or deprivation of freedom for terms of more than 10 years. At first glance, a trial by jury and by an expanded collegium of people's assessors are two different forms of trial for criminal cases. In a trial by jury, a collegium of jurors independently decides questions concerning the guilt of the person before the court, and whether the charges have been proven, while other questions (concerning the classification of the deed committed, the punishment, and so forth) are decided by the court. An expanded collegium of people's assessors represents an ordinary court with a larger number of people's assessors than usual (that is, more than two).

Trials by jury function fairly well in a number of countries (the United States, France and others). But there are also a good many states that have good legal systems without trials by jury. Therefore, we must not put our hopes in trial by jury as a panacea that may save our judicial system from its deeply ingrained flaws. We see a preferable version of legal justice in the establishment of judicial collegiums consisting of at least two professional judges and three people's assessors. Such expanded collegiums, in our opinion, could, on the one hand, significantly ensure the court's independence and, on the other, substantially improve the quality of the administration of justice in criminal cases. In our times, when criminal cases are constantly growing more complex, and there is a need for thorough analysis of the circumstances

of the case and the gathered evidence that has been gathered and for a comprehensive consideration of the defendant's personality, it is extremely risky to rely on the experience and assessment of a single judge. Life itself requires that we enhance the professional element in the hearing and disposition of criminal cases. That can be done only by increasing the number of professional judges serving on courts of the first instance. And a corresponding objectivity and fairness in making decisions can be provided by people's assessors, the qualitative makeup of which must be improved.

We propose that the Law on the Court System in the Belorussian SSR include a norm worded as follows. According to procedures specified by the BSSR Criminal Procedures Code, cases involving crimes for the commission of which the law provides the death penalty or deprivation of freedom for a term of more than 10 years may be tried by a court consisting of two judges and at least three people's assessors (an expanded collegium of judges and people's assessors)."

It may be that not everyone will agree with our viewpoint on the future law. But its content should be a matter of some concern to us, if we are really interested in the establishment of a state based on the rule of law. We believe that until the adoption of republic laws, including the Law on the Court System in the Belorussian SSR, it is useful to compare opinions in order to make the new legislation fully democratic and effective.

#### **Belorussian Legal Expert on Need for Court Reform**

91UN0206C Minsk SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA  
in Russian 15 Sep 90 p 2

[Interview with Oleg Aleksandrovich Medvetskiy, chief specialist with the Belorussian SSR Ministry of Justice's Administration for the Organizational Support of the Courts' Work, conducted by L. Maslyukova: "Rise, the Court Is in Session!"; date and place of interview not given]

[Text] I have often heard this once ceremonial and stern formula in my life as a people's assessor. It is pronounced by the secretary before the appearance of the court in the courtroom. However, I have noted that some of those gathered in the room still remained seated. They did not consider it necessary to attest to their respect for that very third branch of authority on which the rule-of-law state is based.

Over two years I became convinced that a citizen who does not respect the court is a phenomenon. As long as that phenomenon exists, the possibility of creating a rule-of-law state seems doubtful to me. My doubts prompted me to address some questions to the Belorussian SSR Ministry of Justice. There I had a businesslike dialogue with Oleg Aleksandrovich Medvetskiy, chief specialist with the ministry's Administration for the Organizational Support of the Courts' Work.



[Maslyukova] Oleg Aleksandrovich, to start I will recall an episode from my own two-year practice as a people's assessor. Once we were hearing a case on the division of former spouses' property. In the course of the trial the respondent did not like the judges question concerning the location of a car acquired during the years of life together. Angrily slamming the door, he left the session. The people's judge wearily thumbed through the case. Instead of answering the question of how to bring the departed person to order, he sighed with relief. He noted only that now there would be no calling back the violator. I accumulated many such examples. I believe that you are familiar with them, too.

[Medvetkiy] Of course, we legal specialists are very much concerned by the phenomenon itself and by the scale of it. In some places the manifestation of disrespect for the court has become common. In our country, however, to our great shame, until recently there were no laws defending the independence, professional honor and human dignity of judges. However, I should say right away that such a law now exists. The legal prerequisites for changing the situation have been created.

On 10 April of this year a ukase of the Presidium of the Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet was adopted. Changes and additions were made in a number of the republic's legislative acts. They were approved in connection with the USSR Law on Liability for Contempt of Court, and therefore, they have direct bearing on our topic of discussion.

The situation you described now could end differently. Now, when the participants in a trial and even simply those present in the courtroom cease to obey the presiding officer, disturb the order, or in some other manner demonstrate contempt of court, they risk paying a fine up to 100 rubles or being subject to administrative arrest for 15 days. Moreover, these penalties can be imposed immediately, right in the court session. For insulting members of the court or directing threats at it, there is criminal liability.

[Maslyukova] But will not these laws prove "dead," ineffective in actual practice?

[Medvetkiy] I do not think so. There are already instances in which they have been applied. Recently the people's court in Frunzenskiy Rayon in Minsk brought criminal charges against citizen N. The case was turned over to the procurator's office and an investigation was made. (I hope that the readers understand why I am not giving the person's name.) So here is N.—a person, in my view, who had thoroughly messed up his personal life. He had two illegitimate children for whose maintenance the mothers were seeking child support. When he married, he had "his own" children. Suits were brought in the Minsk courts. N. was attempting to reduce his support payments for his illegitimate children. He evidently did not like the fact that, instead of a pro-forma hearing of the case, the courts started to look into his

motives for the action. There were interruptions of the sessions, insults directed against the judges, and formal complaints.

All this gave rise to red tape, of which the plaintiff himself subsequently complained. As evident from the record of a court session, at one of the trials N. declared that the judges were criminals. He accused them of committing practically every deed prohibited by the Criminal Code. His incredible, unsupported slander and aggressiveness were means of putting pressure on the court. But his "jokes" came to an end.

[Maslyukova] The threat of criminal liability will undoubtedly cool the ardor of outright trouble-makers. However, I think that the task is immeasurably more complicated. A sense of respect for judicial power must be instilled in thousands of perfectly loyal citizens. Yet many of them complain (justifiably, in my view) of the red tape in the courts, of the endless postponement of cases.

[Medvetkiy] I agree. Only let us look into the reasons for that situation. Let us take the most typical situation.

A hearing of a civil case is set for 2:00 pm. The court awaits the participants. At best, the plaintiff appears a half-hour late. After another half-hour, the defendant appears. Then it turns out that two very important witnesses simply were not allowed by their bosses to take off work. At 5:00 pm the next case is supposed to be tried. (Often, let me note in passing, one of the parties simply fails to appear, since he has an interest in dragging out the final trial of the dispute.) Consequently, a half-day has been utterly wasted. Both by the court and by conscientious people who arrived as summoned and languished waiting for several hours. The trial of the case, of course, is set for a different date. And that is in a situation in which judges' time is scheduled literally by the minute practically a month in advance on account of their colossal work load.

[Maslyukova] I had occasion to experience such misfires and nerve-racking occasions as a people's assessor. On some days in courts, I learned, the trials of 80 percent of the appointed cases fail to occur.

[Medvetkiy] Last year approximately 110,000 civil cases were tried in the republic. Of those, 5,500 were postponed, and some of them several times, precisely because of the failure of one of the parties or witnesses to appear. Over the same period, the dates for the hearing of about 1,000 criminal cases were missed for the very same reason. So who, I ask, is to blame?

[Maslyukova] Once again it is the citizen who fails to obey the law. Will the ukase that has been adopted help combat this widespread slovenliness?

[Medvetkiy] Unquestionably. We hope that the law will force a change in attitude toward a summons to appear in courts. After all, many people, including officials, do not consider it a serious document. Previously it cost

them nothing not to release a subordinate to appear at a trial. Now it may cost them a fine of up to 100 rubles out of their own pockets and, in some cases, may bring criminal charges against them.

If a witness, plaintiff, defendant in a civil case, or the victim in a criminal case ignores a summons, he may be fined. In the event of a malicious avoidance, he is subject to arrest. The court now has the right to compel the delivery of both witnesses and victims to court sessions.

[Maslyukova] Is that not too harsh with respect to victims, who have already suffered?

[Medvetzkiy] No it is not. Until recently impasses sometimes arose because of the irresponsibility of some victims. Let me cite what in my view is a flagrant example.

The people's court in Zavodskiy Rayon in Minsk has been unable to try one criminal case of rape for more than two years. For all that time the five defendants, young men, have been kept in custody. They deny their guilt. Yet the victims whose complaints originally served as the grounds for bringing criminal charges do not want to appear in court. The girls have dispersed around the country and started marrying.

[Maslyukova] I think that one can understand them.

[Medvetzkiy] One can. But one must also understand the parents of the young men, who have sent petitions to every office with complaints against the investigation and the court. And who will "understand" the defendants if it turns out in the trial that some of them are not guilty at all?

[Maslyukova] The court always warns a witness, like a victim, of his liability for refusing to give evidence or for perjury. That does not affect all of them; some prefer, for one reason or another, to assert that they saw nothing and heard nothing. Or they lie and try to protect one side or the other.

[Medvetzkiy] Yes, even before there was criminal liability for such acts. Obviously, it was not strict enough. Now it has been made stricter—in connection with what practice has shown to be increasingly frequent cases in which witnesses, victims, experts and their family members are intimidated. That method of pressuring the participants in a trial is especially widespread in trials of cases of extortion. Now criminal punishment is stipulated for such actions—up to four years' deprivation of freedom.

[Maslyukova] Well, the warning sounds fairly impressive. Like the others about which you have already spoken. I just do not know how many times warnings have to be repeated in order for the public mind to assimilate them. We are having to start from scratch. Moreover, in my opinion, the rampage of democracy that is misunderstood as general permissiveness has not had the best effect on the atmosphere in the courtroom. I recall that one citizen, after listening to a court decision

that was not to his liking regarding the return of 3,000 rubles that he had borrowed on an IOU, declared: "I will not give it back, anyway!" And he really did not return the debt for more than a year. That is the level from which we must raise the prestige of the judicial branch of authority.

[Medvetzkiy] I believe that life will still convince people of the immutability of the old truth: authority, be it legislative, executive, or judicial, should have the capability of ensuring the implementation of its decisions. In any society, even the most democratic. Especially in a democratic one. Otherwise it may be whatever you want to call it, but it is not authority.

And what did we have before? The Ministry of Justice alone received about 1,500 complaints a year concerning the failure to execute judicial decisions. The old law was oriented toward the law-abiding citizen. Evidently that is why it lacked effective levers compelling a person to obey a judicial decision. It was assumed that the citizen himself would obey, voluntarily and promptly. But we have not had that sort of obligor for a long time! (Obligor here must be understood in the legal sense as a person whom the court has obliged to give up property, free living space, make compensation for damages, and so forth).

A paradoxical situation developed. After proclaiming in the name of the republic that someone's rights had been violated, the court was often unable to restore them. Since a person who ignored a court decision remained absolutely invulnerable from the standpoint of the law.

[Maslyukova] So in terms of execution, the ukase of the Presidium of the Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet should contain a fundamentally new provision!

[Medvetzkiy] I shall note with satisfaction that we in Belorussia have managed to do what has not yet been done in the legislation of the other republics and the union. We have finally brought execution into conformity with real life.

[Maslyukova] How does it look now?

[Medvetzkiy] The court, say, has ordered a citizen to return 3,000 by 15 October. If the decision is not executed voluntarily, the obligor is subject to a fine of up to 200 rubles. A new deadline is set, and in the event of failure to execute the judgment, there is another fine.

[Maslyukova] And it keeps on like that endlessly?

[Medvetzkiy] Up to 1,000 rubles. Then the decision is executed by compulsion, and the sum assigned to the victim is returned, anyway. There is also another possibility—the property of the obstinate citizen is taken to a commission store. Money from its sale goes toward paying the fine, which he has also categorically refused to pay. And that will be his payment for malicious failure to obey a court decision.

[Maslyukova] And if he thinks better of it and, at the last moment, pays the debt anyway?

[Medvet'skiy] All the better for him. After all, the fines that are set are intended to provide motivation. They are necessary in order for an obligor to recognize that he will not "get off" and wriggle out of it. And if he has recognized it, the amounts of the fine that have not yet been taken from him as of the time he executes the court decision are not subject to collection. As you see, the obligor has somewhere to "retreat," and a reason for doing so.

[Maslyukova] It seems to me that we have failed to touch another important aspect of the problem. Once an angry defendant in a civil case told the judge and us two people's assessors that she would go to the newspaper and get satisfaction from us there. The next day she really did show up at the newspaper office. She went to demand that the court decision be rescinded.

[Medvet'skiy] The court always hears conflicts in which both of the disputing parties consider themselves right. The court inevitably takes the position of one party. Complaints and protests by the other party are a normal phenomenon. From the standpoint of psychology, as well as from the standpoint of law. That is why the appeals system exists. It is an essential element and guarantee of the correction of judicial mistakes. Everyone has the right to try to prove his case by going in succession through all the stages of the judicial authority and procurator's supervision. However, a great many people prefer to bypass that route.

[Medvet'skiy] That woman, incidentally, fully recognized that it was not within the journalists' jurisdiction to rescind a judicial decision. Just as most of the other such visitors to newspapers, I am convinced, recognize it.

[Medvet'skiy] Nonetheless, such people do go to newspapers after trials. They write to the Committee of Soviet Women, the Belorussian SSR representative to the USSR Council of Ministers, to the United Nations. Here we are dealing with a certain phenomenon of public awareness. With a deeply rooted vestige of the administrative system. By complaining, say, to the CPSU Central Committee, a citizen is trying to use the authority of the supreme party body to pressure the court and force it to make a decision in favor of a person who is in the wrong.

The need for a separation of powers into judicial, legislative and executive may be assimilated as an idea, but in practice people keep continually acting the old way. That is why it must be incessantly repeated: not merely a newspaper correspondent, but even the USSR president has no right to rescind a judicial decision. Only by a higher court possesses that right.

[Maslyukova] Just a few last words as a postscript. The press and the justice system have a lot of work to do to publicize the new laws and popularize them. To

strengthen the prestige of the judicial authority. Let us wish one another success in this difficult job.

[Medvet'skiy] The task, as they say, is difficult but noble. We must, how desperately we must, return the weight and prestige to the ceremonial formula, "Rise, the court is in session!"

### **Moldovan MVD Minister on Departmental Improvements**

9JUN0244A Kishinev PANORAMA in Russian No 17, Oct 90 pp 20-22

[Interview with Ion Grigore Kostash, Moldova SSR minister of internal affairs, by unidentified correspondent: "So That Order and Harmony Reign"; place and date not given; use of "Moldova" and "Moldavia" as published]

[Text] Ion Grigore Kostash, Moldova SSR minister of internal affairs, was born in 1944 in the village of Glavan, Drokiyevskiy Rayon, in a peasant family. He is a Moldavian. For eight years (1949-1957) he lived with his resettled parents in an oblast of Kazakhstan. University educated, he completed Kharkov Higher Military Aviation Institute and the Air Force Academy imeni Yu.A. Gagarin in Moscow. He holds the rank of Aviation Major General.

His organizational and intellectual abilities enabled him to occupy responsible positions in USSR military aviation. He progressed from ordinary pilot in 1967 to commander of an air squadron in 1976-1978. In 1978 he was appointed deputy commander of a military unit. In 1980-1983 he served as a regimental commander. He was then appointed deputy commander of aviation and aviation chief of staff of the combined-arms army. In 1984 he served as deputy chairman, and in 1985 was made chairman of the DOSAAF [Voluntary Society for the Promotion of the Army, Aviation, and Navy] Central Committee of the Moldova SSR.

In May 1990 he was elected chairman of the Moldova SSR Supreme Soviet Commission on State Security and Military Issues. On 13 June 1990 the first session of the Moldova SSR Supreme Soviet 12th Convocation appointed him minister of internal affairs of the Moldova SSR.

[Correspondent] Ivan Grigoryevich, how would you assess the situation today in the republic with respect to crime? Should we expect a further increase in criminal activity or will the internal affairs organs succeed in putting a halt to this dangerous trend?

[Kostash] Generally speaking, the operational situation in the republic continues to be complex. I do not like to refer again and again to statistical material, but you really cannot avoid statistics these days. The total number of crimes over a seven-month period grew by 5.8 percent; grave crimes—by 11.4 percent.

The continuing growth of dangerous crimes in recent years, including this year, evokes serious alarm—crimes such as murder, which increased by 18.5 percent, robbery—by 11.5 percent, fraud—by 32.1 percent, arson—by 73 percent, theft of state property—by 11.2 percent, and apartment theft—by 44.1 percent. There was a significant increase in drug-related crimes—88.2 percent.

Nor is the situation in the economic sphere improving. The total number of reported crimes here increased by 10.2 percent. They include embezzlement, bribery, and speculation.

With respect to the second part of your question, I must say that as a result of organizational and practical measures taken, we have managed to achieve a reduction in the growth rates for crime. The most general and eloquent indicator of this is the fact that, whereas in the first half of 1989 growth of crime in the republic comprised 38.3 percent of what it was for the same period the year before, this year the figure does not exceed six percent.

I would also like to note a slight decrease in the portion of unsolved crimes. Over seven months of last year, this amounted to 82 percent; this year it is 80 percent. With respect to the grave crimes category, these figures are 75 and 69 percent respectively.

As we comprehensively evaluate the objective and subjective factors influencing the operational situation, we believe that in order to stabilize it we will have to do some very serious work, radically restructure the entirety of militia activity. And of course, we are striving to operate so as to gain prestige among the people, to win their all-encompassing support and assistance, to attain conditions in which order and harmony reign in the republic. Our intentions and aspirations are united in this regard.

[Correspondent] What major reorganizational measures do you, as the new minister of internal affairs, intend to effect in the structure or organization of units under your control in order to make them more effective in the struggle against the criminal world, in protecting the dignity, honor, and if necessary the lives of inhabitants of the republic?

[Kostash] First of all, in listing the measures to be taken toward effectively consolidating law and order in the republic and ensuring reliable protection of the rights and freedoms of its residents, we must mention the coming transformation of the militia into state police organs. Here we are not simply talking about hanging out a new shingle, if I might express it that way, but a new approach to organizing the activities of state organs in fighting crime.

After all, in the primary sense of the word, "militia" means "people's home guard." In transforming the militia into a police force, we are shifting the focus to effecting a professional approach in the fight against

crime, taking into account the processes of democratization ongoing in society and the necessity of building a rule-of-law state.

We intend to form three departments right away in the MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] apparatus—police internal troops, and support services. Each of these will be under the leadership of a deputy minister and must fulfill functions and missions entrusted to it by the Moldova SSR Supreme Soviet and the republic government, and by appropriate legislative enactments.

It is significant that plans call for creation of a carabinieri corps in the internal troops department, charged with ensuring stable social order on the streets and in public places, primarily in their area of permanent residence, in close contact with police patrolmen and division inspectors.

A great deal of work is presently underway in determining the tasks and functions of MVD departments. However, in connection with the fact that the Regulations of the Moldova SSR MVD must be examined in the near future by the republic government, it is too early in our view to get more involved here in the details.

[Correspondent] Comrade General, sufficient time has elapsed since the USSR president adopted the Ukase "On Banning the Organization of Armed Formations Not Envisaged Under USSR Legislation, and the Confiscation of Weapons Possessed Illegally." What has the republic MVD done to implement this?

[Kostash] Upon adoption of this ukase of the USSR president, the republic MVD and its local organs took operational measures to put its requirements into effect. A special staff was created for this purpose in the ministry apparatus and is currently in operation. The necessary departmental normative acts have been adopted. We dispatched brigades to cities and rayons having an adverse crime environment to organize the effort of confiscating weapons and ammunition possessed illegally and uncover illegally armed formations.

Over the period of time the ukase has been in effect, 17 illegally possessed weapons have been confiscated by militia organs. Establishment of the organization or presence of illegally armed formations has not been ascertained.

[Correspondent] Are there now instances of theft of firearms and ammunition, their illegal possession, in the republic? Can you cite examples in which people have been found trading them on the "black market"?

[Kostash] For the seven-month period this year in the republic, 28 cases of weapons and ammunition theft have been registered. Of these, 24 comprise theft of hunting weapons registered with the militia belonging to organizations and citizens, and four constitute theft of military and sports weapons. Criminal proceedings have been instituted in all of these cases and investigations are underway. During the same period, internal affairs



organs confiscated 30 smooth-bore weapons in illegal possession, seven Army-issue weapons, five small-caliber rifles, three homemade pistols, nine sawed-off shotguns, three grenades, and 600 grams of explosives.

No cases of trading weapons on the "black market" have been identified in the republic.

[Correspondent] Ivan Grigoryevich, the latest USSR MVD reports published in the central press show our republic ranking alongside Latvia and Estonia as the worst with respect to street crime. How do you explain this, and what are internal affairs organs doing in the localities to rectify this negative situation with respect to crime?

[Kostash] Indeed, the state of social order in the republic leaves much to be desired. Although results of the first half of the year show that street crime has dropped 8.3 percent, its level still remains high. In my view this is directly related to the fact that the militia is under strength, including patrols and sentry guards. The low level of equipment on hand, lack of motor vehicles, poor condition of available transportation resources, the constant lack of petroleum, oil, and lubricants, low salaries for militiamen (amounting to 140-160 rubles for the first year of service), their lack of ordinary living amenities, poor level of social protection—all of this is reflected like in a mirror in the growth of street crime.

In order to escape this situation—I would have to call it a crisis predicament—organs of power in the localities are undertaking effective measures. The material-technical base for the militia is being shored up through funds allocated from local budgets. The number of militiamen on patrols and sentry duty is being increased. Other organizational matters are being resolved to keep young militiamen in service and form a stable professional core in the internal affairs organs.

[Correspondent] Is it possible to cite achievements of the Moldavian militia in struggling with the shadow economy hardly anyone today would doubt the existence of? Can we see a trend toward decreased or increased scope here? To what extent would you assess its turnover?

[Kostash] Indeed, the shadow economy is today a reality which requires special action on the part of the state, from law enforcement organs first and foremost. It is quite appropriate that experts compare it with an iceberg whose portion beneath the surface presents the greatest danger to the normal life of society.

Its scope may be seen in the fact that over seven months of this year, 1,613 economic and abuse-of-position crimes were uncovered in the republic. This is 11 percent higher than for the same period last year. Militiamen uncovered 475 cases of theft through misappropriation, squandering, and abuse of official position, including 96 large-scale and especially large-scale in scope, 313 cases

of speculation, 23 bribery cases, and a number of other crimes directed toward undermining the republic's economy.

Material damage in cases where economic crimes have been carried out increased by 3.5 percent and amounted to about 820,000 rubles. Money and valuables acquired by criminals through illegal means were confiscated in the amount of 527,000 rubles—this is 13.9 percent greater than for the same period last year.

It is apparent from the data I have cited here that the extent of encroachment on the property of the people is growing. But when you take into account the conclusions of criminologists that internal affairs organs uncover only one-fifth of the economic crimes perpetrated because of their great latency (secrecy), then you can imagine the full sweep and the extent of damage they are inflicting upon our economy.

I do not wish to delude anyone—it would be extremely difficult to determine the overall turnover of the shadow economy in the republic. But I will say that according to official statistics, material damage resulting from shortages, theft, and spoilage of material valuables over the past year is calculated to constitute 90 million rubles. Without a doubt, a significant portion of this money is sitting in the pockets of smart operators in the shadow economy.

[Correspondent] What is being done today with respect to issuing new equipment and materiel, and providing material-technical support for the Moldavian militia? What funds are being allocated from the republic budget to meet these needs? What assistance is the Union ministry providing in these matters?

[Kostash] Matters of shoring up the technical outfitting and equipping of the republic internal affairs organs constitute a component part of the Integral Program for the Fight Against Crime 1990-1991, ratified by the government. With its adoption, we acquired the opportunity to make currency purchases of the necessary technology and equipment, although in limited quantities.

This year militia subunits received 277 vehicles, of which more than 60 percent came from USSR MVD assets. The number of vehicles is 22.1 percent greater than last year. The amount of vehicles apportioned from local budget funding increased by 64 percent (from 25 to 41).

We must make special note of the fact that more than 750,000 rubles were allocated this year by republic enterprises and organizations for technically equipping internal affairs organs.

Financial sources show that the activity of the militia is supported 78.4 percent out of the Union budget and 21.6 percent out of the republic budget.

It is understood that we will not manage to effect the equipment reissue of internal affairs organs in one fell

swoop. For on the whole this depends on the general state of the economy, which itself is undergoing serious, often painful changes at present.

[Correspondent] We hear that new "calming" devices, such as electric stunners and the like, have entered the Moldovan militia inventory. Has the republic community been informed of this? And what has brought about the necessity for such a "reissue" of equipment in the period of democracy's further development?

[Kostash] There is no basis whatsoever for such comments. There are no stunning devices or the like in the inventory of the internal affairs organs and their introduction is not foreseen in the near future.

[Correspondent] Comrade Minister, why do republic MVD reports not reflect the act of vandalism committed in June of this year by a group of thugs who let loose and defaced inscriptions on the Arch of Triumph and its slabs? Were these people arrested by the militia? If so, at what stage is the investigation on this matter?

[Kostash] Reports of the Ministry of Internal Affairs contain overall indicators of violations of law and order in the republic. Our limited capabilities of course do not permit inclusion of an infinite number of such documents. In this regard, special reports are prepared on certain types of the most dangerous crimes, as is the case with respect to the instance in question.

The republic government and USSR MVD were informed of this occurrence and a criminal case was opened (registered in the statements and criminal reports book of the Frunzenskiy Rayon Department of Internal Affairs, city of Kishinev, No. 1725 dated 28 June 1990) and is being conducted by the MVD Department of Investigations. An expert artistic opinion is presently being rendered on the case. No one has been detained or arrested; no one has been accused. The investigation continues.

[Correspondent] Ivan Grigoryevich, what efforts are being undertaken by militiamen regarding observance by republic citizens, and by enterprise and organization leaders, of the Law on Symbols and Decree on State Power?

[Kostash] Together with representatives of the parliament and republic government, the organs of internal affairs are constantly conducting explanatory work with leaders of enterprises and institutions, organizations and farms, especially in the rayons of the Dnestr and in the south of the republic, regarding strict execution of the requirements of the legislation in effect on symbols and the Decree on State Power. Unfortunately, we do not always encounter understanding and a responsible approach to resolving these problems.

During the time the Law on Symbols has been in effect in the republic, 68 illegal acts have been registered related to USSR state flags, and the flags of the Moldova SSR and other Union republics. Of these, 61 (89.7 percent)

were committed with respect to the new Moldova SSR flag. Such violations of the law occurred in 21 rayons of the republic, and in the cities of Kishinev, Belts, Tiraspol, and Bender.

Criminal proceedings were instituted by law enforcement organs in 57 instances; 22 individuals were identified and arrested as suspects in these crimes.

In accordance with the Decree on State Power, the republic MVD adopted specific organizational-legal measures on depoliticizing political organs and terminating the activity of party organizations and sociopolitical formations of various orientations. This effort was completed in September of this year.

[Correspondent] Thank you for our discussion, Comrade Minister. Allow me on behalf of our readers to wish those who work in the law enforcement organs success in their difficult service, in their struggle to eradicate crime.

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#### **New Ukrainian MVD Minister on Responsibilities**

91UN0203C Kiev *RABOCHAYA GAZETA* in Russian  
12 Aug 90 pp 1, 4

[Interview with Andrey Vladimirovich Vasilishin, lieutenant general, Ukrainian minister of internal affairs: "In Accordance with the Laws of a Sovereign Power"]

#### **[Text] Introducing the Minister**

Since 26 July the Ukrainian police have been headed up by Lieutenant General Andrey Vladimirovich Vasilishin, the new minister of internal affairs. The head of our law-enforcement department was appointed, essentially for the first time by a truly democratic method, by an overwhelming majority of votes of the members of this republic's parliament. He is tall, drawn-up, and slender. He is 57 years old. But just who is he, this new Ukrainian minister of internal affairs?

[A.V. Vasilishin:] I was born into a peasant family in the village of Vesnyanka, Starokonstantinovskiy Rayon, Khmel'nitskiy Oblast. Before I went into the army, I worked as a driver. Then I served for five years in long-range aviation. After being demobilized, I graduated from the Kiev Secondary Special Police School and from the Kiev State University Faculty of Law. And since that time I have been employed for 33 years already in the internal affairs organs: as an operative, investigator, and senior investigator in Kiev, then as an investigator of particularly important cases for the republic-level MVD, deputy chief of the Investigative Department, Kiev Oblast UVD [Internal Affairs Administration], and then in the ministry again—this time as a department head. From 1974 through 1982 I headed up the Chernivitskiy Oblast UVD. For the following three years I held the analogous post in Kiev Oblast. And for

the next five years I headed up the UVD for the city of Kiev and was deputy minister at the same time. And so that is my service record. My wife is a medical doctor, and my son is a student.

[Interviewer] Andrey Vladimirovich, you became this republic's minister of internal affairs at a noteworthy time—after the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet had adopted the Declaration of the Ukraine's Sovereignty. It is important for the readers of *RABOCHAYA GAZETA* to know the answers to the following questions: How precisely do you, as head of the police department, regard the Ukraine's independence? And what kind of an entity will the MVD of a sovereign Ukrainian state be?

[A.V. Vasilishin] First of all, about the Declaration. I consider that this is an historically important document, responding to the will, desires, and interests of the Ukrainian people. I fully support all its provisions, and I hope that it will become the foundation of the Ukraine's political, economic, social, and spiritual rebirth. For my own part, I will undertake everything necessary to achieve this lofty goal.

For us staff members of the law-enforcement organs, the principle of the supremacy or primacy of the law, as proclaimed by the Declaration, is of top-priority importance. The law and only the law (not any kinds of political expediency) must determine the actions and behavior of the citizens of a sovereign power, including, above all, those performed by the guardians of order, the staff members of the police.

[Interviewer] But will it not turn out that, although sovereignty has been proclaimed, the Ukrainian police will continue to carry out the orders issued by the Union-level ministry? Because, of course, the right of saying the last word in deciding key questions belonged to Moscow alone until very recently. With regard to personnel, finances, and technical matters.... I will remember a characteristic example of this. The Union-level department sent the chief of one of the Ukrainian MVD sub-divisions to Ivano-Frankovsk. He took charge of the oblast-level administration of internal affairs. Without having his own roots there and not knowing the local traditions, this newly appeared chief unleashed a furious storm of activity. He fired many professionals. He waged such an active fight against drunkenness that he even refused to give his staff associates leave to attend the weddings of their relatives.

And at the same time experienced leading officials from Ukrainian oblasts were transferred to work in other republics. This is only one example. I think that you yourself could cite many more of them. But I brought this up for the following reason. At the end of last week V.V. Bakatin, USSR minister of internal affairs, arrived in Kiev. And, according to an old tradition, he introduced you to his colleagues, having virtually nothing to do with your appointment. Will there not be a repetition in everything else of the lamentably well-known tradition of attentive "concern from on high"? And if not,

then what kinds of mutual relations or cooperation will there be between the two ministries—the Union-level one and the republic-level one?

[A.V. Vasilishin] Here we must make a clarification. Vadim Viktorovich Bakatin did not introduce me (that would have looked strange indeed), but he did take part in the introduction which was made by V.A. Masol. I do not think that there is any real danger that they will attempt to cut short or reduce our independence. The minister and I discussed many problems, and I handed him a packet of our proposals with regard to turning over rights to the republic-level ministry—the awarding of top rank, supernumerary rank, retirement on a pension, wage funds, and many other points. And on all these points I met with complete understanding and approval from him.

The same thing was true with regard to appointing persons to leadership posts. There's no more need to go to Moscow and waste a lot of time and frayed nerves merely to observe a formality. We ourselves decide who will work for us and where. And literally an hour before our meeting I signed orders providing for the appointments of two UVD chiefs—one in Ivano-Frankovsk Oblast and the other in Chernovitskiy Oblast. They are both local, highly skilled, and experienced professionals.

And relations between ministries within the Soviet Union will be built on a contractual or agreed-upon foundation; a few questions remain merely with regard to handling the Union staff. These matters pertain to material and technical supply, internal troops (at least, until a change in this statute within the USSR Constitution), certain educational institutions, and coordinating the activities of republic-level ministries in the fight against organized crime.

#### **Tajik MVD Official Notes Rising Crime Rate in Republic**

91US0079A Dushanbe *KOMMUNIST*  
*TADZHIKISTANA* in Russian 5 Sep 90 p 3

[Article by Militia Colonel A. Imomnazarov, director of an administration of the Tajik SSR Ministry of Internal Affairs' prevention service: "Only the Work of Society as a Whole Can Bring a Reduction in Crime"]

[Text] Crime is a phenomenon of many factors. Underlying it are economic, social and moral causes. Crisis phenomena in the economy, the acute shortage of goods and services, contradictions and difficulties in the social, spiritual and other areas of societal life, the slackening of labor discipline and responsibility—all these are contributing to the growth in crime.

In six months the republic's internal affairs agencies have recorded 8,624 crimes, which is 336 more than for the comparable period of last year. Of them, 1,164 were grave—an increase of 47.2 percent here, too. These are

the crimes that are accompanied by a trail of conjecture and panic and that, to a considerable extent, disturb society.

There have been 86 murders and 138 cases of the intentional infliction of serious bodily injury, which represent 1.1 percent and 1.6 percent, respectively, of all recorded crimes. And although the percentage of murders and severe bodily injuries is insignificant, these types of crime evoke the greatest public response.

The law-enforcement agencies have been taking the most urgent measures to investigate such crimes, enlisting the most experienced criminal crime-solvers and investigators in the process. Generally speaking, the majority of serious crimes are successfully solved and the guilty parties brought to trial. Whether our law-enforcement agencies can prevent these types of crimes, which are mainly committed in domestic settings and in a state of emotional excitement or intoxication, or under the influence of drugs, is another question. Unfortunately, it must be bluntly answered that we have neither the manpower nor the means to actively influence the level of domestic crime.

Work with the public is done by precinct militia inspectors. Each of them is responsible for an average of 5,000 to 7,000 people, among whom are hundreds of people who have been released from places of incarceration and taken off the records of the special commandant's office, drug addicts, people who abuse alcoholic beverages, and parasites. Physically it is impossible even to visit every family for a brief conversation, not to even mention conducting regular, purposeful preventive work.

The situation with respect to "drunken" crime is very complex. The proportion of crimes committed in a state of intoxication on alcohol or drugs amounts to 11.6 percent (a 24.2 percent growth over last year). The problem of combating drunkenness and alcoholism and home distilling needs to be discussed in more detail.

The brief drop in alcohol consumption and the reduction in this connection of "drunken crime" that occurred soon after the well-known 1985 decree have been replaced today by a huge jump. There is no doubt that the May ukase was a timely and essential government decision. It is another matter how its implementation has been treated. At the present time, the only party responsible for implementing the 29 May 1985 ukase of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, which incidentally, has not been repealed, remains the internal affairs agencies, and more specifically, the precinct militia inspectors, who identify and keep records on chronic alcoholics and send them to receive compulsory treatment at treatment and work facilities.

The militia picks up drunks and sends them to medical sobering-up stations. Officers of the State Automotive Inspectorate work to combat drunkenness behind the wheel. The Ministry of Health provides little help to the

internal affairs agencies. In 1985 the country's government assigned research organizations, with the enlistment of practically all ministries and departments and public organizations, to work out and introduce a comprehensive program for combating drunkenness and alcoholism. This program was supposed to be based on the same comprehensive approach to achieving a healthy lifestyle. Those responsible for implementing it were also designated. However, the 1985 ukase has gone without implementation.

The social and economic changes occurring in the republic are contributing their share to "drunken" crime. In order to save money, enterprises have been closing down their addiction treatment offices and posts and not hiring people who have undergone courses of treatment for alcoholism and drug abuse. And why speak of them, when the problem of finding jobs is confronting healthy young people, graduates from schools, technicals and higher schools? Is it any wonder that the principal increase in young people who succumb to drunkenness is provided by young people who are unemployed and not in school?

A strange situation is developing. Throughout the world, including our country, alcohol has been recognized as a disease, and in a number of countries well-developed methods have been introduced for treating people for alcoholism and drug abuse at their places of employment, with the expenses paid by the enterprise. Yet so far all we can do is merely cite the rise in the number of alcoholics and of crimes committed in a state of intoxication.

Along with "drunken" crime, there is repeat, recidivist crime. Every month in the republic the number of crimes committed by people with previous convictions increases by an average of 70-80 cases. They commit one-fourth of all the solved crimes, more than 40 percent of the murders, instances of serious bodily injury, robberies and thefts, and about 60 percent of the robbery-related assaults on citizens.

Among the main reasons holding up the process of preventing recidivist crime, a special place belongs to the problems of placing people who have served sentences in housing and jobs, and to their social adaptation in society. The system of legal regulation that presently exists is not in keeping with the principles of justice and humanism and does not ensure ex-convicts' constitutional rights to jobs, housing and health care. Consequently, this contingent of people falls out of the resocialization process and degenerates even further. That clearly does not fit into the plan of building a genuinely civilized state.

Concerned with the state of affairs with respect to recidivist crime, the internal affairs agencies have drawn up and presented to the USSR Supreme Soviet draft Basic Principles of Legislation of the USSR and the Union and Autonomous Republic on Crime Prevention and a draft USSR Law on the Social Adaptation of



Persons Who Have Served Criminal Sentences and Also Persons Who Have Lost Their Socially Useful Ties. In addition, draft Basic Principles of USSR Legislation on the Execution of Criminal Sentences are also before the USSR Supreme Soviet for its consideration.

As of today, we have a huge number of inhabitants of dumps, cellars, garrets and dens, both vagrants with no previous convictions and persons recently released from corrective labor institutions, who remain without family, housing, job or documents, without any future. How many of them are there, prepared to resort to theft or robbery for a piece of bread, or to murder in connection with their embitterment toward everyone? Given the shortage of charity, the bureaucratic command apparatus, philistine prejudices, and the group selfishness of enterprises, organizations and institutions that refuse daily bread and housing to people who have fallen into misfortune, we, unfortunately, will continue to have a growth in recidivist crime.

The measures that the internal affairs agencies have been taking in isolation to establish centers of resocialization and adaptation counseling, while working with difficulty to obtain beds and positions at enterprises and miserly contributions to the fund for assistance to ex-convicts, and the correspondence they have engaged in with the management of various offices and ispolkoms are not producing any effect.

The growth in crime among young people and teenagers is causing equal concern. Persons ages 14-29 make up nearly 60 percent of those involved in crimes. In 1977-1988 crime among 14- to 15-year-olds doubled. In 1989 about 1,000 of the investigated crimes were committed by minors, and in the first six months of 1990, about 600 of them were. The composition of minor participants in crime is changing, and the number of crimes committed by teenagers who are neither studying nor employed is rising. The structure of crime is changing. The change is in the direction of mercenary crimes. Girls are turning up increasingly often among the lawbreakers. More than 50 percent of the female lawbreakers used alcoholic beverages, smoked and began their sexual life while still in school. Prostitution involving minors is growing at a faster rate.

Family problems are having an extremely negative effect on the state of juvenile crime. As a result of the growing number of divorces, thousands of children are left in broken families every year. The lack of attention to children in such families results in their going without supervision. In the country as a whole, about 900,000 minors a year, including 200,000 under 14 years old, end up with the militia for various violations of law. More than 100,000 children and teenagers pass through reception and assignment offices.

The most negative influence on children is exerted by parents who follow antisocial lifestyles. It is from such families that the majority of young criminals come.

There are serious shortcomings in individual upbringing work. There are 3,289 teenagers on the republic militia's books. They include those who have been convicted with suspended sentences, drug addicts and abusers of toxic substances. But the commissions on juvenile affairs have not assigned public mentors to a significant number of these juveniles, and those who have been assigned do practically no work. The commissions fail to monitor the employment of teenagers, who people are extremely reluctant to hire, especially at enterprises that have switched to cost accounting or leasing arrangements.

And there is another acute problem. A substantial number of the teenagers who are on the militia's books are characterized by abnormalities in their psychological or intellectual development. Many of them break the law on a regular basis.

The republic has no system for treating and training them that is in any way effective.

All these problems are contributing to the rise in crime, with which the law enforcement agencies are unable to cope on their own. Doing so is a difficult, painstaking job for society as a whole, a job that requires tremendous expenditures of material and spiritual effort.

#### **Turkmen SSR Supreme Soviet on Fight Against Rising Crime in Republic**

91US0069A Ashkhabad TURKMENSKAYA ISKRA  
in Russian 19 Sep 90 pp 1-2

[Article by V. Zarembo: "Who Will Stop Crime?"]

[Text] Recently the Turkmen SSR Ministry of Internal Affairs lifted the "Secret" classification of operative reports and thus allowed journalists the opportunity to study them. What was there to conceal? As it were, the most notorious crimes were being gossiped about all over the place and nothing could be done to stop this leak of information. Now it has been officially legalized in newspapers and journals and on television and radio broadcasts. Unquestionably, this should be credited to our glasnost and is an important step forward in the sense of the democratization of the organs of internal affairs.

Initially, the reading of the reports created a heavy feeling of unpleasantness and concern by the fact that some crimes (a substantial portion) remain unexposed. This concern very rapidly developed into extreme worry, when the flood of reports caused by the growing number of crimes also increased at a headlong pace, accompanied by the same helpless addendum, "unsolved."

What is happening? Where are we going? Could it be that nothing can be done to stop crime? Is the situation that bad? The unclassified and publicized crime statistics was not reassuring. Conversely, it became obvious that the state of affairs involving crime was not simply stupefying but critical. All types of crime without exception increased. Last year the crime rate increased by 34

percent compared to 1988 and in virtually all oblasts and rayons under republic administration. The crime rate increased by 400 percent in Nebit-Dag and Krasnovodsk! How much more could it increase!

"It has become frightening to walk the streets in the evenings, with groups of drinking and smoking boys cruising and from whom anything could be expected. We fear for our children when they come from school in the evenings. The newspapers are writing about sex maniacs. We go to work and we worry about our apartments, as one neighbor or another is burglarized...."

How to prevent crime? This question is raised in letters and telephone calls of readers. It was also discussed at the meeting of the TuSSR Supreme Soviet Committee on Problems of Legislation, Legality, Law and Order and Rights and Appeals by Citizens. A report to the members of the committee was presented by V.A. Grinin, TuSSR Minister of Internal Affairs. Frankly speaking, this meeting seemed to me strange but I shall talk about it later.

Yes, the minister acknowledged, the state of affairs concerning crime is not pleasing. We are faced with an escalation of cruelty, violence, a significant increase in black-marketeering, thefts, extortion and the situation is hardly likely to change for the better this or next year. Acknowledging that the main responsibility for the created situation is that of the internal affairs organs and the not always satisfactory work of the criminal investigation authorities and other services, the still existing lack of professionalism and treachery by personnel and the use of official position for selfish purposes by some personnel, V.A. Grinin emphasized that many other reasons also exist, which hinder preventing the increase in the crime rate. The exceptionally poor material and technical facilities make it impossible to conduct inquiries and investigations on a modern level; the unchanged strength of the internal affairs organs in the republic is unable efficiently to react to the growing number of crimes: there are an average of 70 cases per investigator, which is more than twice the rate, and, furthermore, wages are rather low. How can this contribute to the exposure of crime? A blame was also addressed at the courts which give suspended sentences in cases in which individuals should be clearly isolated from society. According to the minister, this system of total forgiveness leads to the growth of recidivism. Another contributing factor is the press which, by publishing critical materials on the work of the militia, creates an unhealthy atmosphere within the internal affairs organs and does not contribute to enhancing the reputation of the MVD among the population.

V.A. Grinin's address was not noted by optimism concerning holding the increased crime rate in check. It was more a question of the problems encountered by the militia and what it lacks in order to mount an efficient struggle against crime. Despite the difficulties, the minister noted, the spirit of the personnel is high, there are no major errors in the cadre policy, the situation is more

or less stable, and explosive situations, such as exist in other parts of the country, are not anticipated. In a word, although with difficulty, the situation is under control.

The committee members were not satisfied either with the report of the minister or his answers to questions. Those assembled spoke of the minister's lack of exigency toward his personnel and their forming alliances with criminals, the fact that delinquent personnel, instead of being punished, are transferred to "cozy" positions and that the MVD has turned from an operative agency into a ministry of information; meanwhile, the people no longer believe that they are being protected; the minister is facing a barrier which he cannot cross. The discussion was conducted objectively.

During a break I asked G. Igdyrov, TuSSR Supreme Soviet deputy committee chairman, to comment on the minister's speech.

"At the first session of the TuSSR Supreme Soviet, last winter, in discussing candidates for the position of minister of internal affairs, V.A. Grinin was asked to submit a program for holding in check the increase in the crime rate. The deputies were not pleased with his initial speech, considering his program to be weak. They suggested that he work further and in two or three days once again to submit his views. Once again they were dissatisfied. It was resolved then to recommend that the session hear a report by the minister and his program for improving the situation in the autumn. Currently crime statistics indicate that the situation is quite alarming. In terms of indicators of organized crime we are in one of the leading places in the country. The MVD leadership refers to poor technical facilities and inadequate material base. I believe such references to be groundless. The flood of complaints against the militia has increased. The people fear as a result of their helplessness when faced with criminals and this is not a time for placidity. The crime rate has increased as sharply as the food problem."

After the break, the resolution passed by the committee was to consider the work of the TuSSR MVD in organizing the struggle against crime and the preservation of public order unsatisfactory, and recommended to S.A. Niyazov, TuSSR Supreme Soviet chairman and first secretary of the Turkmen Communist Party Central Committee, to consider the expediency of the further employment of V.A. Grinin as minister of internal affairs.

What did I find strange in the work of the committee? It was the lack of a profound study of the work and of specific suggestions about how to improve it. Yet this question was extremely important. This meeting was attended by the heads of all law enforcement organs in the republic. However, although hearing the, generally speaking, helpless report submitted by the minister of internal affairs, not one of them beat his chest and said "we too are to blame." The result was that the MVD had

been left to prevent crime by itself. Unfortunately, however, it had failed to do so.

What about the other law enforcement organs? The speeches by the heads of department included complaints to the effect that, allegedly, the militia does not catch the real criminals, for which reason cases "collapse" in court. Honestly speaking, after the minister's speech, I expected to hear a practical, a specific discussion on "what should we do to improve matters?" Instead there were reciprocal charges. However, this is not a time for ambitions and meaningless discussions as to who is right and who is wrong. We need a unified tactic in the struggle against crime which, however, judging by all appearances, is not to be found not only within the MVD but also in the other law enforcement authorities.

I do not intend to sit in judgment. Possibly, changing the leadership of the TuSSR MVD is justifiable and a new, more exigent minister will take over, who would be able to surmount the barrier and set matters "on the proper level." However, he too will have to face a number of problems the solution of which not only depends on the

talent, will or wish of the leader. Where can we find well-trained professionals who, for a low salary, would begin to work tirelessly and, sometimes, at the risk of their lives? How to provide full and modern technical facilities for the personnel when scientific and technical facilities in the country are on the level of the Stone Age? How to protect our fellow citizens from criminals when our militia itself is socially unprotected? How to surmount the imperfections in the legislation many parts of which are simply inoperative?

Most importantly: crime will not be surmounted as long as it is fed by social sources, such as drunkenness, drug addiction, low recreational standards, family troubles, lack of attention to the growing generation, and so on, and so forth. As long as armies of profiteers are roaming among the ruins of the economy, triggering the organization of another army, that of extortionists, and as long as we have interethnic conflicts and unbridled hatred which does not spare anyone, as long as general discipline in the country will remain on the zero level and as long as the state will put a low price to the safety of its citizens we shall not be able to live in peace.

**Ukrainian Youth Association Founded**

91UN0173A Kiev MOLOD UKRAYINY in Russian  
10 Oct 90 p 1

[Article by Vitaliy Portnykov: "Public Meeting of the Internal Soviet Diaspora"]

[Text] They gathered in Moscow—several dozen young people from almost all, even the most distant, regions of the Soviet Union, in order to join together in the Ukrainian Youth Organization [UMA]. However much we might talk about an identical interest in all our countrymen—those in Canada and those in Kazakhstan or Tyumen, declarations are only declarations, while dollars are dollars. Millions of Ukrainians living beyond the borders of the republic cannot do anything to help their motherland. They themselves need help. And, as no wide-scale program has been put into place, they are beginning to take action themselves.

We could spend a long time describing the discussions that took place at the meeting, recounting the details of the projects. Let us just say that UMA organizers hope to focus the attention of international organizations on the problems of the Ukrainian diaspora within the USSR, to have the famous "Rozumovskyi palace" turned into a Ukrainian cultural center, to work for the establishment of Ukrainian educational institutions, to create an UMA-PRESS information agency, and to revive the publication in the capital of the newspaper UKRAYIN-SKAYA ZHYZN [Ukrainian Life]. Among the projects which the association will consider is the "Dzvin" campaign, which is already well-known in the Ukraine.

"We are not trying to be an all-Ukrainian organization," says UMA executive secretary, Volodymyr Martynyuk. "Our organization has no choice but to be based in Moscow: so far in the Ukraine they are not ready to recognize us as a part of the existing people and state organizations show no interest in solving our problems. And Moscow is a handy transportation and information center. In fact, it is easier to talk from here about problems arising in Union republics, for there is no fear of undesirable diplomatic repercussions and we do not encounter the difficulties which, for understandable reasons, Ukrainian organizations experience. One of the most pressing problems is that of Ukrainian refugees. We should be conscious of the fact that we have an obligation to help them."

"Since the passage in the Ukraine of the Declaration of Sovereignty, we Ukrainians in other republics have found ourselves living outside the country, in practice having the same possibilities as Ukrainians in the West. And in our republic this should also be fully realized."

One might think that with this we could end our report about the first public meeting of the UMA. But I would like to give readers a sense of the geographical scope of Ukrainian problems. For that reason, I will give the word to participants of the meeting.

Serhiy Sufostalskyi, executive secretary of the cultural and educational association "Kievan Rus" (Sakhalin oblast), member of the South-Sakhalinsk city council: "We are now beginning the struggle for the establishment of a cultural centre in South-Sakhalinsk, for in our region there are close to 50 thousand Ukrainians. Of course, only about 50 people take part in the activities of the 'Kievan Rus' association, but our work has only just begun. The association has also established a cultural cooperative society 'Ruta.' We are eager to be contacted at the following address: Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk, Apt. 59, 239-a Myr Prospect, Tel. 5-37-79."

"The Murmansk Ukrainian cultural association is already in existence for more than a year," explains Yevhen KARPUSHKIN. "During that time we already published two issues of the newspaper UKRAYINSKE SLOVO [Ukrainian Word]. We have daily meetings, during which we discuss the situation in the Ukraine, sing, read letters from readers, some of whom live outside our borders. We are planning to go to Syeveromorsk, to meet with the crew of the cruiser 'Kiev'."

"Literally on the day I was leaving for Moscow," recounts Lada ZAICHENKO from Dushanbe. "calls began to come to our apartment from people wanting to take part in the activity of the Ukrainian association. Among them were Ukrainians and Russians, Azeris, Tadzhiks. We are trying to organize a library, although this is not easy."

A history student from Ufa, Serhiy KHOMENKO, was born in the Bashkir ASSR; however he speaks his native language quite well. "In March, we held the founding meeting of the 'Kobzar' association," he recounts. "And now we have created a Ukrainian youth association, to which about 30 people belong."

Serhiy KLYMENKO, a Research Fellow at the Institute of Linguistics of the Academy of Sciences of the Kazakh SSR, tells of the establishment of Ukrainian cultural centres in many cities of that republic. "However," he notes, "the Ukrainian language is not included in the republican program of language development. We can only hope for good luck: now, for example, Ukrainian programs are being revived on TV and radio."

"In Nizhniy Novgorod there are close to 18 thousand Ukrainians," says the executive secretary of the Ukrainian cultural association of that city, Viktor HURSKYY. "On September 13 we held our first meeting and the vice-rector of the conservatory, V. Holubnychyy, was chosen president of the association. There are now about 30 active members and we are discussing establishing a Ukrainian hamlet close to Nizhniy Novgorod in future."

As always, Ukrainians from the Baltic region have their own news. In Vilnius, they established 'Plast' as part of the Lithuanian 'Scouts' association; in Riga, a former youth club served as the basis for the creation of a Ukrainian youth association and a 'Ukrainian Family'



organization. Registration of citizens of the Ukrainian People's Republic is taking place there.

Belorussian Ukrainians from the Minsk association are eager to create a republican association and they provide a contact telephone number in that republic's capital: 68-22-97, Bohdan Mykhailiuk.

Of course, one could just disregard this news, dismiss it as applying to only a few dozen people. It is true that there are thousands who do not participate in Ukrainian cultural associations, but these people long to read their own newspapers, to hear their own songs.

Thus, the new organization is beginning to act. We will hope that its fate will be happy, that the Ukraine will turn her face to those of her sons and daughters whose existence does not fit into the framework of the present administrative and territorial divisions. I would be able to cite many more interviews, with people from Yakutia, from Siberia, and from less-distant places like Voronezh and Ivanovo. But the general picture is this: on the one hand, a movement towards awakening, and on the other, a total lack of information or interest on the part of the republic. And many of our fellow-countrymen need significant assistance, not only material, but also moral. Yuriy Almazov, from the Kuban Kozak village of Saratovska, told me with pain that the Kozak movement in that region is becoming chauvinistic. So things are not easy for a Ukrainian association there. Yet, Kuban is an indivisible part of our spiritual heritage. Just like the Russian Sloboda territory. No, no, I am not calling for any change of borders.

I would just like people to be able to feel like people even given the present borders.

#### **Lithuanian Writer Views Jewish Emigration**

91UN0319B Riga SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA in Russian  
24 Oct 90 p 2

[Report on interview with Grigoriy Kanovich, writer and chairman of the Jewish Community in Lithuania; place and date not given: "Why Are Jews Leaving the Soviet Union?"]

[Text] "I am certain that in the Soviet Union and Lithuania Jews can take only one of three paths: return to their historical homeland, where our children and grandchildren are now headed, be assimilated and merge with other national structures, or move in the direction of nonexistence," thinks the writer Grigoriy Kanovich, chairman of the Jewish Community in Lithuania. He granted an interview to the youth newspaper LETUVOS RITAS (MORNING OF LITHUANIA) which was titled "Small Nation—Large Sorrow."

Anti-Semitism is raising its head again in many countries, says Kanovich. The theme of the guilty parties is very attractive. The clearly marked anti-Semitic organization Pamyat in Russia is not the only one. Anti-Semitic attitudes are even flourishing in Poland where

there are practically no Jews any more, and the situation is similar in Hungary and even in Lithuania, where Jews feel more confident. There are people who think that the Jews destroyed Lithuanian statehood, and that there were many of them in the ranks of the CPSU and NKVD [People's Committee for Internal Affairs].

It is this kind of situation that is forcing Jews to abandon the USSR and other Eastern countries. "I am convinced that it was not without reason that Gorbachev opened up the gates out of the Soviet Union for them. He did not need an additional source of tension. The Jews are taking advantage of the opportunity to leave; they feel that Gorbachev will not be able to hold on to his position much longer either," emphasized Kanovich in conclusion.

#### **Turkmen Official on Social Security for Underprivileged in Republic**

91US0066A Ashkhabad TURKMENSKAYA ISKRA  
in Russian 6 Oct 90 p 2

[Interview conducted by A. Kurbanova, Turkmeninform correspondent: "Social Guarantees for the Underprivileged"]

[Text] The main thing which concerns the people today is the socioeconomic consequences of the conversion to market relations. The scarcity on the consumer market is growing, an undeclared price increase is taking place and the living standards of the population are declining. Under these circumstances, the Turkmen government is trying to provide social protection for the poorest population strata.

What specific steps have been taken in this area? This was the question which Turkmeninform asked of T.K. Amangeldyyeva, deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Turkmen SSR.

One of the most pressing problems in the republic, which demands an immediate solution, is that of protecting the family, motherhood and childhood, Tuvakbibi Kuliyeveva said. That is precisely why the recent session of the TSSR Supreme Soviet considered and passed the resolution: "On Urgent Measures To Improve the Situation of Women, the Protection of Motherhood and Childhood and To Strengthen the Family." The resolution stipulates a set of measures to upgrade the social protection of the least prosperous families with children. Under the conditions of a republic budget deficit, realizing the significance of this problem, the government found funds and even increased the amount of payments and aid compared with the Union average. Thus, starting with 1 January 1991, one-time aid for a newborn child will total 300 rubles and state aid for caring for the child until the age of 18 months will be no less than 90 rubles (in the Union resolution the respective figures are 210 and 70).

Salaries will be raised to reach 80 percent of the minimal wage of women for those with less than one year work

seniority and for nonworking women who take care of a child until the age of 18 months. With a view to protecting the health of mothers and the newborn, leave for pregnancy and giving birth is extended by 14 days.

It is necessary to emphasize that managers of enterprises, organizations, kolkhozes and sovkhozes, together with the labor collective councils and the trade union committees, starting with 1 January 1991, using their own funds, will be able to increase the length of paid leave to women for child care until the age of three and providing material and other types of assistance to needy underprivileged families.

Currently the republic's Council of Ministers is seeking funds and material resources for the building of treatment-prophylactic institutions for children and maternity homes, and foreign currency for the purchase of imported medical equipment and pharmaceuticals. The question of additional types of aid to women and children who live in areas of the Turkmen SSR within the Aral zone is being resolved.

In order to supply the necessary products to treatment-prophylactic establishments for children and maternity homes, and for dairy kitchens and Pioneer camps, it was resolved, starting with 1991, to credit such supplies made by kolkhozes and sovkhozes to the implementation of state orders. As of 1 January free nutrition to first-fourth grade students will be introduced in the republic's general education schools.

[Kurbanova] What changes have taken place in the republic's pensions legislation?

[Amangeldyyeva] Starting with 1 January 1991 the ukase of the TSSR Supreme Soviet chairman: "On Additional Steps To Improve Pensions and Social Services to Citizens of the TSSR" will be enacted. Essentially, pensions will be improved with funds contributed by enterprises, kolkhozes and sovkhozes and local budgets.

Thus, pensions to mothers who have given birth to five or more children and who have raised them to the age of eight, will be increased; between the ages of 50 and 55 they will receive the full amount of old-age pensions, regardless of job. A supplement of 35 rubles will be added to the old-age pensions of mothers, who have given birth and raised 10 or more children, who live on the republic's territory.

Some category workers will be able to retire before the universally accepted retirement age. Thus, men employed for the full season in the growing and harvesting of cotton for 25 years can retire at the age of 55; rug makers and felt milliners who have worked 20 years, one-half of which in said professions, will be able to retire at the age of 50. Urban passenger transportation drivers will be able to retire five years earlier: men with a total work seniority of 25 years and women with an overall work seniority of 20 years, no less than 10 years of which was spent in intraurban transportation.

In computing the pensions and other assistance to residents of the republic engaged in the raising of silkworms the actual earnings for this type of work will be taken into consideration.

The minimal pension in the case of an incomplete work seniority will be 60 rubles monthly. Let us point out that the national average is 35 rubles.

Starting with 1 January 1991, individual pensions on the republic or local levels will be given to disabled military-internationalists who have earned state awards and to mothers of dead soldiers-internationalists.

[Kurbanova] What other measures are stipulated by the government to improve the social status of invalids and veterans of the Great Patriotic War and soldiers-internationalists?

[Amangeldyyeva] Starting with 17 September of this year, a ukase on additional benefits to invalids, veterans of the Great Patriotic War and soldiers-internationalists and the families of killed military servicemen has become effective; many of them are interested in the question of being granted private ownership of governmental and departmental homes and apartments in which they currently live. The implementation of this stipulation of the ukase has been assigned to the executive committees of the local soviets of people's deputies which have set up special commissions to evaluate the housing and to which those who would like such a transfer should address themselves. The apartment or home which has been transferred as personal ownership is, naturally, to be repaired by the owners. This prerequisite, naturally, is holding back many disabled and veterans of the Great Patriotic War whose age or health do not permit them to maintain such a house through their own efforts. On their request, they are released from paying rent.

Veterans of the Great Patriotic War and soldiers-internationalists have been granted benefits in the payment of communal services which so far have been extended only to war invalids. The executive committees of the local soviets of people's deputies already have some experience in solving this problem.

The one-time financial aid, as stipulated by the ukase, is provided by the social security authorities at the place of residence of the families of deceased soldiers-internationalists and disabled soldiers-internationalists.

In accordance with the stipulations of items four and five of the ukase, a special resolution will be drafted by the TSSR Council of Ministers. All computations and, if necessary, recomputations must take place starting with 17 September 1990.

The executive committees of the local soviets of people's deputies must find funds and, together with the TSSR Ministry of Communications, ensure by 1993 the installation of telephones in the premises of veterans of the

Great Patriotic War, soldiers-internationalists and families of died military personnel registered before 1 January 1990.

The executive committees of oblast, city and rayon soviets of people's deputies must secure all available means for providing by 1993 housing to war veterans and individuals of equal status registered before 1 January 1991 and to war invalids and families of deceased military personnel in 1991.

These ukases and the resolution are only part of the major social program implemented in the republic in defending the rights and granting benefits to underprivileged population strata.

### Incipient Clerical Parties in USSR

91UN0144A Moscow PARTIYNAYA ZHIZN  
in Russian No 17, Sep 90 pp 68-72

[Response to Readers' Questions by V.A. Alekseyev, candidate of history: "Clericalism. Does It Exist in the USSR?"]

[Excerpts] In recent times, we have begun to encounter letters with such questions in the editorial mail. The author of one of them, V. Yesaulkov from Krasnodar asks: "Did clerical parties exist in Russia? What was their fate, their attitude to the October [Revolution]? Is there a probability of their appearance in the present-day political arena?" A.Ye. Grachev of Novgorod, in his letter, already asserts that "...the birth of clericalism has become a fact in the Soviet Union. These forces have loudly proclaimed the creation of their parties. But it is not clear what attitude the churches operating officially in the USSR have to all of this."

The editors asked V.A. Alekseyev, candidate of history, to answer the questions of readers.

Various dictionaries define the concept of clericalism as follows: "A socio-political current which demands an increased role of the church in the political and spiritual life of society. Trying to expand their influence among the masses, to lead them away to religious-idealist ideological positions, and to divert from the revolutionary and national liberation struggle, the clericals create various different national and international parties, organizations, and associations. Such parties exist in many countries of the world. For example, in Italy there exists the Christian Democratic Party, 'Komeito'—in Japan, etc. Clericalism frequently is closely allied with anticommunism...."

Of course, these definitions contain quite a lot of dogmatism, ideological confrontation, and the non-acceptance of other points of view. What is more, the compilers of the dictionary based themselves only on the analysis of the activity of foreign clericals, almost completely ignoring our domestic historical practice. [passages omitted]

From the beginning of perestroika after April 1985, democratic processes and political pluralism began to develop and a multiparty system began to take shape. The role of the church in society has also changed. It is becoming an appreciable factor of the national consciousness of the people and an important element of the spiritual rebirth of society.

All of this was conducive to the fact that Christian-Democratic parties, allies, and movements began to form actively. In talking about the character of this common and at the same time rather contradictory public religious-political current, one of the leaders of the Moscow Christian-Democratic Alliance, V. Rott, assesses its goals, special features, and moving forces as follows. We are talking not about a religious Christian organization, but about a political association of Christians.... Since Christians live in a complex world, among the representatives of many other religions, it is necessary for them to unite. To protect and promote the development of their way of life, to represent the interests of Christians—in this lies the task of our party.

Christian socialism is close to Marxism, since in precisely the same way it comes out in favor of the socialization of property as the condition of the achievement of social justice, seeing as their ideal the first Christian communes.... We advocate the complete equality of all forms of property.

For a dialogue with the communists, I do not see the proper conditions for the time being. Let us compare: A 19-million strong corporation with enormous incomes, invested with power, controlling two-thirds of the mass media, and next to it our semi-underground group, which meets in apartments and publishes a small paper in a miserable edition.

...What points of contact can we have? Above all, a discussion of the path to a market economy and social assistance to the weak. At present we are going through the period that is called clique-formation and which only indicates that we are at the beginning of the road.... We can overcome clique-formation, the claims and ambitions of group leaders, [but] only having united around the deputy corps which will defend the interests of Christians.

One of the figures around which this association is proposed is V. Aksyuchits—a member of the Duma of the Russian Christian Democratic Movement, a RSFSR people's deputy from the territorial election district of Moscow. It should be underscored that the positions of this movement, and more precisely, parties, in all their similarity, are somewhat different than among the Moscow Social-Democratic Alliance: The sharp rejection of communist ideology, rejection of the right of the CPSU to lead society, orientation toward free enterprise, private capital without restrictions, etc. A declaration to this effect was made by Aksyuchits on behalf of the leadership of the Russian Christian-Democratic Movement at the First Congress of RSFSR People's Deputies.



People can ask me why I, a Christian, am so fundamentally against communism? Among everything else, I must say that communism is the most radical anti-Christian doctrine and anti-Christian force in all of world history. The unprecedented destructions and demolitions which communism has brought were directed not only against all of society.... From all this follows the necessity to fundamentally and consistently repudiate communist ideology. And only this will open the path to reforms.

...Above all, all the laws we adopt will have an effect only when the complete deideologization of the state, culture, and the economy will be carried out... In so doing, we must remember that private property in all times, and in our time as well, is the guarantor of the civil, economic, and political freedoms of man. I support the draft laws of the privatization of the economy...

The Russian Christian-Democratic movement strives to secure the support of the most diverse political forces occupying anticommunist positions both within the country and abroad. Thus, the bishop of the Russian Church Abroad Vasiliy (Rodzyanko), the grandson of the famous figure of the State Duma and the Provisional Government was the honored guest of the founding congress of this party on 8 April of this year in Moscow.

Anticommunist sentiments are characteristic also for the representatives of other religious circles and organizations of the Christian current. Let us say, this is increasingly the position toward which G. Yakunin, the leader of the movement "The Church and Perestroyka," the Orthodox priest from the city of Shchelkovo of Moscow Oblast, is moving, who came out with a special declaration at the session of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet, being a member of this organ, on the occasion of B.N. Yeltsin's withdrawal from the CPSU: "...I congratulate you on a step of great civic courage, the withdrawal from the CPSU....May God bless you, and give you strength in your laborious work!"

Still more open anticommunist statements were made by G. Yakunin during a recent meeting-demonstration in Moscow on 15 July, which was organized by the Democratic Russia bloc, the Moscow Popular Front, and others. Other members of this, up to now not numerous, religious-political association "The Church and Perestroyka," which has a tendency to develop in the direction of a clerical-type party, occupy positions close to Yakunin.

What attitude does the leadership of the Russian Orthodox Church take to these parties and movements? Both the Synod and the higher hierarchies have declared more than once that they are guided in their activity of directing the church exclusively by the principle of the separation of church and state. The church is outside of politics—this principle remains the most correct for the leadership of the Russian Orthodox Church even today. For this reason, both the patriarch and the Synod do not intend to give their blessing to the broad participation of

clerics in the activity of any sort of party, including the Christian-Democratic trend.

In connection with this, it is appropriate to cite the statement of a member of the Holy Synod, the archbishop of Smolensk and Kaliningrad Kirill (Gundyayev), which he made in June 1990 during the work of the "roundtable" in the Council for Religious Affairs at the USSR Council of Ministers, where, having noted the rapid growth of various Christian-Democratic movements in the country, he emphasized that the Synod made a very important declaration apropos of this on 3 April of this year, which he compared with the declaration of 1927 by Patriarch Sergii. In the declaration it is noted that the church has had a traditional approach to questions of political struggle: The Russian Orthodox Church has never identified itself with one political party or political program. One of the most important tasks of the church consists in testifying to the truth, to be the voice of divine revelation, and to search for aspects of truth in society. In defending the right to its prophetic voice, the church must stand firmly on the principles of the separation of church and state. In so doing, it can assess the state of the political development of social movements from a moral point of view, but it can use only its own dogma as criteria for this assessment. Although, of course, every citizen—be he a believer or a non-believer—has the right to belong to the party which is close to him, Kirill observed. However, in taking part in the work of parties, he does not have the right to talk on behalf of the church, but merely to state something only on his own behalf or on behalf of his voters or collective.

As far as the Christian-Democratic or other party is concerned, in the name of which some confessional or religious definition are introduced. Regardless of what they are called, these are first of all political organizations, they pursue concrete political goals. Otherwise they are not political parties. These political tasks and aims cannot be the goals of the church because the Russian Orthodox Church cannot have them. In order to demonstrate that this is not simply phraseology but the position of the church leadership and the Russian Orthodox Church in general, the archbishop cited another declaration of the Synod, which emanates from the context of the resolution of the recent Synod of Bishops [Arkhieyreyskiy Sobor] on the participation of the Orthodox clergy in the elections to people's deputies.

In the elections to USSR people's deputies, as is well known, Archbishop Kirill declared, several persons from among the clergy and the episcopate were elected as USSR people's deputy. After long meditations we took this step. But when the elections to the republic and local Soviets began, members of the clergy were very actively nominated in many places as candidates for deputy. I, for example, was nominated by the collective of the Smolensk Aviation Plant. And then we began to analyze: And what can happen further? And we understood that the people is disillusioned with the existing socioeconomic reality and people will against their will search



for some alternative. Even in outward appearance the church is in a position to appear to them as the kind of an alternative that can help them in their search for a better life.

In this situation, we could have a very large number of deputies. The Synod modeled a situation where there would be not one, two or ten, but very many representatives of the church. In this case, whether they want this or not, the priest-deputies will be compelled to form blocs, and blocs are already the expression of party interests. And then the church may even against its will be drawn into politics. But this contradicts its essence. And the Synod adopted the, in my view, wise decision that the church, in this fateful time, cannot completely keep away from participation in the elective organs of power, even if only because laws needed by believers are adopted there and there must be representatives of the church. Secondly, very often the elective organs of power want to know the official point of view of the church, and they must include representatives who could represent this point of view. And then a decision was adopted that in every republic parliament there would be a necessary minimum of church representatives. The same in regard to representation in the local organs of power.

The Synod decided that archbishops, before joining an election campaign, must obtain consent from it, and priests—consent from their ruling archbishop. But, as is well known, a large number of clerics of the Russian Church became candidates in spite of this decision. (Including the priest G. Yakunin.—V. A.). Moreover, the Synod was very severely criticized by a large number of radically-inclined priests. They attributed dishonest intentions to the Synod, [asserting] that it wanted to prevent some people from becoming deputies. Actually, this decision was aimed against anyone personally, but it was adopted only in order to regulate this process and to prevent the creation of a clerical party.

In short, the position of the Russian Orthodox Church is clear. But what about the other concessions [as published]? Let us say, how do the followers of Islam regard the facts of the creation of clerical parties? Here is the opinion of R. I. Gaynutdinov, the imam of the Moscow Mosque. Among certain strata of the Muslims there is an inclination to create an Islamic "party of revival." Recently, for example, a report was received to the effect that a founding congress of "an Islamic party" took place in Astrakhan. But this is a party which the fundamentalists want to create, who do not fully accept the priests who are registered in the organs of power and who do not recognize the officially operating religious organizations.

They accuse the believers and the priests of these communities of cooperation with the state organs of power, trying to attain the creation of an independent Muslim state on the territory of Central Asia and the Northern Caucasus. It was these forces which not long ago tried to hold a founding congress of their party in the city of Astrakhan.

But why did they select for this a city in the territory of the Spiritual Administration of the Muslims in the European part of the USSR and Siberia? You see, these people are from Central Asia, from the Birlik Society, and the founding congress of the party would have to be there or in the Northern Caucasus, where they also have followers. I had a number of discussions and meetings with some followers of this party from the "Moscow Group." They want for us not to stand for registration in the state organs, to come over to this party, etc. Thus, they set quite a few conditions that are unacceptable for us. Our Spiritual Administration does not have any need for this party. We at last received the opportunity of developing freely, after an interval of 42 years we held our own congress of Muslims of the European part of the USSR and Siberia in Ufa, at which we set forth the paths of the further development of Muslim communities in present-day conditions.

The representatives of other officially operating churches and religious organizations express themselves approximately in the same spirit in regard to the clericalism that is coming into being in our country. Their positions are clear—to act only within the framework of legality, on the principles of the separation of church and state. As a rule, it is religious organizations which have difficult, at times conflictual relations with the authorities, that are interested in the creation of clerical parties, currents, and cooperation with them, organizations such as the "autocephalists", the Uniates of the Ukraine, the "fundamentalists" in Central Asia, etc. Recently nationalistic and chauvinistic currents and separatists have increasingly more persistently been striking roots in this alliance. And all together they try to ignite anticomunist sentiments, demanding the abolition of the CPSU, changes in the USSR Constitution, and the very socialist order in the USSR.

As we see, the world of religious relations is not identical. And the party committees and party organizations should know this very well. This knowledge has importance significance for their activity in regard to the further development of the restructuring processes, the democratization of society, and its spiritual renewal.

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**DATE FILMED**

*11 January 1991*